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Note for contributors

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

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Editorial

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)—a great turn-out!

On 1 June the world was presented with 'a new reality'—Bishop Abel Muzorewa stepping into Ian Smith's shoes.

Fifteen years ago, on 11 November 1965, Ian Smith announced that Britain's jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia was 'unwarrantable'. He claimed sovereign independent status and proclaimed his determination to preserve the 'precepts on which civilisation in a primitive country has been built'. The British Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson, said in the House of Commons, the same day, that Smith's declaration was 'an act of rebellion against the Crown and against the Constitution as by law established. Action taken to give effect to it will be treasonable'. Sir Harold added that Smith was inspired by 'unreasoning racialist emotions'.

A week later the UN Security Council called upon all states to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from any action 'which would assist and encourage the illegal regime'. The Security Council also called upon Britain to 'quell this rebellion of the racist minority'. Finally, on 9 April 1966 the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter were invoked and mandatory sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia.

And that is where the matter rests. There has been no change in Britain's official position towards the illegal Smith government. Nor have the governments which endorsed the Security Council resolutions renounced their international obligations. That mandatory sanctions were grossly and persistently violated by multinational companies, with the knowledge of or in collusion with government officials, does not affect the legal and constitutional requirements which have continued to govern the dealings of governments with the Salisbury regime. The internal settlement worked out by Ian Smith and the April elections were actions intended to give effect to the 1965 rebellion, hence treasonable. A communique issued by the front-line states in the first week of June appropriately recalled that 'Rhodesia remains a British colony under an illegal, racist minority and rebel regime'.

Yet, we are asked to believe that both rebellion and treason have evaporated, the situation in Rhodesia having undergone a qualitative change because of an 'impressively large' turn-out of voters — 64·45 per cent to be exact. In some provinces the figure was even more impressive; for example, Mashonaland East

91·5 per cent, Mashonaland Central 93·4 per cent, while Mashonaland West produced a staggering 114·8 per cent! How were these figures worked out when there has been no census? The estimates of the electorate vary between 2·9 million to 3·8 million. There were no electoral rolls, and anyone above the age of 18 was free to vote in any province. A large number of mobile polling booths were provided to collect the votes. There were no means of checking how often one voted. Neither age nor identity was verified. Most of the country was under Martial Law and thousands of black citizens were under detention. Every white had two votes while blacks had only one vote. This was the 'carnival atmosphere' of elections which so impressed Lord Boyd and his four colleagues that they declared the election fair 'in the sense that the electoral machinery was fairly conducted and above serious reproach'. They arrived at this judgment after applying 'the strictest Western European criteria'.

Lord Boyd's team of observers deputed by the Conservative Party arrived in Salisbury on 13 April. Two of the members left Rhodesia a day before the votes were counted. The remaining three stayed on until 29 April, and during these 16 days travelled over 2,000 miles, visited 66 polling stations and two prisons, and 'talked with countless individuals including members of all the services, all branches of the civil service, prisoners, detainees, clergy and private people, both in the towns and in the countryside'. During these travels Lord Boyd tells us, 'We also used our eyes and our cameras'. What they saw and photographed prompted them to go beyond their terms of reference and to interpret the election as an endorsement of a constitution which ensured the domination of the whites.

The Parliamentary Human Rights Group in the House of Commons, too, invited Lord Chitnis to assess, among other things, the political content and atmosphere of the election campaign. Lord Chitnis also travelled extensively and met a number of officials and non-officials, attended political meetings and rallies, and observed voting at some 17 polling stations in a wide variety of localities. His finding was that 'the recent election in Rhodesia was nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick to foist on a cowed and indoctrinated black electorate a settlement and a constitution which were formulated without its consent and which are being implemented without its approval'.

The western media have adopted a predictable position. Truth must lie somewhere between Lord Boyd and Lord Chitnis. The Rhodesian election should be accepted as 'relatively free and fair'. Relative to what? Not to the universally recognised democratic requirements but to the prevailing environment in Africa. After all Smith had managed to stage an election. How many other African countries had done that?

All this is intended to prepare public opinion in Britain to accept the need for the recognition of Bishop Muzorewa's government, and the official lifting of sanctions. Not in one go—but step by step, moving cautiously and deftly, towards a 'creeping recognition'. And sanctions do not have to be formally lifted — they can now be allowed to be defied openly.

For Britain the test will come at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka in August. Andrew Young, the US Ambassador to the UN

does not see why the US should invite trouble from the rest of Africa by unilaterally lifting sanctions. The six African states — Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana — have warned Britain that recognition would 'seriously jeopardise' her relations with African countries. Nigeria has gone on record that recognition would be taken as 'wanton disregard for African opinion' and will call for 'an appropriate response'.

Lusaka should provide Mrs Margaret Thatcher with an opportunity to make a realistic assessment of African opinion on the subject. Admittedly, Britain has strong financial stakes in Rhodesia, but short term gains are not always compatible with long term interests. This is the one lesson the West should have learnt in Iran.

UNCTAD V, VI . . .

Will there be another UNCTAD? All hell did not break loose in Manila as Gamini Corea had feared (see North-South Dialogue) but it did show that North-South negotiations were becoming a charade. Nothing of substance emerged from the month long conclave. The rich stonewalled every move by the poor. While a detailed assessment of UNCTAD V must await an evaluation of the resolutions which were finally approved, it is clear that the Third World delegates left the Conference weary, depressed and annoyed. They wanted some discussion in depth about the restructuring of the present monetary system. That was denied. There was some hope that the Common Fund negotiations might make some progress. That was not to be. On protectionism there was much rhetoric but little result. The World Bank President, Mr McNamara went through the familiar routine of providing an impressive set of statistics, frankly acknowledging Third World objections to the results of the Tokyo Round, forcefully condemning the protectionist tendencies of the industrialised countries and concluding with a word of suitably qualified friendly advice to the developing countries to protect 'their interests by ultimately becoming signatories to the agreements' under GATT. What will the developing countries get out of it? According to Mr McNamara 'representation on the committees charged with the implementation of the individual codes'.

UNCTAD V did not produce any agreement on substantive issues. The analysis of economic problems offered by the South was rejected by the north. The industrialised countries maintained that the world economic crisis was a cyclical phenomenon and not the result of any structural imbalance. But the Third World was able to demonstrate in Manila its democratic strength within the UN system. Issues were taken to the plenary level where majority opinion was placed on record. That has been a gain. The North cannot opt out of the UN system without doing itself great damage. And within the system it cannot indefinitely evade or stall the people's demand for economic justice. It may be possible to divide, manipulate and pressurise governments and their delegates. But the people of the Third World will not be fooled — not forever.

North–South Dialogue

A regular feature intended to provide eminent statesmen and scholars involved in North-South issues with an opportunity to express their views.

GAMINI COREA

Secretary-General of UNCTAD

Gamini Corea was born in Colombo and completed his education at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge and Nuffield College, Oxford. He has held a succession of senior appointments in the Government of Sri Lanka: Secretary of the National Planning Council, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and Ambassador of Sri Lanka to the EEC and Benelux countries. He was Chairman of the UN Committee on Development Planning from 1972 to 1974. He became Secretary-General of UNCTAD in 1974.

A member of the Board of Governors of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, the Third World Forum, the Marga Institute and the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, he has been Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex and Nuffield College, Oxford.

Altaf Gauhar, Editor of Third World Quarterly, *interviewed Corea in April 1978.*

AG: What is your appreciation of the present state of negotiations in UNCTAD? You got a certain resolution in Nairobi in 1976. What has happened since?

COREA: I think we should get over the general questions first before coming to specific matters. It would certainly be correct to say that since Nairobi UNCTAD as an organisation has been very much involved in the implementation of the various decisions taken, particularly in the vast negotiating process that was launched by that conference. This has been quite unprecedented in the annals of UNCTAD and it has resulted in a notable increase in our work. Three years ago it was usual for UNCTAD to have about 44 weeks of meetings a year. This year, it is going to be 108 weeks of meetings. The greater part of this increase in activity in terms of meetings has been occasioned by the commodity programme and the resolution on the Integrated Programme for Commodities and the setting up of the Common Fund. Here, we did receive from Nairobi a mandate to implement an overall commodity programme which was much more wide ranging in scope and more extensive than anything that had been undertaken before. The Integrated Programme aimed at regulating and strengthening markets by

bringing under the aegis of international agreements as many products from Third World countries as possible. This was to have been done not in an isolated ad hoc fashion but as part of a single interlinked exercise. So we have been trying to get this programme implemented, first by getting agreements on individual products and at the same time by setting up the new institution that forms part of the Integrated Programme, namely the Common Fund.

As for results, let me say this. Right at this moment we have not yet established the Common Fund, nor have we seen any really new commodity agreements other than on sugar. Having said that, I think one also ought to underline the nature of the task that we are performing. We cannot expect to concentrate into two years what in the past took one or more decades to realise. What has happened in the period since Nairobi? First, I believe, that there is now for the first time an international acceptance of the concept of commodity agreements. Many of the developed countries – I might even say virtually all the developed countries – including particularly the US, now endorse the concept of international arrangements to regulate commodity markets. In the past, the US and other developed countries were not prone to take this view. They acquiesced in commodity arrangements more as an exception than a norm, and they preferred to give a free hand to the workings of the free market.

In the present situation, I think there has been a discernible change in attitude and the new US policy has been proclaimed at various levels. This includes the President and the Secretary of State themselves. It has been said that the US is now committed to a policy of stabilising commodity markets through international commodity agreements, that it would join the agreements that have already been negotiated but of which it was not a member – as in the case of cocoa and tin – and that it would participate in new agreements. It has also been pointed out that this new policy of theirs is not simply a response to North-South issues, but that it is something which they see as being in the interest of the US economy and as another instrument for combating inflation and recession. In other words, the US is making an effort to convince public opinion in that country about the validity of this approach in terms of the interests of the US itself. I think that this is a new development, a major development in view of its potential importance. It creates an atmosphere in which one can strive for commodity agreements, an atmosphere which did not exist before. That certainly is a plus and I would say this attitude is also reflected by the other OECD countries, although to varying extents. France has for long been in favour of the organisation of markets, while Germany has shown a certain hesitation in accepting the concept. But in one way or another all countries are now committed to the idea and I think this is a major move forward.

My second observation concerns the Common Fund negotiations. We have always felt that the establishment of the Common Fund was of vital importance to the Integrated Programme. The developing countries have seen the Common Fund as one of the major initiatives in the entire North-South dialogue, as part of the establishment of new international economic relations. So the Common Fund concept has a significance which goes beyond the purely technical or financial one. It is seen as an instrument that would play a part in the drive to get a better relationship in the field of commodity trade. We had two negotiating conferences on the Common Fund but the last meeting, unfortunately, was suspended without results. There was a deadlock on two issues. First, whether or not the Common Fund should confine itself to the financing of buffer stocks or whether it should have a second window to finance measures in the field of commodities other than buffer stocks. The second intractable issue related to the financial structure of the Fund – as to whether it should be a Fund which was only a depositary of monies collected independently by individual commodity agreements, or whether it should also serve as a source of finance for such commodity agreements.

After the suspension, I was asked to reconvene the conference as early as possible but not until there was a satisfactory basis for a reasonable prospect of success. Since December 1977, I have been consulting with governments of both developed and developing countries through visits to capitals and through discussions here in Geneva with a view to assessing whether a reasonable basis could in fact be established. I must say, although I don't wish to minimise the differences that exist or to give the impression that the differences have been resolved, that I do feel encouraged that there seems to be on all sides a desire to reach a solution. I have the feeling that the developed countries have committed themselves to the idea of establishing a Common Fund and are willing to work towards this end. I also feel that with regard to the two issues outlined earlier, some movement is possible and that in the course of the consultations which I have been having – and those I intend to have – the building blocks of a viable, acceptable Common Fund are gradually beginning to emerge.

As I said, I don't want to sound overly optimistic but I do feel that there is movement and that the process is under way. What I would like to see now is an approach which takes the best elements of the proposals that have been made and puts them together to ensure that a successful Common Fund is set up. Of course, we have to await developments. But it is my hope to convene the Common Fund meeting as early as possible. I do not wish the conference on the Common Fund to be delayed too long, partly because I am anxious to keep up the momentum but also because if we get too late into the year we would be getting meshed in too much with the preparations for UNCTAD V.

I would like to see the Common Fund issue behind me and to have the back of the problem broken before we go to UNCTAD V. The international community could then go to UNCTAD V with some record of achievement. I should also say that in regard to individual commodities, although so far we have had only the sugar agreement, the discussions we have been having on other products have resulted in a new situation where the possibilities for arrangements are being looked at. I have myself stressed that in this field progress has been too slow; that the general commitment to commodity stabilisation which is expressed at high policy levels in developed countries, is not really translated into action when it comes to the actual technical exercises. I have urged that this process be speeded up.

It now seems that there is a prospect of a commodity agreement on rubber. A firm decision has been taken to call a negotiation conference. The possibilities for actual agreements are also now being quite intensively looked at in the case of tea, jute and possibly copper, which is certainly an important commodity. We have also been continuing to work on other products, such as vegetable oils, hard fibres, cotton, tropical timbers and so on. Things are moving and one can only hope that they will gain momentum and that in the months to come the focus will be sharper than at present on reaching actual agreements.

AG: In talking about the Common Fund you have used two words, viable and successful. Both these words are very close to the developed world's concept of a Common Fund. Is the Common Fund you have in mind the same you had in mind in Nairobi, or is it now beginning to look different?

COREA: Let me say that, in my view, the Common Fund concept which the developing countries have themselves proposed is meant to be viable and successful. It is not that the proposals made on that side were in any way unrealistic. But the initial concept did not spell out at any length the details of the Common Fund. It estimated a total financing requirement for buffer stocks and it spoke of an institution which would provide such finance to individual commodity agreements for such stocks. It also envisaged an institution in which the developing countries will have a decisive voice, one which would not be patterned after the Bretton Woods institutions and their voting and decision-making system. The Common Fund would be a source of finance with resources of its own to offer to individual commodity agreements. It was seen as a catalyst rather than as a passive body. The developed countries, on the other hand, made a proposal for a Common Fund which would have considerably reduced, if not altogether eliminated, its role as a catalytic agent. It would have been a Fund solely dependent on funds raised through individual agreements. I think that, in the discussions that are now evolving, we are coming close to the idea of a Fund which would have resources of its own but would also receive

some deposits from individual commodity agreements. Now there was nothing in the proposals made at Nairobi, which would have prevented an individual commodity agreement from raising money of its own or from depositing it with the Common Fund. But the original concept did not visualise a Common Fund that was exclusively based on this footing. I don't think there is going to be a Common Fund which is just a reflection of the developed countries' concept. I imagine that eventually you will get a Common Fund which would have resources of its own and which would not be a passive institution but which would have an active role to play, a Fund that will get out into the market to harness resources, a Fund that will mobilise money through borrowings to finance buffer stocks, *et cetera*.

AG: I will take up the operational problem of the Common Fund later, but first the conceptual problem and why I thought 'viable' and 'successful' were somewhat diluted words as compared to how you had described the Common Fund in Nairobi when you presented the concept. You wanted to get away from this entire business of treating individual commodities on a case-to-case basis, concentrating attention on the commercial aspects of the Fund. In order to get away from that, therefore, you got this catalyst idea. Now as you talked to me, you first suggested an agreement on individual commodities. Am I right, therefore, in detecting a certain reversal in the concept? It cannot become a catalyst of any kind whether the deposits are larger than the commodity agreements' yield to the Fund, because it now becomes subservient to the conclusion of agreements on individual commodities and, in its operation, a large number of difficulties can arise.

COREA: I don't see any reversal. My use of the word 'viable' reflects a concept which we had from the very beginning, namely that this whole operation of financing buffer stocks was a self-financing operation which could be conducted on commercial lines. We feel that the process of buying and selling stocks would enable the Fund to borrow money and, from the very start, we saw the Fund receiving something like two-thirds of its requirements from the money markets, primarily on commercial terms. The original idea was a Fund which would start with $3 billion going up to $6 billion eventually. Out of the $3 billion, two would have been borrowed and one would have been raised through subscription. When I talked about the Fund being 'viable', what I meant was a Fund which will be able to borrow successfully in the market and, by virtue of that, offer resources to individual commodity agreements. I think that the Fund which might come about would be an effective borrower and the borrowed monies could come from not only the capital markets of the West but also the OPEC countries. We were very anxious to create a Fund which could offer a sound outlet to the OPEC countries for the investment of their financial resources. I think that this kind of Fund can still be structured.

AG: But you don't see my point. I find that there has been a reversal of the position. What attracted me in the Nairobi concept, both in terms of the package that was presented, the manner in which it was structured and the priorities it envisaged, all seem to have really been spun over, and you now have your back to a position where you are being told to negotiate the individual agreements, to be told later how much will come from direct contributions and what the individual agreements will generate. Do you see any inconsistency there?

COREA: The Nairobi resolution envisaged that we conduct negotiations for the Common Fund *pari passu* with commodity negotiations. Nobody wanted to delay commodity discussions till after the Common Fund was set up. But I referred earlier to the slow progress of individual commodity negotiations. I think that there is an interaction between this phenomenon and the failure to set up the Common Fund up to now. I think that once the Common Fund is set up you will have a very different situation in which individual commodity negotiations will progress more rapidly. This is because the Common Fund can offer to finance the stocking needs of such agreements – assuming, of course, that there is agreement on a minimum or maximum price and the size of the stock. Thus I think the Common Fund can still play a catalytic role. The very fact that we have not had many individual commodity agreements stresses the need for the Common Fund to be set up early as an institution which can offer to provide finance and thus help bring about agreements. I think that what is not likely to emerge is a Fund which is a pot of money put together in advance and independently of everything. The problem is that when you come to harness the money, you have got to find the security you can offer which, in this case, are the commodity stocks and the guarantees of governments who are entering into commodity agreements. You need the commodity agreements to have stocks to offer as collateral. Once you really get into the mechanics of financing the Fund, you cannot get too far away from this link between the Common Fund and the individual commodity agreements. But all this does not mean that individual agreements must precede the Fund. On the contrary, it is the existence of the Fund that will give an impetus to reaching agreements.

AG: Talking of 'harnessing of funds', one of the Nairobi papers quoted you from one of your speeches where you said that in fact twenty-six countries, including one developed country, had pledged support and that twenty-three of these pledges were without qualification. Now the impression one got was that at that time, to use your words, these countries demonstrated their capacity to pledge financial support. What exactly happened to all these pledges and where did they disappear?

COREA: At the time of Nairobi the basis on which countries would contribute to the Common Fund had not been set out. Many countries, mostly

the developing ones, in order to demonstrate their political support for the Common Fund and their willingness to put their own efforts and resources into it, made specific pledges which were independent of any criteria on assessments and which were often in excess of what these countries would have been called upon eventually to contribute. This was a gesture of support for the idea of a Common Fund. Norway, and subsequently the Netherlands, also made a commitment. From the Nairobi commitments we have pledges of over 200 million dollars of voluntary funds for the Common Fund. In addition to that, the OPEC Special Fund has taken a decision to contribute voluntarily to the Common Fund.

These pledges should be seen as being available to feed, after offsetting assessed contributions, what I would call the voluntary component of the Common Fund. As I see it, the Fund will derive its resources from four channels: direct subscriptions from governments based on criteria of assessments; from voluntary contributions over and above the subscriptions; from deposits that the commodity agreements may wish to make – although in current thinking these deposits will be only a relatively small part of the total needs of financing buffer stocks – and finally from borrowing in the market. You have asked what has happened to these voluntary contributions. I hope that they are still there. You see, once the Common Fund is finally established, the governments will make their contributions available and strengthen the cash basis of the Fund.

AG: You don't think that in Nairobi there was a possibility of taking concrete steps to establish the Common Fund with the help of voluntary contributions and proceeding from that point on?

COREA: This would not have had the support of the bigger developed countries.

AG: Whose support in particular?

COREA: All. The US, Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Australia.

AG: But they didn't oppose it in principle, so the door could have been kept open for them?

COREA: No, I think that if one had put it to vote at the time, before its modalities had been negotiated, most of the developed countries would have abstained or gone against it. That option of voting is always available for the developing countries.

AG: Would you be exercising that option now when according to you there is a change in the attitude of the OECD countries, and a distinct change in the American attitude? I take it that this has something to do with the Carter Administration and it may also be due to the fact that there has been a collapse of the ministerial meeting or, at least, its suspension.

COREA: What we are hoping for is that at the next conference we would have a basis on which a policy decision to establish the Common Fund could be taken. Mind you, everyone is committed in principle to the establishment of the Common Fund. Once the basic elements are established,

the Common Fund can be set up. But whatever the outcome, the developing countries are too committed to the idea of a Common Fund to accept an adverse result. I think that they are committed in one way or another to pursue it in the councils of the Nonaligned Movement. There is already the decision that should this Common Fund fail, the developing countries should establish their own Common Fund. They have not presented it as a preferred course, because they prefer an international agreement, but they have clearly committed themselves to that alternative.

AG: You have referred to this in one of your speeches, the Dakar and Colombo thing as a unilateral action which is not the preferred course. Don't you find that what the bigger countries did in Nairobi was also unilateral? They prevented the setting up of the Fund which, in principle, they had accepted and for which there was very considerable support.

COREA: At Nairobi they did not accept the principle. That came subsequently, after May 1977, and was announced at the Paris Conference. At Nairobi what they did agree to was the Integrated Programme and the schedule of negotiations, including negotiations on the Common Fund. But many of them expressed reservations, saying that merely by agreeing to the idea of negotiations, they were not committing themselves even in principle to the Common Fund. So, in Nairobi one could have voted a decision, but I think the intention of all parties was to have a cooperative arrangement and not to cease trying till all the avenues had been exhausted. This thinking continues.

AG: Am I correct in understanding that you consider the atmosphere propitious now? If some of the major developed countries were still unwilling to concede the kind of Common Fund that you have in mind and dragged their feet, is it not then time for the developing countries to act in pursuance of the pledges made in Nairobi and later? Do you think the time is now right for them to take this decision which would not be unilateral? I mean, it is your child and you have to own it. It is not any Common Fund but what has come to be called the Corea Plan.

COREA: One has to work out ways and means by which a Common Fund could be set up which succeeds in capturing the resources needed to make it effective, otherwise it is just an idea with no capability and I think that as one gets into the mechanics of the Common Fund, into more and more details, into its structure, one encounters constraints. How do you set up a Common Fund which succeeds in mobilising the resources? You have stocking needs for the eighteen commodities in our list of $6 billion. We cannot hope to get $6 billion by voluntary contributions. We have to structure a Common Fund which could successfully go into the market and borrow the bulk of what is needed. In order to borrow the bulk, the Common Fund will have to offer security. How

does it offer security except the security of its stocks and the guarantees of governments? So, the more one gets into the basic financial question, the more one has to adapt the idea of the Fund to the key question: how to get the money? My major constraint is how – that is why I use the word 'viable' – to establish a Fund which would successfully mobilise the resources needed for it.

Now, if this thing breaks down for political reasons – I don't think it will break down for technical reasons – it will be because certain governments have not been able to agree. In this situation I think the Group of 77 will have to face a basic challenge. They launched a major initiative which they considered to be very important. Where do they go from there? Do they shake their heads sadly and say, 'It is too bad, we tried and prayed and now let us forget about it and move on to something else'? Or are they going to say, 'We believe that commodity trade is of vital importance to us and we would continue to pursue our goals whether others join us or not'? I do not believe that the whole process regarding restructuring of commodity trade will come to an end, whatever the outcome of the Common Fund negotiations. I would also like to state that the idea of commodity agreements backed by the Common Fund is not the last word on what to do about commodity trade, and does not exhaust the Integrated Programme. There are innumerable other aspects of commodity trade such as processing of products within the developing countries, and increasing their share in marketing and distribution. All these are related to the question of commodity trade. Price stabilisation or strengthening commodity markets is a major aspect of all this. But it does not, you know, exhaust all options. I feel that even if we succeed in setting up a Common Fund, even if we succeed in getting a number of commodity agreements, the process of change in the area of commodity trade in developing countries will go on at an enhanced tempo.

AG: There has been criticism that the Secretary-General of UNCTAD in Nairobi developed cold feet because of US pressure. Even though pledges were available, he declined to take any concrete steps. Subsequently pledges made at Nairobi have been wavering. In two years UNCTAD has been losing ground. Its functions are being fragmented. There has been a UN Committee advising on restructuring. You have said that if there is any need for such an exercise it should be within the system, not outside it, and that this is a thing which UNCTAD ought to be doing. All this is not only weakening UNCTAD but, in fact, making its entire future extremely doubtful. You once said that perhaps there is an attempt by many of the developed countries to weaken this forum because this is where the Group of 77 can exercise its leverage much more effectively.

COREA: If it was for the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to establish the Common Fund, you would have had such a Fund long ago. But to

turn to the general issues you raise, well, you know, it is very difficult either way. On the one hand, you can have UNCTAD as an organisation which takes various strong positions on various issues but is really a debating house in which certain views are expressed and goals are defined. It passes resolutions, but does not get on to implement them. You then have an institution which serves a purpose but after a while begins to lose credibility because then the countries, including developing countries, will say that UNCTAD does not produce results. A point can be reached where developing countries themselves begin to feel that it is not UNCTAD where they can do business. Thus UNCTAD should be not only a generator of new ideas but should also supplement this role by becoming a place where you can do business. On the other hand, when you act as a negotiating forum you are on different terrain because you have to cast aside the glamour of broad resolutions and to really try, through a complex process of discussion and negotiation, to reach agreement with the developed world. In this process, not only the glamour is lost but there has inevitably to be a process of give and take. It is seldom that you can reach a negotiated solution and still retain the full position from which you started. UNCTAD today is perhaps one of the few places, if not the only place, where something concrete is being negotiated. We are negotiating the Common Fund and international agreements on several commodities. We are negotiating a code on transfer of technology, and principles and rules to regulate and control restrictive business practices. We are also negotiating solutions to the external debt problem of developing countries.

These are not resolutions that we are aiming at. We are aiming at obtaining complex agreements many of which would have a legally binding character. This is an entirely different kind of exercise and one in which UNCTAD did not involve itself too much before – although it did generate a code of conduct on Liner Conferences in earlier years. The fact is that we are trying to restructure international economic relations, not by words, not by resolutions, but through concrete actions. It calls for perseverance and a lot of effort. It involves situations in which an outsider could get impatient, but the fact is that we can begin to show results. In the Common Fund, in international agreements on commodities and the code of conduct on transfer of technology, we can show to the world that UNCTAD has achieved something more than mere debate.

AG: I don't think the criticism is on the professional aspect of UNCTAD's record. I think the criticism is about UNCTAD's fragmentation of authority and its responsibility.

COREA: This situation of diffused responsibilities has always been there. I have said it many times that there isn't a single subject that UNCTAD is dealing with in which some other organisation has not got a lot of interest; this is true even of commodities, where there is FAO. If it is

trade in manufactures and technology, there is GATT, UNIDO and WIPO. If it is shipping, there is IMCO. If it is money and finance, there is the World Bank and the IMF. So we have always had this situation. It is not new. In some issues, like financial issues, it was earlier the view, particularly of Group B, that these were issues to be considered by the IMF, but this did not stop UNCTAD from discussing them. For example, UNCTAD III in Santiago was the forum in which the whole idea of the SDR link and of the participation of developing countries in the decisionmaking process on monetary reforms came to the forefront.

These ideas were generated and supported in UNCTAD but sometimes implemented through negotiations in other forums. You can tell me about issues going away, but take the question of the external debt problems of developing countries. In March this year we had a ministerial meeting on this question which came out with some kind of positive results. In the past, even a year ago, it would have been unthinkable for the external debt question to be considered for action at UNCTAD. In Nairobi we tried to get some results on this question and failed. The idea of a ministerial meeting of UNCTAD on the subject of debt aimed at taking concrete measures is something which in the past had eluded us, but we managed to do it and eventually the developed countries agreed to come to UNCTAD and talk about the debt issue and in regard to official debts of the poorer developing countries the meeting produced some positive results.

There is now the growing realisation that UNCTAD is a place to do business. I have been saying it, and the answer to your question is a reflection of this. I think that in the North-South dialogue we are now moving into a new phase, from the general to the specific; from the formulation of goals and objectives to the concretisation of these in terms of special arrangements. The UN General Assembly at its sixth special session did the task of formulating broad goals for the establishment of NIEO. We have got to implement these through hard negotiations. It is a different kind of process compared to that involving the formulation of goals and broad objectives. It requires getting into the complexities of actual action and UNCTAD has been involved in this aspect more than any other organisation. Where else is a greater effort being made to implement the idea of NIEO as against merely talking about it? Concrete negotiations for the implementation of NIEO are taking place in UNCTAD.

AG: You mention that the negotiations are going on and that in itself is a tangible result, but people do like to look at the balance sheet and they find that somewhat depressing. It is a very satisfying thing that ministers talk about the debt problem. But, in fact, the resolution only takes account of one aspect of the debt issue. It is possible that UNCTAD's achievements have been what they are because the world economic

situation is in a particular state, and perhaps it is the Third World about which we all talk so romantically as if it were united and as if the only hurdle in its way was the UNCTAD Secretariat which was not allowing it to establish its point of view. Would you like to comment on the world situation, the factors which make it difficult at this particular moment to have anything like a complete agreement on the kind of Common Fund or commodity agreements that you are talking about? It might be useful to see how you view the situation from these points of view rather than from the point of view of UNCTAD alone.

COREA: The first thought that comes to my mind is that although there are difficulties, we should not assume that prior to these difficulties there were wonderful achievements in the field of international negotiations which are now being reversed. On the contrary, for a whole decade or two, even in times when western economies were doing well, they were not producing results in terms of responses to the Third World. It was really after 1974 that developing countries began to make a push, and this was very much a reflection of the new awareness that had been created in them, first by the crisis in the international economy and secondly by the actions of the OPEC countries which showed that a group of developing countries was capable of mobilising its efforts and achieving results. Since then, of course, I think there has been a feeling that momentum has been lost, partly because of the recession in the developed countries and the persistence of inflation and unemployment, which has made responses from these countries less easy, and partly because the leverage of the developing countries in the field of oil prices has not been manifested in the same manner as in 1974. On the other hand, I think that at this juncture more than at any time in the past, there is an international awareness, even in the developed countries, of the importance of the so-called North-South issue. Today, you hardly have a meeting of heads of governments of the developed countries which does not refer to this in their communiqué or put it on the agenda.

AG: What do you attribute this to?

COREA: I think that the OPEC action was one factor, but there is also greater consciousness of the fact that if there are problems and troubles in the Third World, they will have their repercussions elsewhere as well. I think there is now greater recognition of the political importance of this issue than there ever was. But apart from the background, what I would like to get across is the concept of results, because if you want to get concrete results by negotiations this is entirely different from making declarations or passing resolutions which can be easily done but which, as you know, have no teeth to them. If you really want results, the Group of 77 and the international community will have to get into the process of negotiation. This requires more expertise, more skill, more organisation on the part of developing countries than they

have been called upon to show in the past.

I don't think there is enough awareness of this. The general feeling is still that all you need is to have a meeting or a conference to obtain an agreement. In reality it is a very complex task. One has first to reconcile differences among the developing countries. It is very easy for developing countries to unite on some broad objective such as more aid, better prices, less debt, but when it comes to the mechanisms by which this is to be achieved, in order to keep a unified position they have to reconcile all the conflicts and differences arising from the diversity of national economic interests. However, I must say that I have been immensely impressed by the way in which the Group of 77 has succeeded, despite the differences in nuances, in adopting a common position on the Common Fund. It was not an easy task but they have succeeded. I think this kind of thing has to go into other issues as well.

So it is this new phase which I think UNCTAD is reflecting. I don't see UNCTAD as coming into a period of bad weather. On the contrary, I think more than ever before UNCTAD has become a more effective instrument for the real negotiations on international economic issues. The slowness is due to that fact that you are now in a game very different from the earlier game in which you were. I wish to emphasise that UNCTAD has come alive, and what I am anxious to do is really to make sure that whilst we serve as a negotiating forum, we also keep our other role prominent, namely the role of UNCTAD as a place in which new ideas on economic and social questions are generated and new policy approaches developed. I want to see that role of UNCTAD strengthened and developed.

AG: Taking the least optimistic position, if by UNCTAD V you neither have an agreement on the Common Fund nor any Common Fund established by the developing countries and you do not have any agreements on commodities, would you still think that UNCTAD, which you say has come alive, would have reason to stay alive?

COREA: If there has not been success in these areas then, of course, UNCTAD V would be meeting in an atmosphere of frustration where all hell would be raised. That is why I have in mind two scenarios for UNCTAD V. One that you mention, namely that we continue to be deadlocked on these issues and go to UNCTAD V in a discouraging atmosphere, in which case the meeting would be an occasion to ponder on why the international community failed to agree. The other scenario is that we do succeed in the Common Fund and also on the code of conduct on transfer of technology and in other areas, and then we go to UNCTAD V in an atmosphere of some positive achievement in which we can launch new programmes for the coming years. UNCTAD V could then be the major launching pad for the work programme of UNCTAD and the international community for the coming years. The agenda for UNCTAD V has not yet been agreed upon. There are so many un-

certainties at the moment. It is very difficult at this stage to be precise about what this agenda will be. So much is going on: the Common Fund, the code, the question of debt, also the multilateral trade negotiations. You don't know what state things would be in and how they would come out. Inevitably, the shape and character of UNCTAD V will be influenced by developments in these fields. But, as I said, there are two scenarios, the pessimistic one and the optimistic one, and I do hope that the optimistic one would be the real one because I feel that we should not linger on the old Nairobi issues but when in Manila rather build upon them with a new vision of the period ahead.

AG: I am surprised you call the Nairobi issues 'old Nairobi issues' because I thought if you had those issues behind you, then you would have had some fundamental problems solved because they cannot just be described as academic issues. In the meantime, the problems that you refer to, such as the trade negotiations, the very difficult situation in GATT, talk of more tariff barriers and non-tariff restrictions, voluntary export restrictions, moves to amend the law itself, may mean going into UNCTAD V in a much more restrictive trade environment.

COREA: Yes, one of the big issues of today is the growing protectionist trend. What I mean here is that I would not want to see UNCTAD V having the same agenda as UNCTAD IV. I would like to use UNCTAD V to respond to the new situation as it has emerged since Nairobi and to chart a course for the future; and if one has some building blocks of success, one can do that in a much better atmosphere. However, if we do not succeed, inevitably UNCTAD IV must dominate UNCTAD V because we will have unfinished business on our hands.

AG: Do you feel that because of your tremendous, and to my mind perfectly understandable and wholly justified, involvement with the Common Fund and the commodities programme, you have had to ignore or pay less attention to problems like access to markets for manufacturers which also happens to be a major problem with some of the developing countries?

COREA: Well, you know at any given period in the life of an organisation like ours, there are bound to be certain issues which are in the forefront as compared to other issues, but this is not a rigid thing. As regards the issue of access to markets, with the launching of the MTNs and the Tokyo Round, attempts to discuss this problem in UNCTAD were thwarted because governments, particularly developed country governments, said that these issues were now being negotiated under the auspices of the MTNs and therefore they were not in a position to say or do anything in this area. This has been the case since the Tokyo Round was launched in 1973. So we were stymied in that area because of these developments and no amount of interest would have really changed the situation. I do think that the question of access to markets will be very much in the forefront of issues with the conclusion of the

MTNs. In the context of growing industrialisation in developing countries, and in view of recent developments in international commercial policies, I think this question is going to come back into major prominence.

AG: A Third World representative who attends meetings in GATT was telling me that when he talks of developing and developed countries while these negotiations are going on in MTN and the Tokyo Round, he is told by the developed countries not to bring UNCTAD jargon into a forum where things are discussed quite differently. The danger is that the access problem negotiations there may not be conducted in the same spirit and with the same objectives as in UNCTAD. By the time they come into your lap, they may already have got too tangled up, as happened in the case of earlier GATT negotiations. That is why there is a feeling that a problem which could have been dealt with far better in UNCTAD has been handled in another forum which is far more restrictive. This, in fact, is a compliment to UNCTAD.

COREA: I would like to think that this is true. I feel that, whatever its weaknesses, UNCTAD is able to show its maturity by being, not only what it was in its earlier phase as just the forum for expounding Third World demands, but also as a forum in which to do business, to hold negotiations and to restructure the whole framework of international economic relations. As I said before, this calls for a different type of skill and expertise on the part of governments. The process is different and this must be appreciated. I myself see the frustration when I call a meeting on cotton and I don't get an agreement; but then I have to realise that it is a major thing that has to be done. One has to be patient and to persevere. All the same I think that UNCTAD, more than any other forum, is most capable of handling issues in the development context.

AG: Do you think a South-South meeting at the summit level or a level lower than that of a summit before UNCTAD V would be of any assistance in the pursuit of your objectives here?

COREA: There always have been, and there will be in the future, meetings of such kind. It has been the practice, prior to the UNCTAD world conferences, for the Group of 77 to meet at ministerial level, first regionally, and then interregionally, as a whole Group. I think that while UNCTAD V is going to be held in Manila, the Group of 77 at ministerial level will meet in Africa.

AG: Perhaps what these people are proposing, the academics and intellectuals, is something like the London summit of western heads of government.

COREA: We have this at the nonaligned level. But another thing one must realise is that UNCTAD is an international organisation. It is the organisation where the developing countries meet the developed countries of the West and the socialist countries. It is an organisation which looks at the world economy from the point of view of the

dynamics of development, with particular reference to developing countries. However, it is not an organisation which is exclusively confined to the Third World point of view. UNCTAD gives the opportunity for the Third World to meet with the developed countries in order to get results which involve actions by the developed countries, and from that point of view it is very important that UNCTAD be seen by the developed, socialist and developing countries as a forum in which they could all participate to arrive at results. I think one should stress that role of UNCTAD. It is an international forum. One of the developments of recent times is that developed countries are begininng to see UNCTAD as a place where concrete actions can be taken. Earlier, there was perhaps a certain hostility on their part to UNCTAD, or at best a kind of tolerance of it as a debating house, but no more than that. I think there is a growing conviction now that UNCTAD can also be the place to do business in, because one could approach concrete issues in an atmosphere of technical knowledge, professionalism and expertise. UNCTAD is to be judged in terms of its international role. I wish to emphasise that it is not the secretariat of the Third World.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF THE HIGHLY SKILLED: ECONOMICS, ETHICS AND TAXES

Jagdish N Bhagwati

The analysis of the consequences of highly skilled migration across countries has recently moved into novel economic, legal and social areas of intellectual inquiry.

However, progress in the scientific pursuit of these questions, and their possible implications has been handicapped partly by the rigid mental and emotional reflexes of some of the economists who actively participated in the early postwar debate on the consequences of 'brain drain' and who evidently seem to fear that the newly burgeoning interest in the subject somehow breathes life into a public policy issue that they had hoped to have successfully buried. However, part of the explanation lies also in the fact that the new developments have resulted almost entirely as a result of 'advocacy economics' in the form of a proposal advanced by the author to tax brain drain in the shape of a supplementary income tax to be paid by the highly skilled migrants from the poor countries on their incomes in the developed countries.[1] This proposal has economic, ethical, tax-legal, human rights, sociological and political implications and has, therefore, proved to be a powerful stimulus in opening up afresh what was until recently a rather moribund field of inquiry. But it has also correspondingly tended to provoke more heat than light.

The Postwar Debate

The earliest economic analyses of the international migration of highly skilled manpower were almost wholly stimulated by the concerns of policymakers in the countries that were experiencing a net emigration of professional personnel such as doctors, engineers and academics. The emigration was therefore described typically as 'brain drain': a persuasive phrase that predisposed one to see the phenomenon in an unfavourable light.

The late Harry Johnson, writing first in *Minerva* in 1956 and often elsewhere thereafter, was to lead the 'counter-revolution', noting that brain drain could be

[1] Originally mentioned in an article of mine in *Daedalus* (1972) on 'United States in the Nixon Era: the end of innocence', the idea was developed in other writings at greater length and was the subject of an international conference at Bellagio whose deliberations led to the two volumes: *Taxing the Brain Drain: a proposal* (Vol I) edited by J Bhagwati & M Partington. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. 1976; and *The Brain Drain and Taxation: theory and empirical analysis* (Vol II) edited by J Bhagwati. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. 1976.

beneficial to the countries of emigration and arguing passionately that it often was.

The ensuing debate paralleled the classic division of economists into two different philosophical traditions which the author once described as the 'benign neglect' and the 'malign neglect' schools. The orthodox, professional economists typically tended to follow Adam Smith in looking for the non-zero-sum-game (i.e. every party to a transaction gains) aspects of an economic phenomenon. The resulting 'benign neglect' view of these economists contrasted sharply with the concerns of the economists whose 'malign neglect' analysis focused instead on the harmful aspects of the same economic phenomena for specific groups, and therefore raised more pointedly questions of desirable policy intervention on grounds of both efficiency and distributive justice.

Thus, while the economists led by Johnson tended to emphasise the advantages to the skilled migrants themselves and to the countries of origin and destination, the economists and policymakers arrayed on the other side emphasised the losses to 'those left behind' from such emigration, whether permanent, or of a to and fro variety.

Unfortunately, however, it became fashionable to consider the complacent, everyone-gains viewpoint as an 'internationalist' or 'cosmopolitan' position, whereas the group of economists more impressed by the possibility of the adverse impact of highly skilled migration on countries of origin came to be described as 'nationalist'. The very same economists who had brilliantly debunked the phrase 'brain drain' by noting that one had to draw a distinction between the brain drain phenomenon and the brain drain problem and that migration of the highly skilled could be beneficial to those left behind, were now to be guilty of describing their own position in self-congratulatory terms that equally prejudiced the ethical demerits of their opponents' position.

As it happens, there is nothing ethically reprehensible in worrying about specific groups within a social entity. Indeed, Rawls' *maximin* principle requires us to put a decisive weight on the impact of a policy change on the welfare of the least privileged, so that if highly skilled migration does affect those left behind adversely, and the incidence of such losses is on the underprivileged, the principles of Rawlsian distributive justice would indeed make it morally obtuse not to worry about the migration. Indeed, on more traditional utilitarian ethics as well, if the migrants are earning more than those left behind, one could argue that the migration, if it imposes losses on those left behind, will be an ethically undesirable phenomenon.

Evidently, therefore, the moral basis of those concerned with the impact of emigration of highly skilled manpower, especially from poor countries of origin, was more than defensible. And the description of these intellectuals as 'nationalists' was somewhat propagandistic.

Who Loses?

When we have abandoned the fetching but foolish term 'brain drain' and the 'internationalist' and 'nationalist' positions, we are left with the enhanced awareness that migration need not worsen the welfare, however defined, of the non-migrating population in the countries of origin.

However, the arguments on this question have remained primarily qualitative, as always. For, even when economists are agreed on the criteria by which they judge policies as desirable or otherwise, they can and will often disagree because several relevant variables will be quantifiable only with a generous input of imagination and goodwill, qualities that vary from individual to individual.

Thus, does the permanent emigration of a talented professor from India to the US hurt Indian education? The optimist will argue that his research output will be available to other Indians, that his research will be of significantly higher quality in better conditions and thus will inspire other Indians at home to better work; and that his knowledge will also be available on frequent summer visits to Indian institutions, to take only some of the more obvious and persuasive arguments in favour of the Johnsonesque position. On the other hand, the pessimists can equally well argue that his research output may be constrained by patents or by CIA secrecy requirements; that his research may then turn to fields where India derives no real economic advantage; that his success in research abroad may serve only to reinforce the feeling that it is not possible to work at home; and that success requires emigration abroad, and that the summer visits will often serve to create resentments among those not so fortunate as to leave and succeed abroad.

Several such questions do not lend themselves to easy quantification. The field is thus left open to the immediacy of one's own experience in these matters. It has, therefore, been customary for the pessimists to come from the poor countries where institution building and retention of professional manpower in several fields are important problems in the face of superior working conditions and enormously improved incomes abroad; and for the optimists to come from countries where this is not so because the countries of emigration and immigration are much closer to each other in working conditions and salary levels.

But while economists are divided, in the main, on what the empirical reality is, the optimist economists and the pessimist policymakers are divided rather on their assessment of the costs and benefits of the empirical reality. Typically, the policymakers have leaned to the pessimist view because they are concerned with shorter time horizons than the economists who write academically about the issues at hand. Thus, for example, economists will say that the emigrating scientist will probably return some years later, better informed and more experienced, and will be of greater value to the country than when he left it. After all, the Chinese nuclear capability was built by Chinese scientists who had returned to the mainland from American universities where they had earlier settled for long periods. This argument, however, makes little sense to politicians and planners who have to struggle with the problem of adapting their economy

to the immediately disruptive exodus of highly skilled manpower. In economic jargon, therefore, the difference in assessment of the policymakers and the economists is to be attributed to a great extent to different time horizons over which they make their welfare judgment concerning the emigration of highly skilled manpower.

These differences are further compounded by the tendency of most economists to underplay the importance of the 'non-economic' objectives that people often have. Welfare is not simply a function of the availability of goods and services. If migration of the highly skilled raises the incomes of the unskilled left behind, the economist will rejoice, but politicians will probably regret the technological backwardness of the society that follows.

Recent Analytical Arguments

It is therefore easier now for the objective intellectual to see that categorical assertions affirming or denying the presence of a brain drain problem are without merit. Recent analytical developments have further suggested that the 'benign neglect' view, which had many adherents among economists, may have been oversold.

Thus, a principal argument advanced by the proponents of this view was that the migration of the highly skilled was a reflection of domestic unemployment; that it was a 'spillover', or 'safety valve', or 'vent-for-surplus' phenomenon. Thus, if a doctor was driving a taxicab in Manila, and was, therefore, virtually unemployed, how could his migration to New York hurt the Philippines? Persuasive as this argument is, it reflects an implicit economic model which is quite unrealistic. Why not think instead of the Filipino doctor as driving a taxicab precisely because he is waiting to pass his US examination for foreign medical graduates and that if this opportunity were not available, he would have to start practice in the outskirts of Manila or even further away if Manila is getting overcrowded with doctors. In short, the external migration possibility, the brain drain opportunity, actually inhibits the 'internal diffusion' process which carries, however slowly, these professional skills to where they will create greater social impact.[2]

Let us also examine the alternative model where the migration at high salaries abroad of one hundred nurses in the Philippines, in an initial situation of a hundred currently unemployed nurses, leads to a greatly enhanced expectation reward for becoming a nurse and hence to the private expansion of training facilities so that annually one thousand rather than one hundred nurses are turned out. Since, given immigration restrictions, no more than one hundred nurses can go abroad annually, the Philippines is going to be faced with the problem of contending with nine hundred unemployed nurses annually, at least

[2]K Hamada & J Bhagwati, 'Domestic Distortions, Imperfect Information and the Brain Drain', in Bhagwati (ed), 1976, *op cit*.

for some time.[3] This is not a fanciful example. It reflects empirical reality better than the one where the one hundred nurses, initially unemployed, leave for gainful foreign employment and the Philippines can rejoice at the outcome.

Again, if one presses this 'explosive expectations' argument home, it is easy to see that one does not need 'large' outflows to get the resulting expansion of unemployment and associated economic waste and political disruption. The mere integration of a professional market across countries, in the sense of expectations about earnings taking into account the probability of finding jobs in every national market, is enough to make the 'explosive expectations' effect possible. Moreover, if such integration also leads to an upward pressure in domestic salaries of such professionals in the poor countries, this will only accentuate the problem. In either case, the oft cited statistics about the 'smallness' of outflows of specific professionals in relation to total annual output or stock are really beside the point and do not invalidate the argument.

Moreover, these analytical developments indicate that the 'vent-for-surplus spillover' argument reaches optimistic results by incorrectly assuming that the unemployment is due to domestic reasons and emigration is exogenously superimposed on this situation with evident relief. Actually, it makes more sense to consider migration, actual and potential, as an integral part of the economic system and as itself being responsible for the unemployment phenomenon.

These and related new developments have left us with a keener awareness that losses to countries of origin cannot be ruled out and that, contrary to occasional assertions about the insanity or non-educability of policymakers in the poor countries that sometimes raise their voices in pleas for redress, there can be real problems here.

At the same time, it should be equally evident now that these problems will not generally apply to all professional categories in any one country of origin or to all countries in any one profession. There is considerable diversity of national objectives, the time horizon over which these objectives are sought, and the conditions in different professions concerning wage formation and employment. This makes it naive to make categorical assertions about the presence or absence of losses to countries of emigration.

Shift of Focus

While recent developments in economic analysis have served to lend more respectability to the contention that migration of the highly skilled can impose difficulties or losses on the countries of origin, other developments have served to undercut the relevance of this issue and to focus on quite different aspects of the migration process. These developments have arisen in the form of a systematic examination of the tax arrangements that govern highly skilled migrants.

The primary stimulus for analytical developments in this direction was provided by my proposal to levy a supplementary tax on professional migrants

[3] J Bhagwati & K Hamada, 'The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for Professionals and Unemployment', in Bhagwati (ed), 1976, *op cit.*

from developing countries, to be levied and assessed on their incomes in the developed countries of immigration. The specific ethical rationale at the time involved the view that highly skilled migrants coming from poor countries ought to make an institutionalised tax contribution from their earnings to their countries of origin, and possibly for development financing to poor countries *en bloc*. It is somewhat hypocritical for developing countries to ask rich countries to tax their citizens in order to finance foreign development aid, while not undertaking any direct tax burden themselves.

A great deal of economic, legal and sociological thinking on the questions that this proposal stimulated, indeed often provoked, as also deliberations on it at international conferences and an intergovernmental expert group meeting in March 1978, suggests that the surest way to defuse emotional reactions and prevent them from overtaking one's ability to look dispassionately at these new ideas is to note that international migration of the highly skilled, often varying in duration and constituting a to and fro movement across countries, is an important aspect of the interdependence that characterises the modern world. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the equity and efficiency aspects of the existing and potential arrangements for taxing highly skilled migrants, much as it has been done by economists, political scientists and tax lawyers for multinational corporations and international capital movements.

It also helps to distinguish between two quite different ideas, namely taxation of the migrants themselves, and tax sharing by the countries of immigration with the countries of origin. The rationales for these alternative proposals, as also their legal, administrative, economic and political implications, are naturally different.

Taxing Migrants

The case for taxing highly skilled migrants on their incomes in the countries of immigration can be developed on alternative rationales. Two major ideas in the literature may be briefly noted here before I move on to a more sustained statement of a third, more compelling, rationale.

An obvious rationale lies in the fact that these migrants typically make substantial earnings when they manage to emigrate (except probably when they are expelled as in Uganda, in which case the decision to migrate is involuntary), whereas there is the distinct possibility that their emigration causes losses to the countries of emigration. It would then be appropriate to ask that some taxation should be levied on those who are allowed to migrate in pursuit of a humanistic world order for the compensatory benefit of those who are unwilling, or more often unable, to migrate.

A very different rationale, but one that is built partly on the identical premise that the migrants derive major gains in income, follows from the oldest argument for taxation in economic science: the taxation of economic rents. The stiff immigration restrictions in the rich countries, and the enormous differentials in economic rewards between rich and poor countries, imply that the professionals

migrating from the poor countries into rich ones enjoy windfall gains in the nature of economic rent. These rents, like all economic rents (for example, the monopoly profits enjoyed by those who manage to get the scarce import licences in exchange control regimes that confer scarcity premia on imports), can be taxed to social advantage without entailing any harmful effects through distortion of resource allocational incentives.[4] Thus, migrants from the poor countries or the South may be taxed to raise resources for development spending in the poor countries, much as profits from the sale of IMF gold stocks at the substantially higher market prices are being used currently to assist needier member countries.

Both the rationales above are likely to apply with much greater force to the migration of the highly skilled from the South to the North than to the intra-North mobility of such people.[5] The windfall gains are much higher for South-North migration; and the disruption and losses are more likely to arise for countries of emigration in the South.

The most compelling rationale, however, emerges if we reflect on the nature of modern migration of the highly skilled. We are, in a sense, back to the nomadic culture. We are born in one country, get educated there and elsewhere, work over a lifetime in several countries and may retire perhaps in a country different from the one we were born in. However, the most characteristic tendency of the modern, highly skilled migrants in this complex world is that they typically tend to retain their nationality as also their ethnic ties. The world has collapsed into a manageable geographical unit, with cheap transportation, conferences and foundation financed short term visits for virtually all those who fall in the highly skilled categories. Few change nationalities any longer, even when they have changed residence permanently. The professional and especially the academic world is truly international and the pressures of assimilation that led to the 'melting pot', and the need to affirm loyalty to one's host nation by changing nationality, are no longer operative in anything like the same degree.

The result is that the professional migrants retain their national status and associated rights, including often the right to vote, but carry no corresponding tax obligation, even of a minimal nature. The situation is one of 'representation without taxation'. The anomaly is particularly compounded because typically these highly skilled migrants are among the more prosperous and successful even prior to their migration, and their ability to work abroad additionally renders them the most taxable, but almost totally untaxed, citizens of their countries. When one considers that in Albert Hirschman's apt conceptualisation

[4]While these rents will generally imply that there are no resource allocational effects from their presence or their being taxed away, recent analysis of 'rent seeking' models has shown that rents, in fact, lead to the wastage of resources because they inevitably lead to 'rent seeking' activities: e.g. firms using people to obtain larger shares of the import licences. Thus, again, a great wastage of resources may be caused in the countries of emigration from 'rent seeking' activities directed at getting the scarce entry permits to jump over the restrictive barriers imposed by immigration authorities. This qualification, however, means that a tax that reduces the net rents accruing to the migrants will only reduce this 'rent seeking' loss of the less developed countries.

[5]The reference here is to first country of origin i.e. an Indian doctor coming to the US from England is still considered a South-North movement.

these migrants have not chosen to 'exit' but have retained 'voice' and 'loyalty', it appears legitimate to regard their escaping the tax system as altogether incongruous.[6]

Curious Anomaly

Curiously, this anomaly of 'representation without taxation' at the emigration end has been matched by the anomaly of 'taxation without representation' at the immigration end. The immigrants have been typically excluded from all voting rights, even in the US which has often been the champion of civil rights and whose Supreme Court has progressively struck down discrimination against resident aliens. However, there have been exceptions to this practice. For example, in the state of Victoria in Australia, aliens owning property within the municipality have been allowed local voting rights; in New Zealand, aliens 'ordinarily resident' for at least a year have the vote even in the general election; and in Ireland all foreigners have the right to vote and even to be elected in local elections.[7] The question has further been vigorously debated in recent years in West Germany, France, Switzerland and Luxembourg, whereas Sweden actually allowed non-Swedes to vote in the elections of September 1976 for the first time.[8]

By contrast, the symmetric move towards elimination of 'representation without taxation' has surfaced only recently to the level of intellectual and policy discussions. Such reform, which would bring the highly skilled (and others) working abroad into the tax net, is in fact precisely what is done under the existing 'global tax' system, under which all nationals working and living abroad are taxable, as opposed to the 'schedular tax' system where they are taxed on the basis of residence rather than nationality. Countries such as the US, Mexico and the Philippines practise the global tax system to their advantage, and the poor countries, which generally do not, have forgone their right to tax nationals abroad, when they can least afford it.

Such a global tax system is fully acceptable under existing international tax law, is consistent with human rights conventions at the UN and elsewhere – no one has accused the US yet of violating human rights because of its tax laws – and reflects notions of equity that characterise nearly all western societies

[6]The relevance of Hirschman's concepts to the problems discussed in this paper was suggested by Kindleberger's review article in *Minerva* (1978) of the two volumes by myself, *op cit*, and H Grubel and A Scott's *The Brain Drain: determinants, measurement and welfare effects*, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 1977. However, whereas Kindleberger uses Hirschman, to argue against the taxation of migrants, on the false assumption that they have 'exited' in the Hirschman sense, I use it to argue the exact opposite, on the assumption that they have not, but in fact retain 'loyalty' and 'voice'.

[7]Sica, 'Involvement of the Migrant Worker in Local Political Life in the Host Country', *International Migration*, 15 (2/3) 1977.

[8]Hammar, 'The First Immigrant Election,' *International Migration*, 15(2/3), 1977. The election, although described as the 'general election' by Hammar, appears to have been only to local bodies. Interestingly, the Swedish authorities not merely offered the vote to foreign workers, but in fact spent a great deal of time and money to educate them about the Swedish political system.

today.[9] Moreover, it fits in very nicely with the emerging stress in intellectual circles in less developed countries that increased 'self reliance' is necessary. There is also the increased perception that the bargaining power of the less developed countries is not as great as was believed in the early euphoric days of the success of the OPEC cartel. For what could be better for developing countries than taxing their prosperous nationals working and living abroad in order to raise resources, especially when the developed countries are not really critical of this effort, as the tax can be levied and collected unilaterally without bringing them into the picture in any essential way?[10] This is not to deny, of course, that in several cases the collection would be more efficient if, under bilateral or multilateral tax treaties, the developed countries were to agree to supplying minimal tax information on foreign nationals residing in their territories.[11]

Harmonising Transition

While, furthermore, the global tax system can be adopted unilaterally by single countries, an advantage of several countries exercising such an option, more or less simultaneously, would be that they could then harmonise tax rates on nationals abroad, thereby making the transition to the global tax system appear legitimate, fair and hence defensible against special interest lobbying. At the same time, such simultaneous action would make it easier to seek tax treaties that would make the collection easier.

It is interesting to note therefore that in the concerted position of the Group of 77 reached at the UNCTAD Inter-Governmental Group of Experts meeting on highly skilled migration in early 1978, the possible adoption of the global tax system by less developed countries was incorporated in the draft recommendations and, by implication, in the agreed Report, signed, among others, by the developed countries.[12]

While, therefore, my original proposal to tax brain drain visualised a format where developing countries would levy the supplementary income tax with the developed countries of immigration agreeing to its collection and enforcement

[9]From the viewpoint of *efficiency* also, recent work on the theory of public finance underlines how the escape of one set of taxpayers from the tax net, just because they live and work abroad, is harmful to the country of origin. See recent work of Bhagwati, Hamada and John Wilson's thesis at MIT, 1979.

[10]Both the US and the Philippines collect their taxes on nationals abroad without the aid of the countries where their nationals reside and work. In the case of the Philippines, the collection is reportedly geared to passport renewal and the associated requirement that the documentation to be produced for such renewal must include a copy of the tax information that is issued by the tax authorities of the country of residence.

[11]Bilateral renewable tax treaties may be the only way to proceed realistically. It is difficult, for example, to think of the Swedish government agreeing to a multilateral treaty which requires it to yield information on Chilean and Ugandan nationals in Sweden to their governments.

[12]The UNCTAD Expert Group met from 27 February to 7 March, 1978. The Group of 77 in its Draft Recommendations, urged the developed countries to 'render assistance, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, to developing countries which exercise or wish to exercise their internationally recognised jurisdiction to tax their citizens abroad under a "global" tax system; such assistance could take the form either of "tax collection assistance" and/or of access to information.'[TD/B/C6/AC4/LI/Rev 1, 1978, Committee on Transfer of Technology, p 3, Section A(2)(d).]

under a UN treaty, and the revenues to be disbursed for development spending via some UN agency, the optimal format now seems to be essentially for the developing countries to exercise their global tax jurisdiction abroad and not to involve the developed countries of immigration into the process except through seeking bilateral or multilateral, mutually acceptable, treaties aimed merely at 'normal' exchange of tax information. In this version, the proposal to tax the brain drain turns into an action of 'self reliance' by the developing countries, rather than appearing as something that the developed countries would do for the developing countries. The onus thus shifts to the developing countries as far as policy action is concerned.

The extension of the global tax system to nationals working abroad can be undertaken without, in most cases, involving 'double taxation'. The principle of double taxation, of course, is by no means sacrosanct and its economic basis is derived from the assumption of perfect international mobility of factors, a postulate which is certainly invalid because of severe immigration restrictions. Nonetheless, if this principle were still considered desirable, it would create few difficulties, since tax rates in developing countries applicable to incomes in the developed countries would generally exceed corresponding tax rates in the developed countries, largely because the unadjusted incomes abroad would take these nationals into very high tax income brackets at home.[13] If therefore developing country tax schedules were to be applied to incomes earned by nationals living abroad, it would be natural to make adjustments for the higher cost of living abroad, much as the US does with Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. An alternative, simpler procedure would be to follow the Philippines example, and to levy a flat rate of 1 to 3 per cent on the incomes of nationals working abroad, regardless of their residence status. The 'small' tax rate avoids the incidence of double taxation, while sparing the taxpayer and the Filipino authorities the costs of filling out and checking complicated schedules.

Again, it is true that the adoption of a global tax system would encourage some to change their nationality. I doubt, however, if US and Filipino nationals living and working abroad have changed nationality in significant numbers because of the incidence of domestic taxation. But even if nationalities were to be changed, why should that harm the countries of emigration? The revenues earned from global taxation would cease for such ex-nationals; but would that really matter?

Also, the fear that such taxation would cut into remittances appears to be groundless. Not merely casual empiricism, but also such statistics as are available, suggest strongly that remittances go mainly from unskilled and semi-skilled workers rather than from the highly skilled. Typically, the highly skilled migrants tend to come from successful families and hardly need to support needy members left behind. A global tax system which is suitably progressive and taxes skilled higher paid workers rather than the unskilled, lower paid workers, should not cut into remittances in any significant way.

[13]Table 1 in K Hamada, 'Taxing the Brain Drain: a global analysis', in J Bhagwati (ed), *The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate*. MIT Press. 1977.

Substantial Gains

As for the tax revenues raised, there is little reason to feel that the adoption of the global tax system would not be worthwhile. The Philippines' experience with its extremely small tax rate (1 per cent in the main) and its revenue collection of roughly Filipino $23 million in total during the four year period 1973-6[14] suggests a tax base which is by no means negligible, especially since it is in foreign exchange. The US has been raising substantial revenues, estimated at $150 million in 1975, for example, through its taxation of US citizens residing abroad. Substantially greater revenues are also suggested by tax revenue estimates that I made on the basis of a higher tax rate of 10 per cent on net-of-developed-countries-tax earnings of less developed countries' immigrants (belonging to the professional, technical and kindred category, PTK, in US law) into developed countries, taking the stock of these over a ten year period. The resulting estimate was close to $500 million annually. It seems unlikely, however, that a tax rate of 10 per cent on net-of-developed-countries-tax incomes could be levied and enforced without the active cooperation of developed countries. But if, say, 5 per cent were considered reasonable, it would amount to $250 million and 3 per cent to $150 million at 1976 prices.

While, therefore, the adoption of the global tax system seems on current evidence and reasoning to be equitable, efficient, consistent with existing international tax-legal and human rights practices and conventions, and capable of raising revenues for the less developed countries on a self-reliant basis, its adoption should not necessarily be considered probable. Ultimately, the politicians and the policymakers in the less developed countries, as indeed everywhere, are likely to consider it expedient to avoid taxing their own nationals and to concentrate instead on seeking revenues from foreign governments in one form or another.

The major opposition to the idea from the intellectuals of the developed countries is likely to come from a philosophical direction. The late Harry Johnson, in private conversation, once expressed his distaste for the proposal on the ground that it would help extend the arm of the less developed countries' governments to people who had essentially left the country, and that this was particularly reprehensible since many less developed countries were now dictatorships. This viewpoint could be compelling, given the empirical premises, if the less developed countries' taxes were enforced by the countries of immigration and, besides, applied even after a change of citizenship, if any. The original format of my tax proposal did indeed have these features. However, the format suggested above, in the shape of the adoption of a global tax system, is entirely free from these sources of discord.

Sharing Tax Revenues

The idea of taxing the incomes of the migrants themselves must be distinguished

[14]G F M Sicat, *A Survey of Problems and Policies in the Philippines*, Transfer of Technology Division, UNCTAD, Geneva, TD/B/C6/AC4/5, 1977, p 19.

from the idea of getting the developed countries of immigration to share income tax revenues (raised from the migrants through the routine taxation apparatus) with the less developed countries of origin. The rationale for such migration-related taxation on developed countries can be provided in two alternative wasy: either that the developed countries ought to compensate the less developed countries for the losses that the brain drain imposes on them, or that the developed countries gain from such migration and therefore, regardless of whether there is any loss to the less developed countries, they ought to share these gains (based on the inflow of less developed country nationals) with the less developed countries that need development resources.

The latter moral argument reflects a Nozick type of ethical criterion: the human resources 'belong' to the less developed countries and the division of the gains from their working in the developed countries ought therefore rightfully to be shared with the former. This form of argument, which is evidently not utilitarian in nature, therefore does not fall if it is contended that these human resources would have been utilised less profitably or not at all in the less developed countries themselves.

Of these two notions, the former (suggesting compensation for the less developed countries) would appear to be the main motivating force behind recent pronouncements from spokesmen of the less developed countries calling for a brain drain related transfer of resources/revenues by the less developed countries. Consider, for instance:

> . . . I would also like to propose the establishment of an International Labour Compensatory Facility (ILCF). It could be elaborated along the lines of the Trust Fund for Compensatory Facilities of the IMF. The proposed Facility would draw its resources principally from labour importing countries, but in a spirit of solidarity and goodwill, other ILO members may contribute to it. The accumulated resources will be diverted to developing labour exporting countries in proportions relative to *the estimated cost incurred due to the loss of labour*.[15]

> The Commission on Development recommends that, in order to *compensate* for the reverse transfer of technology, resulting from such exodus, amounting to several billions of dollars for the last decade, special arrangements including the possibility of establishing special funds, should be made to provide the necessary resources for strengthening the technological capabilities of the developing countries.[16]

However, given the controversy that surrounds the question as to the magnitude, if not the existence, of losses to less developed countries in a meaningful and measurable sense, it would appear to be pertinent to rest the case for a migration-related transfer of funds from developed countries to less developed countries so alon the former moral rationale: namely, the gains by developed countries from the influx of highly skilled migrants. That such a gain exists is generally conceded, national immigration policies on levels and composition

[15]Address by Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan to the 63rd meeting of the ILO, Geneva, 10 June 1977. Note the emphasis on 'compensation' and the notion of losses suffered by loss of manpower.

[16]*Report* of the Contact Group on Industrialisation and Transfer of Technology, CIEC, Paris, 14 May, 1977.

having generally been dictated by national interest (except in the case of political refugees).[17]

Thus, by bilateral or multilateral tax treaties, individual developed countries could agree, for example, to share tax revenues that they earn from the nationals of less developed countries on the basis of some formula. Thus, for example, if the formula involved the developed countries paying to less developed countries 10 per cent of adjusted gross domestic incomes (and hence definitely less than half of the tax revenues from PTK immigrants from less developed countries), it would appear that the less developed countries would earn under such an assessment formula more than half a billion US dollars annually.

There is legal precedent for such tax sharing, of course. Thus, for example, the revenues from taxing the French workers in the canton of Geneva are shared with the French principalities from which the workers come into Geneva. And again the proposal to have the developed countries share their tax revenues with the less developed countries of nationality/origin fits in well with the notion that the less developed countries are self-reliant. These revenues are, after all, paid by their own talented and skilled manpower which constitutes their 'natural resources' and this legitimises revenue sharing arrangements which enable the less developed countries to share in the taxes generated from the incomes of their nationals.

Other Proposals

Finally, two other tax and quasi-tax proposals have been recently made and are worthy of consideration as supplements to the two major tax ideas developed here.

First, it may be suggested that the US practice of tax exempting contributions to approved charities be extended so as to enable a generous and easier inclusion of many less developed country charities as eligible for such benefits and that this then be extended to other developed countries as well.[18]

Secondly, following the recent US practice of taxpayers being allowed to earmark part of their taxes to finance presidential elections, one might suggest that less developed country immigrants in developed countries be allowed, in the same way, to earmark (up to, say 10 per cent) of their taxes for routing to a

[17]The presumption that the developed countries gain from PTK immigration has recently been challenged by Dan Usher in the *Journal of Political Economy* (85) 1977, on the ground that the immigrants receive more from their share in public expenditures than they give up by way of taxes. However, his calculations are hardly persuasive, being mainly 'quick' estimates, often based on dubious procedures. The general presumption in this regard, which is hardly disproved by Usher's arithmetic, is that PTK immigrants, belonging generally to the developed country groups that are subject to progressive taxation in developed countries are likely to be making a net contribution to, rather than a net claim on, the developed countries through the tax system; hence the presumption of gain by the developed countries from PTK immigration can only be reinforced on this account.

[18]This suggestion is contained in the paper by O Oldman & R Pomp in Bhagwati and Partington (ed), 1976 *op cit* and is also in the Group of 77 Draft Recommendations at the Meeting of Experts, UNCTAD, March 1978. Also see Pomp and Oldman, *Legal and Administrative Aspects of Compensation, Taxation and Related Policy Measures: suggestions for an optimal policy mix*. UNCTAD Geneva, TD/B/C6/AC4/7, 1977. The eligibility need not be confined to less-developed-country-origin taxpayers in developed countries.

designated UN agency for development spending.[19]

Evidently, therefore, economists, lawyers, policymakers in less developed countries and international agencies are beginning to examine the migration of highly skilled labour from the fresh perspectives which are called for in the light of the nature of modern migration in a highly interdependent world. The result is likely to be the development of a whole set of new tax arrangements which, consistent with human rights conventions, replace the existing legal structure, which is a legacy of the past.

[19] J Bhagwati, *The Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain): international resource flow accounting, compensation, taxation and related policy proposals*, UNCTAD, Geneva, TD/B/C6/AC4/2, 1977.

THE WEST AND THE THIRD WORLD: WHOSE DEMOCRACY, WHOSE DEVELOPMENT?

W H Morris-Jones

Political economy is enjoying a boom. What could be more timely? Wherever one turns, political dilemmas are found to centre on economic problems and economic puzzles are set within political frames. This appears whether one is looking at relations between states (including blocs of states) with their problems of trade and tariffs, aid and dependency, arms and influence, or within states where productivity tangles with social justice, inflation with relative deprivation and ethnicity with class – not to speak of the difficulty of distinguishing between international and domestic issues.

Many students of economics and politics will welcome the trend, for they have often been frustrated by the specialisations of economic theory and political science which seemed to achieve rigour only by the construction of models which necessarily distanced themselves from real world situations. The justification of such specialisation was of course not so much precision for its own sake, however satisfying that might be, but rather the greater effectiveness of sharpened tools for the task of analysing actual processes, hence understanding them better and moving into a position of controlling them for human satisfaction. At a time when in all parts of the world, almost regardless of the type of regime, the sphere of public policy has so expanded as to interlock the processes of politics with those of economics, what could be more appropriate than to address afresh those questions which are inescapably political economy compounds?

Democracy and Growth

One such question is that raised by Mr B K Nehru's article in *Third World Quarterly* I(2): is there some basic and unavoidable incompatibility between the institutions of liberal democracy and the processes of rapid economic growth? In some respects this seems a very familiar question, frequently aired from public platforms, around seminar tables and in conversations on affairs of the day. Yet systematic treatment of the matter has been curiously rare and Mr Nehru has performed a needed service in undertaking to set out one fairly clear answer.

Like most problems in political economy, this one is complex – even for Marxists. Those of that persuasion have at least the advantage of a doctrine to

furnish them with a coloured map of the ground, a doctrine indeed which stems in part from the first flowering of the subject two centuries ago. Mr Nehru is not a Marxist – though he is not above borrowing bits of their map from time to time. What he lacks in doctrine, however, he makes up for in bravery. He confidently asserts that 'liberal democracy and the removal of poverty do not go together in a poor society'. This may appear plausible but there are a number of difficulties in the argument. To examine these is by no means a merely academic matter – though, to be sure, that description would have no dismissive connotation for an academic. Mr Nehru's argument carries a clear message of prescription addressed to Third World countries: if you are not a liberal democracy, you do not need to feel guilt or be apologetic; if you happen still to retain that form of government, you should not strive unduly to persist in your eccentricity; if you are at a moment of choice as to the system to adopt, you should 'think twice before adopting an open democratic society'.

Defining Democracy

Mr Nehru has ambivalent attitudes towards liberal democracy but at least there is no ambiguity as to what he understands by the term. It refers to a system of government in which the rulers are accountable to the ruled through the device of a representative assembly freely elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage by voters who have a choice of candidates from competing parties. Additionally, it is a system which secures regard for individual rights and liberties by its insistence on regular authorisation (as opposed to arbitrary fiat) through the rule of law and on an interpretation of the laws by a judiciary which is independent of the government of the day. That provides a firm enough definitional base from which to set out, but we soon run into awkward terrain.

For one thing Mr Nehru is struck by the fact that there is so little of this kind of democracy to be found in the world. But his attitude to the situation is ambivalent. He is on the one hand and in much of his article anxious to pull the ideal down off its pedestal, as if to reveal it as shabbier than some have proclaimed and others have been willing to believe. Yet on the other hand and in other parts of the article, he is eager to protest his espousal of the ideal: at least 'for advanced societies', he says, it is 'perhaps the best system of political organisation man has been able to devise'. Moreover, even for most of the Third World it is, by the end of the article, permissible to hope that some may achieve no worse than a modification of that system. But if this looks like a pretty inoffensive mouse as the outcome of mountainous ratiocination, it should not distract us from the job of tackling what nevertheless appears to be the major thrust of the argument. After all, the toned down conclusion – a sop to the liberal dogs? a salve for the Nehru conscience? – may have a lesser impact than the earlier reasoning; others may be tempted to pursue the seeming logic to more negative, despairing conclusions.

Historical Perspective

We begin then with what for Mr Nehru is the oppressive fact that liberal democracy is doubly associated with the western world: that is where it began and that is where, with few exceptions, it has been confined. About the origins there is little cause for dispute but even here a caveat must be entered. It is an oversimplification to assert that 'democracy as we now understand it did not exist anywhere in the world before' the late nineteenth century. For reasons which will emerge shortly, it suits Mr Nehru to stress its late arrival; yet to place its effective life within our own century passes too lightly over the preparatory stages of its development. Briefly, the point is that there were liberal and limited democratic institutions before that time and there were also earlier ideas and movements which pointedly pressed towards fuller democratisation. It is half the truth to say that in nineteenth century England an oligarchy presided over the exploitation of the people; the other half is to add that the oligarchs were already retreating before the irresistible logic of the institutions they had themselves created and towards a position in which access to political power was in the process of being won by successive social layers of previously excluded people. This suggests two lessons: a fully developed liberal democracy may stem from elite beginnings; also, its operations afford valuable protection for such sections as acquire access. In this connection one may note Mr Nehru's rather gratuitously denigrating comment on present day liberal democracy – to the effect that it is 'showing signs of being frayed at the ends' because it appears unable to maintain public order and it has debased the currency – and respond by suggesting on the contrary that it is continuing to do what it has done before: it is, in its mainly undramatic fashion, making possible a remarkably complex phase of social transformation in which whole peoples and whole social layers are adjusting to radically changed relative positions, and doing so with more consent and less pain than any other system so far 'devised'.

But more important than the origins and the alleged present failings of liberal democracy in the West is the question of its spatial distribution. At first glance it would appear that Mr Nehru accounts for its virtual confinement to the West in primarily racial terms: he notes that its main zones of successful penetration outside Western Europe are those parts which Europeans 'colonised through the settlement of their own racial stock, namely the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand'. (The tricky case of South Africa is omitted; were the blacks too many to permit those of European racial stock to run, as in the US, a system of liberal democracy even for whites only?) But there are still others: 'Japan and a few exceptional communities of the Third World'. These are the limits of liberal democracy. Outside there are two categories which are interestingly distinguished: some are 'organised on the basis of the Marxist theory', while the rest have 'varying patterns' which 'must be assumed' to be 'suitable to the countries concerned'. Does this mean that communist governments are not 'suitable' to the countries that have them? We are not told and it is perhaps irrelevant to the argument, but it raises the question as to whether countries simply have the

forms of government which 'suit' them or whether they can somehow be led into 'unsuitable' forms. This question applies with particular force to those 'few exceptional communities of the Third World'.

Counting Exceptions

The exceptions are, for Mr Nehru, very few indeed. With a somewhat lordly disdain he acknowledges that 'a kind of democratic pattern' is 'still followed' in parts of the Caribbean but these are 'very small countries' – as if that made democracy easy or their experience uninstructive. Latin America yields 'hardly one or two' convincing cases, while there are 'none at all on the vast continent of Africa' – which may be almost true but rather unfairly overlooks the great efforts in Nigeria and Ghana to get back to the democracy which they had and appear to wish to have again. So to Asia where alone are to be found 'three countries of some importance, all of them ex-colonies of Britain, (which) continue to retain a democratic form': Malaysia, Sri Lanka and India. Of these Malaysia 'has been helped to maintain a democratic system by the rapid growth of its economy', whereas Sri Lanka has had an insurrection followed by constitutional change and India went through 'near chaos' which 'caused' the imposition of the Emergency. The tone strongly suggests that these 'exceptional cases' are in trouble because they have given themselves 'unsuitable' forms of government.

This is indeed Mr Nehru's view and he offers two fundamental reasons for it, one broadly cultural, the other more economic and political. Both are very rigidly determinist in character. The cultural argument is that liberal democracy 'can neither be established nor can it maintain itself unless men's minds have been opened for the reception of rational and non-dogmatic ideas'. Europe had the Renaissance and the Reformation, the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, and from these were deposited the ideas of rights, equality and tolerance, but 'no country in the Third World has had this kind of intellectual ferment'. There 'the vast mass . . . is tradition ridden and backward looking' and the 'native traditional pattern' of government is innocent of any liberal democracy. If this sweeping view were valid it would appear to rule out the possibility of change by diffusion and would in effect envisage the permanent stagnation of the Third World pending its 'own' intellectual revolution. Instead, the view is grotesque; it misunderstands the processes of change and fails to recognise what has been taking place. It may be awkward for pride to allow that ideas which originated in the West have not stayed there, but if this is not acknowledged the past century cannot be understood. Man has always been a learning and communicating animal, but nothing has changed more than the rate of change, and nowhere is this more evident than in the transmission of messages between men. Of course ideas are not like material goods; they travel more subtly and what arrives is seldom the same as what was released; ideas are received selectively, are modified – but they are then appropriated as one's own. Paradoxically, nationalism, which sometimes sets up resistance to such free adaptive flows, is

itself an idea which has travelled and changed by doing so.

The Colonial Relation

In a sense Mr Nehru knows this – and resents it. Or perhaps he resents only the fact that a colonial relation was part of the transmission mechanism. (Mr Nehru is incorrect, at least as regards the British version of colonialism, in attributing to the ruling power the deliberate intention to propagate and impose liberal democracy. For much of the time they expressly insisted that this form of government would not be suitable for areas such as India. It was this which the educated Indians saw as a challenge; helped by their reading of western political ideas, they demanded precisely what their rulers said they were unfit to operate. This was less a planned than an unintended consequence.) Thus he angrily uses the pejorative 'brainwashed' to describe and denigrate his own kind, the 'microscopic elite' of western educated men of 'modern mind'. Here again there is ambivalence: self-accusation along with self-esteem – the former as he seeks to distance himself from 'foreign' borrowings, the latter as he sets himself apart from his benighted masses. Both sentiments are misconceived. Who else but an elite will be the first traders in ideas? But will they not (even under colonialism) select and adapt them just as they will also be changed by them, so where is the cause for guilt or shame? Equally, how can he suppose that his people have remained unchanged while he and his articulate fellows have been busily modernising? We can see here a curious feature of thinking among elite elements of developing countries. On the one hand they entertain laughably exaggerated views about the sophisticated rationality of ordinary citizens of advanced societies; every western voter is pictured as a product of the enlightenment. There has been an odd failure of communication here; perhaps elite visitors to the West have met only their own kind, have gone to the wrong pubs, have not even read of the influence of traditional loyalties and the force of passionate emotions revealed in studies of western electoral behaviour. On the other hand – or perhaps indeed as a consequence – this idealised view of the western masses is joined with an unrealistically sad picture of the unregenerate condition of their own 'lower orders'.

The kindest interpretation to put on this is that it simply reflects impatience for more rapid uplift of the ignorant. But certainly the weight of evidence, both systematic and impressionistic, points to great changes of attitude and perception on the part of the ordinary people of, say, India during the past few decades. The spread of formal education and the improvement in literacy is only a part, perhaps a small part, of the story; the rest is linked with radio and the bicycle, with direct and indirect contacts with towns, with involvement in new local organisations and yes, above all, perhaps, with engagement in parts of the expanding avenues of democratic political activity itself. Only a kind of blinkered vision could miss the extent of real change that has taken place in the Indian voter through the very experience of free elections. So far from it being necessary to backtrack on institutional development in order to 'suit' the unchanging

stereotype of backward masses, it is precisely the establishment and persistence of democratic institutions that can produce the citizen to 'suit' them. Of course, to explain why this is not seen by some Third World elites, there can be not only the 'kind' of interpretation mentioned above but also one which is less flattering: this would suggest that these elites who stress the backwardness of their people as an obstacle to democracy are far from blind and in fact have their eyes open to a danger to their own position; recognising that the disadvantaged are indeed rising from their knees, they fear democracy is the weapon that could be used against the privileges of the few.

'Suitable' Forms

The cultural argument thus will not bear the burden it is asked to carry. There are no rigid levels of rationality or modernity that can be laid down as pre-conditions for viable liberal democracy – though ruling groups, in the Third World today as in the West a century earlier, attempt to do so. The doctrine of 'suitable' forms of government is at best a prescription for reinforcing old traditions in place of forging new ones; at worst and in our own day it is but the standard cry by the military autocrat who seeks to stifle all political processes except those of the officers' cabals. The only remedy so far 'devised' for a people's incompetence in free politics is – free politics.

Mr Nehru says that many Third World countries adopted the institutions of liberal democracy only to find 'that in their conditions they did not work' and that they 'had to give them up'. In some of these cases – Pakistan for instance – it would be nearer the truth to say that liberal democracy was pronounced a failure before it was given a serious chance. Even in some other cases the failure was one of leadership rather than of popular response. On an inspection of successes and failures it may be suggested that no 'objective' variable has an importance comparable to one of a more subjective kind: the degree of serious commitment to liberal democracy on the part of those in charge in the formative stage of a new state. In the case of the new Asian states this sticks out – notwithstanding the admitted importance of factors such as size of the liberal middle classes and the possession at several leadership levels of a great store of skills relevant to the conduct of liberal democracy. It would be more profitable to look in this direction for the determinants of liberal democracy's fortunes, rather than towards the supposed mental condition of the ordinary people.

The Economic Argument

If the cultural argument is unsteady, does Mr Nehru's politico-economic argument offer any firmer support for this theme? His first statement on this aspect is a bold assertion: 'From a cursory examination of the manner in which the political organisation of societies has developed over a period of time, it is apparent that one of the essential requisites for the establishment and continuance of democracy is the possession of a certain amount of wealth together

with continuous growth of the economy.' One difficulty with this is that any statement of the type 'A has always been found preceded by B, so B must be a necessary condition for A' has a plausibility which depends directly on the ratio of cases of A to the total relevant universe. Since, on Mr Nehru's own counting, the number of cases of liberal democracy is small, even if it were possible to say that they had all emerged after an economic breakthrough of some sort had been achieved, it would by no means in principle make us very strongly sceptical of the possibility of liberal democracy in future managing to arrive along a different route.

But, secondly, the vagueness of the economic conditions makes it difficult to know just when they would be satisfied; just how big is a 'certain amount'? And what is entailed by 'continuity'? Some reasonable answers to these questions could permit us to identify cases which are awkward for Mr Nehru. Perhaps a 'cursory' look is not quite enough. As already suggested earlier, even in Western Europe one could argue that liberal democracy was at least well under way before mass poverty had disappeared and indeed that the most substantial erosion of mass poverty took place only after liberal democracy had been extended far enough to create strong pressures from the ranks of the disadvantaged. Again, is it seriously suggested that it was because the 'certain amount' had not been reached that liberal democracy after some time collapsed in Germany, Italy and other countries? This question is worth putting because although Mr Nehru claims wealth as a necessary, not as a sufficient, ground for liberal democracy, he does seem to think that those three Asian countries – the awkward and tiresome exceptions to his thesis – can be disposed of by some notion of a false or premature start: are they not doomed – as was Weimar? – to fail because they tried to run democratically before they had crossed the qualifying line of the 'certain amount'? While we are on the subject of possible exceptions it has to be pointed out that those settler societies – the US, Australia, *et cetera* – would probably wish to protest that they had democratic practice before the 'certain amount' was in view. Mr Nehru does not agree, asserting that they were governed 'autocratically from London' while they were below 'the poverty line' and acquired democracy only when it was economically safe to do so.

Those settler cases do, however, prompt Mr Nehru to a modified restatement of his thesis: 'history has no example of any country raising itself from poverty to prosperity through its own unaided efforts while suffering the disabilities of a liberal democratic system'. The settler societies 'had to rely heavily on external capital'. Well, but are not Third World countries today able to receive external aid for their development? Mr Nehru is adamant in his surprisingly negative answer: the less developed countries' quest for capital has not 'been successful in a meaningful way' and the situation is unlikely to improve 'within a reasonable period of time'. These are again vague phrases and there must be some doubt as to the validity of such a totally negative view. Whether 'Third World' or 'less developed' constitute a useful category, when some such countries have resources which give economic and political leverage which others totally lack is a relevant

question here. Whether all Third World countries actually wish for external capital on the scale that it was sought and obtained by the settler societies is yet another question.

The Obstacle

In any event, Mr Nehru is thus led away from the 'cursory examination' approach to one of seeming logic, a demonstration of the precise way in which liberal democracy simply has to be an obstacle to the removal of poverty. It runs thus, 'the only way to ensure economic growth is to increase capital investment'; 'if capital has to be generated from within the country, the only immediate way of doing so is to increase the gap between current production and current consumption by reducing consumption'; this entails sacrifice (in proportion to the gravity of the poverty) through increased taxation and reduced benefits; but liberal democratic governments are bound to seek short term popularity instead of long term needs and thus to pursue diametrically opposite policies 'which increase consumption rather than savings – through such measures as increasing expenditure on social services, building more schools and hospitals, raising wages, providing subsidies on articles of essential consumption and by offering work at government expense'.

The first thing to say about this demonstration is that it is far from being conclusive or uncontroversial as a piece of strictly economic reasoning. The IMF brief has a certain influence because of the position of the IMF, but it is not the only brief in the field. The latter parts of the demonstration are familiar ground not in the Third World alone but in the West also, and it is not the case that professional economists are intellectually respectable only if they are politically to the right. These arguments move to and fro even in the communist world, though of course the political system there allows them to be deployed not openly and continuously but only in confined conclave and through sudden lurches towards new directions with upheavals of party leadership. It is not proposed to assess these arguments here but it will not be out of place – nor, it is hoped, inaccurate – to say that the opposite view would urge that the 'gap' can be closed not from the consumption end alone but also from the production end, that increased productivity may be obtained through a variety of social changes such as land reform, and without the injection of massive amounts of new capital, that the major impediment to economic growth is not excessive consumption as such (unless it is that of the rich on luxury imports) but rather the stagnant volume of domestic mass demand, and that the vital initial lever of improvement is indeed government action to lift at least some layers above subsistence level.

The Indian Sickness

If the logic is less than overwhelmingly irrefutable, one may for a moment return to a little 'cursory examination'. Were it the case that liberal democracy was

such a huge handicap to economic development, would it not follow that any underdeveloped country that was free from this curse would enjoy a clear advantage? Some of the rapid developers – Brazil and the Shah's Iran most clearly – are on Mr Nehru's side. But, as we have allowed, the non-democratic states are a big category and in fact they include development flops – Amin's Uganda, Burma – as well as successes. Global cross-country comparisons reveal a mainly messy picture and yield poor correlations between non-democracy and development. Mr Nehru, like many Indians, is of course troubled in particular by direct comparisons between his own country and China. But this is something of an Indian sickness and largely unnecessary and self-inflicted at that. Indian statistics on growth may have faults but they are at least constantly probed and qualified in public, whereas those from China have to be taken on trust – which may be to say not taken at all, but left. China's new regime has revealed a rather sorry state of industrial technology which may make the Indians feel better; it is also possible that their eagerness to open up to the West for trade and know how may incline India to think again about her shift in the 1970s towards self-sufficiency, a mark surely of misplaced pride and unwarranted distrust in her bargaining strength. (If one were to focus not on GNP and its growth but on the distribution of wealth, then in terms of that other 'gap' between rich and poor, China might well compare favourably with India by standards of egalitarianism and even of equity. Mr Nehru would have done better to look at this than to display petulant irritation at the courting of Chinese leaders by the West). While on this matter of comparisons, it may not be irrelevant to point out that if Mr Nehru's thesis was correct it could also be expected that within a country handicapped by liberal democracy no shining patches of economic growth would be found. Yet it is well known that within India such areas, notably but not only in Punjab, can be discovered. Admittedly this offers no proof that liberal democracy is not a handicap, but it certainly suggests that other factors are of much greater determining influence.

Grotesquely Overdrawn

The Nehru argument has its political dimension and here the caricature of the democratic politician as inescapably unable to take unpopular action is grotesquely overdrawn. To be sure, Mr Nehru exempts the politician of a rich country from the more severe strictures; he has, after all, those mature, reasoning electors who understand 'the inevitability in a good government of some unpopular actions'. It is the democratic politician of the Third World who is presented as responsive to the point of total irresponsibility and his clientele as graspingly selfish to the point of desperation. There is of course some element of truth in all this but not enough to see Mr Nehru through to his conclusions. Much is made of the relentless pressures of primordial loyalties of caste and the like, but hosts of studies have shown that the growth of fresh loyalties which cut across these lines – as Mr Nehru says happens in advanced societies – is precisely the outstanding outcome of the practice of democratic politics in countries like India;

certainly the primordial loyalties as such would only be reinforced by the curtailment of politicisation which Mr Nehru seems to desire. Again, stress is placed on the scope offered for corruption in the triangle composed of desperate client, unprincipled politician and enlarging government, but is there not ample evidence (for example, from the Indian Emergency period) that if the second apex is removed his place is promptly taken by the uncontrolled petty official and the quantum of corruption is undiminished? Above all, the portrait of the ordinary folk as uncomprehending and impatient is grossly inaccurate. (Some would say that it is their very patience which is incomprehensible). There can be little doubt that political comprehension is enhanced rather than diminished by involvement in the processes of democracy and that such comprehension has increased markedly in a country, such as India, where the electoral process has been continually employed at a variety of levels over the past thirty years of independence. As for patience and capacity to see beyond proximate goals, this is so much a matter of leadership and party penetration: given a convincing lead and given a set of effective communication channels, people can respond to wider interests; what is sure, however, is that their 'patience' will be sorely tried if they feel that they do not have a fair share within those wider interests.

Indeed probably the main point to be made about Mr Nehru's appeal to economic logic and the nature of the democratic political animal is that if we are to talk about sacrifices, we really cannot be content with large national categories but, on the contrary, must attend more closely to the incidence of sacrifices on different social layers. Here the liberal democrat has to expose two myths which normally come from very different quarters. One says that in Third World countries, unlike advanced industrial societies, there are no antagonistic interests; here Rousseau's general will readily manifests itself in support of a common interest of the whole. The other states that in no country can the liberal democratic form of government make a deeply significant difference to the structural cleavages in society. The former is a kind of modern social romanticism, the latter a corollary of Marxism; some writers, notably C B Macpherson in his *Real World of Democracy*, manage to combine both. Mr Nehru espouses neither but is touched in a measure by both.

Social Divisions

In much of his article Mr Nehru refers to 'the people' at large, the undifferentiated nation that has to be called upon to make sacrifices of bread today for cake tomorrow. But he is perfectly aware of the divisions in society, even in Third World countries. Indeed, as already indicated, he sees these countries as rendered fragile by ethnic and communal cleavages. Nor does he imagine that just because class formation in Marxist terms is relatively unadvanced in these countries there are no classes with antagonistic material interests; in one place he even suggests that ethnic and religious rivalries are the 'disguises' worn by interest conflicts. In fact, so far is he from having a romantic view of social harmony that he insists specifically on the desperate and ferocious nature of

civil strife in the context of poverty: 'between landlord and tenant, tenant and landless labourer, employer and employee'. All the more astonishing is it that when it comes to sacrifices we return to the undifferentiated whole, the 'people' – and this when it is perfectly plain that the policy shift which is advocated actually takes away benefits from those sections which need them most. It looks rather as if divisions are to be brought out in the context of ungovernability by liberal democracy and then forgotten in the context of policies to be imposed by more authoritarian government. But in the real world will they melt away so conveniently? And if not, then are we in effect saying that what is needed – and what liberal democracy makes difficult – is a measure of suppression and repression?

If Mr Nehru is no romantic – unless it be to disguise harsher things – he is no Marxist either. He does not see liberal democracy as a respectable outer cover to hide class conflict; on the contrary it is for him a form of polity which facilitates and aggravates such conflict in underdeveloped countries. But he has this much in common with the Marxists: like them he cannot see that liberal democracy can be a weapon in the hands of the economically weakest sections. He presents bread and freedom as mutually exclusive goals for 'the mass of the people'; since the first is the painfully urgent 'war on want', the second 'can afford to wait'. It must be said that recent Indian experience does not suggest that the poorest people themselves see the matter in these zero sum terms. (This was a very precious piece of evidence; normally the poor are scarcely consulted on the high affairs of choice of regime.) When they were provided with an opportunity to express their views on this matter by giving a verdict on the Emergency regime (which was a signal curtailment of liberal democracy) they behaved as if for them freedom and bread were complementary *not* competitive goods. Mr Nehru may be very ready to believe that the poor do not understand these matters, but were they so mistaken? Mrs Gandhi's temporary dictatorship was strong on populist rhetoric – how can Mr Nehru still speak as if that is a weakness typical of democracy? – but if we ignore the talk and inspect the policies and budgets, it is not clear that sacrifices were unevenly imposed and that the 'landlords' and the 'employers' were relatively favoured? Even if there can remain some dispute on this, there can be no doubt at all that in the areas where the Emergency hit hardest, it was the weakest sections which suffered most from exposure to the brutalities and corruption of the unchecked officials and the emboldened police.

The poorest sections of the population in Third World countries are in every other sense the weakest; just as different forms of power tend to cluster in the same hands, so alas do the different forms of powerlessness. But the poor have at least one thing in their favour – their numbers. True, this is no more than a latent power; the poor are often unaware of their potential, they are divided among themselves and almost characteristically reserve their chief hostilities for those who are only just a step above or a step below them on the social pyramid. Even so, liberal democracy offers at the least some protection, while at the best – that is, as the disadvantaged acquire awareness and organisation through democratic participation – it may be a weapon of advancement. That

has on the whole been the experience of the poor of the West: through group organisation access to political power has succeeded in securing that the machinery of state imposes its sacrifices and distributes its benefits where capacity and need dictate. It is impossible to see any reason why this experience should not be repeated in those Third World countries which manage to persist as liberal democracies.

Authoritarian Blueprint

It is small consolation that Mr Nehru shrinks from the harsh logic of his own analysis and ends up by advocating a system seemingly inspired by Gaullism and the new constitution devised by Sri Lanka's frightened conservatives. He proposes concentration of executive power in a strong President able to pick his team of ministers without reference to political support; how the President is selected may vary and 'the one party system is not quite as objectionable as it may seem to the democratic purist'; the legislature will be elected by adult franchise but 'would definitely be placed in a position of subordination to the executive'; the checks on abuse of presidential power would be a limitation to one term of office, an independent judiciary, a 'quasi-independence' of the administrative services and a set of fundamental rights which, while guaranteed would nevertheless be quite confined and would be specifically 'curtailed' in respect of rights of association and rights of such bodies to protect their members. There is little comfort to be derived from all this, if only because the damage has already been done by arguments which point firmly away from liberal democracy and hardly less firmly towards some variant of authoritarianism.

At one point above it was said that Mr Nehru could not see that liberal democracy could be a weapon in the cause of the weak. But there is another, and uglier, possibility: it may be that the unconvincing cultural, economic and political arguments against liberal democracy are placed in the service of elite groups just because they now see that liberal democracy has gone too far for their own interests, just because it is becoming a weapon of the poor. Authoritarian rule is bad enough as a burden of sufferings to be added to those of poverty; it is even worse when it is the means to prevent the poor from helping themselves. And all this in the name of the 'war on want'!

NOT BY UNITY ALONE:

THE CASE FOR THIRD WORLD ORGANISATION

Shridath S Ramphal

The Postwar Era

The period of twenty five years between 1945 and 1970 is now discernible in broad terms as the true postwar era. Despite the risks implicit in any overview, certain generalisations about this period are perhaps permissible because of their pertinence to the situation of the Third World on the eve of the 1980s.

In political terms, the postwar era was the era of decolonisation. The Third World emerged out of the process of political restructuring undertaken, and it was restructuring on a vast scale. In less than one generation in the nineteenth century, one fifth of the land area of the planet and one tenth of its inhabitants had been gathered into the domain of imperial powers.[1] But formal colonialism was not the only indicator of dominion. 'On the eve of World War II, about 80 per cent of the land mass of the world and 75 per cent of the world's population was under the control of western powers', Brzezinski asserted recently.[2] There may be argument about percentages: there is no doubt, however, that the political changes that characterised the postwar era were monumental in their scope. The transformation, of course, did not take place overnight. Although India became independent in 1947, it was only in 1956 that the dismantling of colonialism in Africa began – a process that was to continue through the 1960s. The Third World was still emerging quite late in the period of twenty five years that marked the postwar era.

The same era, however, saw the consolidation of the dominant position of the West in a world economic system specially propitious to it. But this maintenance of the primacy of western countries in the world economy during the postwar era was not secured automatically: it was greatly assisted by a massive programme of western economic cooperation directed initially to the economic recovery and reconstruction of Western Europe. The Bretton Woods system and the institutions supporting it, the World Bank, IMF and GATT, were important elements in this process of consolidation and cooperation on the economic front. The 'centrally planned economies' (having abstained at Bretton Woods) opted for non-participation, during the early postwar period, in the

[1] H A Kissinger (1976), quoted in M Harrington: *The Vast Majority: a journey to the world's poor*. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1978, p 127.

[2] *A Review of the International Scene*, transcript of press briefing. Washington, 20 December 1977.

institutions that Bretton Woods established – leaving western supremacy within them essentially unchallenged. Meanwhile, the new power of the TNCs helped to maintain western levers of control which decolonisation tended to weaken.

The overall result was that while the world's political system was undergoing massive structural change through decolonisation, the world's economic system was being restored and strengthened on the old premises of dominion. But more important still, western economic strength was being consolidated on a firm base of functional cooperation among European states and between Europe, North America and the industrialised countries of the Pacific. The EEC, EFTA, OECD, the Nordic Council and the Trilateral Commission were all, in their different ways, manifestations of this process of economic integration, cooperation and coordination. And, of course, political alliances, like NATO, served to strengthen the process. In North-South terms, the postwar era saw the release of over a hundred fragmented nation states, most of them new, into the mainstream of world political and economic life; but it saw also the drawing together, in varying degrees of intimacy, of the older communities of Europe, North America and the Pacific. And it saw, as well, the drawing together of most of the 'centrally planned economies' within the framework of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact.

By 1970, the process of formal decolonisation was almost complete; in the main, only the bunkers of racism in southern Africa remained to be taken, and the microstates to be brought to independence. But by 1970, also, the global economic system of the postwar era had begun to come under pressure. The US decision in 1971 to move away from convertibility was dramatic acknowledgment of the erosion of the Bretton Woods arrangements. Pressures were arising for the democratisation of the World Bank and IMF, and for them to play a more effective role in development. Imperfections in the 'free market system' were manifest, and manifestly inimical to the interests of developing countries. Recognition of the TNCs as instruments of external dominion was producing tensions of major proportions between North and South.

What remained intact, however, indeed grew stronger over the years, were the patterns of northern collaboration; and increasingly they found expression – sometimes on the basis of an enlarged internationalism – not only in relations within the North but also in relations between North and South. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD, the unified approaches which led the enlarged EEC to conclude the Lomé Convention and, more recently, the Northern Economic Summits – which, at least in part, are concerned with development issues – were all byproducts of northern unity at the policy level and northern organisation in terms of relations with the Third World.

The Era of Negotiations

No era is complete in itself. Each is a continuum and a beginning. The postwar period was no exception. Rooted as it was in an ethic of power – military, political and economic – it was to become characterised by an enlarging awareness of the limits to power. Berlin, Suez, Cuba, Vietnam, all underscored the

new realities. Nuclear non-proliferation, SALT, and, of course, detente itself, were reflections of that awareness. Power alone was not enough. Survival was imposing a new imperative of consensus. But, in a more positive sense, the new perception of planetary community in such different dimensions as environment protection, space technology, population growth, food scarcity and energy conservation was leading the world to an acknowledgment of interdependence – to a recognition that the world, in an economic and social, no less than in a political sense, was undergoing a structural change. The dawning of interdependence straddled the end of the postwar era and set the scene for the era ahead.

Although development issues occupied attention during the 1960s, it was not until the 1970s, and indeed the mid 1970s, that North-South relations moved from the level of petition to that of negotiation. The new era of negotiations began essentially with the OPEC challenge to the old economic order in 1973. The snap of realism which that action induced was the essential catalyst for negotiation. Whether the era will see real negotiations, and successful ones, is a central question of our time. Relevant to the answer is the readiness of the participants for the process of negotiation itself.

The character and content of the negotiations are unfolding. It is clear that they will be concerned not merely with declarations but with concrete agreements involving highly technical issues covering a wide range of subjects. They will be negotiations in which costs and benefits will have to be assessed not only in respect of individual agreements but also of the negotiating package as a whole. They will be complex in the extreme and will demand specialist skills unknown to traditional diplomacy and certainly in short supply in the capitals of most developing countries. And these demands will arise not only in relation to the process of negotiation but also in relation to the process of implementation. How does this new era find the North and the South?

The North: organisation in depth

It finds the North substantially unified. Differences, it is true, of a qualitative nature between the policies of, say, Norway or the Netherlands on the one hand and of Germany on the other; differences of a tactical nature among most of the member states of the EEC or between the European Community and the US; differences, also, within OECD between 'the like minded' and the rest. But it is a North essentially unified and, above all, a North effectively organised to maximise its areas of unity and to optimise its strength in negotiation.

OECD is not monolithic; its member states are not always in tune in domestic politics; but they have a high degree of tolerance of the differences among themselves. And they maintain formal and informal networks of contact that operate constantly and consciously to enlarge their areas of commonality: networks between bureaucrats, between academics, between industrialists, between political parties, between non-governmental organisations, to name some of the more informal ones. In addition, there exists the formal machinery

for cooperation and coordination, OECD itself, whose essential task is to find the common ground within the North on the basis of the most rigorous analysis of the directions in which northern interests lie, and the most vigorous pursuit of a reconciliation of those interests within the framework of common policies and joint programmes. Dialogue within the North does lead to decision, and without inordinate delay. The 'safety net', the International Energy Agency and the European Monetary System are all manifestations of this process – whatever the initial abstentions. OECD has a staff of 1,750; it is serviced by 548 professionals – 305 more than all the professionals working for UNCTAD. It has a budget of over £59 million. The DAC Secretariat alone, within OECD itself, comprises 70 staff members.

And underpinning all this is the crossfertilisation of ideas and analysis between the official and the unofficial agencies, between the bureaucrats and the academics and the negotiators and the staff of the multilateral agencies and members of the many development institutes and interest groups. There are 'think tanks' constantly at work in the North informing northern policies and positions. Some like the old Tidewater Meetings and Bilderberg Conferences are at the highest level and on a periodic basis; others are routine. The era of negotiations has found the North highly organised for negotiation. That some differences and discords nevertheless exist and from time to time become important between the countries of the North, merely underscores how major is the task of finding convergences between separate states – even though, in this case, they are only some twenty four countries with relatively high levels of convergence in the most important areas of national economic self-interest.

The South: unity without organisation

How does the era of negotiation find the South? Right through the postwar era, but more particularly in the 1950s and the 1960s, the new states of the South were preoccupied with making a reality of their new political freedom. Determined not to become pawns in an East-West power struggle, they sought security in nonalignment. The Nonaligned Movement provided a collective front behind which they could resist becoming participants in, and victims of, the cold war. Almost by definition, it was a defensive union. Its essential role was the development of a will to resist hegemony from East and West alike and to sustain solidarity in doing so. Its contribution was in being, even more than in doing.

It was, it is true, in the vanguard of the movement for Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) and, as it became clearer that self-determination did not imply an end to economic dependency, nonalignment became more concerned with global economic issues, including collective self-reliance. The 'Action Programme for Economic Cooperation between Nonaligned and other Developing Countries', formulated at the Georgetown Ministerial Meeting in 1972 and elaborated and endorsed at the Algiers Summit the following year, provided a framework for action. Through a system of

designated countries acting as coordinators, some work has been done. But, for the greater part, the contribution of the Nonaligned Movement on development issues has been more declaratory than functional.

The very title of the Nonaligned Action Programme underscored the reality of a wider development constituency than the member states of the Movement. The Group of 77 covers that constituency; its membership now numbers 117 developing countries. It is inevitably a widely disparate constituency in terms of economic interests. It has been a major achievement of the Group to have sustained a high level of unity in the negotiating position of the Third World on particular issues. Its ministerial meetings have provided opportunities for mobilising the solidarity of the Group behind its negotiating objectives. The Charter of Algiers, the Declarations of Lima and Manila and the Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance are examples. But the Group also plays a functional role in the negotiating process through ad hoc negotiating groups established for particular conferences, for example the recently held UNCTAD V, or on a more routine basis through coteries or ambassadors in Geneva and New York.

But, neither in the Nonaligned Movement nor in the Group of 77 is there any permanent machinery established to carry out the essential preparatory economic work of analysis, of coordination or of planning. There is no permanent Third World machinery for exploring the collective policy options of the developing countries; there is no established cadre of professionals engaged in developing a negotiating strategy for the South. A modicum of work is done at the informal level through pioneering agencies like the Third World Forum; but they make a low input into political decisions on North-South issues. Some work is done at the academic level in the universities of the South; but the impact of this also is minimal. A great many of the best professionals from the South (some of them exiles) work in international organisations and multilateral institutions – most of them making significant contributions in their respective spheres of influence. They contribute only indirectly, however, to the thinking of the South on issues within the negotiating process and even less to the process of translating collective self-reliance into action programmes of South-South cooperation. The net result of all this is that the South is almost wholly unorganised in terms of negotiations with the North and even in terms of relations within the South. When to this lack of collective organised effort are added the obvious deficiencies within the capitals of all save a few of the developing countries in terms of manpower and financial resources to service and support international negotiations, the nakedness of the South is stark in the extreme.

During 1977, there were over 2,000 meeting days in Geneva for UNCTAD alone. And these were quite apart from other important negotiations and consultations at ILO, GATT, WHO and other international institutions in Geneva. In that year, which saw intensive activity in the TNCs as well, only 56 of the 117 Group 77 countries had resident missions in Geneva, the great majority of them with single digit total staff complements. The US staff in Geneva for the Multinational Trade Negotiations (MTNs) alone was in excess of 150.

Monumental efforts have been made by individual Third World representatives: by ministers, by ambassadors and by others in the negotiating front line. But they negotiate from a position where an almost total absence of organised support exposes intrinsic weakness and conceals intrinsic strength. There is no collective 'back up', no 'backroom', no 'think tank' for these negotiators. With minimal support from capitals, they must carve a narrow negotiating ledge for the South and proceed along it, or perish. They have no elbow room; no manoeuvrability; there is no option to fall back. Deeply involved as it is in dialogue with the North, the South is not yet organised for the era of negotiations. The 'trade union of the poor' has remained a turn of phrase. There is no 'union'.

The Third World has displayed, it is true, a quite astounding capacity for solidarity. Third World support for OPEC in 1973 and 1974, despite the crushing impact of oil price increases on the non-oil developing countries, was a model of enlightened commitment to longer term objectives – and was central to OPEC's initial success; so too was Third World solidarity and tangible OPEC support that led to the establishment of IFAD. On a smaller scale, the solidarity of the initial 46 ACP states in their negotiations with the EEC that led to the Lomé Convention was at times more impressive than the unity of the Nine in Europe. The potential for unity is unmistakable; but the strains upon it are tremendous.

The differences between the developing countries are, of course, much greater than any among the developed. Their numbers alone enlarge the differentials. Their different stages of development dictate different areas of emphasis in dialogue with the North. Their patterns of development (agricultural, mineral, agroindustrial, or secondary industry, for example) produce differing priorities and, at times, conflicting needs. The negotiating priorities of Latin America, Asia and Africa do not automatically fit into a common mould; but the common need of them all is a need of each other if their several interests are to be served by the negotiating process.

Today, as the interests of the 'newly industrialising', of the 'commodity producing', of the 'least developed' countries diverge along the negotiating path, the very structural integrity of the Third World is being threatened. Without a modicum of organisation to hold it together within the framework of a balanced negotiating strategy, the North-South dialogue can itself induce the disintegration of the South. It is not a fate the North will work hard to avoid. The diversity of interests within the South makes unity difficult in the era of negotiations; but that diversity also makes unity essential to survival no less than to success.

How to reconcile these several interests? How to maximise collective strength through cooperative action and coordinated negotiating positions? How to research and develop a joint negotiating strategy that fulfils the essential requirements of each regional or sectoral sub-group and can command the support of all? How to be creative and innovative in the search for consensus among the Group of 77 and between North and South? All these pressing needs demand of the South a much greater effort of collective organisation than the North requires.

Consider the following:

Our people have come to understand one thing: that they can only preserve the identity of each of their peoples and cultures, and exploit their natural resources and many talents for invention and organisation if they act together as a real community, each time it seems necessary to do so .... Each one of our member states is too small to handle the problems, sometimes completely new, which arise from a world in which the economic order is rapidly changing. And, as if by instinct, our people have been coming together on this issue![3]

For 'our people' read 'Europeans'. The speaker: Claude Cheysson, the EEC's Commissioner for Development – for relations with the Third World! When ranged against the intensive organisation of the North, southern deficiencies are not merely deplorable; they are tragic.

Nonalignment and the Group of 77

It would be surprising, in the circumstances, if thought had not been given to the question of southern organisation. It has been, from time to time. There has always been a handful of countries in the Nonaligned Movement that wished to see a Secretariat of the Movement developed; but there have always been many who feared moving along such institutional lines. And there have been some voices raised in the Group of 77 to the same end; but with no more encouragement. Ad hoc arrangements were of necessity made for the Paris Conference; but they were ad hoc and, because they were, they were inadequate; and, however inadequate, were dismantled. The needs of the South, therefore, remain unfulfilled and the deficiencies that result continue to leave undeveloped the potential of ECDC and to miniaturise Southern prospects in negotiations with the North.

Certainly in terms of the Nonaligned Movement, these misgivings were understandable. They sprang, in part, from deep wells of resistance to the Movement itself becoming a 'bloc'; in part, from doubts over 'control' of the Movement passing into bureaucratic hands or, behind the veil of bureaucracy, into the national domain of a single coordinating government. These misgivings were not insurmountable; but they were real enough, and perhaps remain so, to restrain action through 'Nonalignment' alone.

With the Group of 77 it is different. No similar doctrinal impediments exist; no similar fears of a 'takeover' by particular governments or sub-groups. And the Group has tinkered with the idea of a Secretariat. Mrs Bandaranaike proposed it to the Group of 77 at Geneva in 1975; and a Working Group set up by Group of 77 Ministers at Manila the following year examined various organisational models without opting firmly for any.[4] Group of 77 Ministers at Mexico in 1976 took the proposal no further. President Nyerere has now given

[3] *The European Community and the Third World.* Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. November 1977, p 5.

[4] See *Report on the Proposal for Establishment of a Secretariat of the Group of* 77. UNCTAD/ CA/ 843, GE 76-64251.

it a forward thrust at Arusha 1979,[5] and a Group of twenty one countries (seven from each of the three main regions) is to report in more specific terms to Group of 77 Ministers in New York in September 1979.[6]

What holds the Group of 77 back? Perhaps, more than anything else, it is a lingering habit of resistance to institutionalising the processes of consultation by which the Group has traditionally worked. It was a habit formed, of course, out of the vast differences between members of the Group – differences in their economic condition, their development needs, their political ideologies, even their negotiating styles. And a habit of resistance formed, as well, out of uncertainty about the answers to underdevelopment, out of doubt about the policy choices, out of fears that too formal a Group structure might foreclose options better left open.

This habit of Group resistance to marshalled unity may have been innocuous in the postwar era when the basic struggle was to create a global awareness of the problems of underdevelopment. The trouble is that an instinct for unity without organisation has persisted into the era of negotiations when organisation itself has become the concomitant of unity and the pre-condition of unified action. The organisation of the South for effective negotiation with the North can never be free of difficulty; the question now is, however, whether effective negotiation with the North, or even practical cooperation within the South, is possible without such organisation. All the evidence suggests that it is not.

An 'Organisation' for the South

Foremost among the needs which a southern support system must serve in the era of negotiations is the coordination of the interests of all developing countries in the negotiating process. Because these interests are so varied, it is essential to Third World unity that the negotiating basket contains 'packages' of importance to each of the principal constituencies of the South. This requires the most sensitive and exacting work of preparation. It is easy enough to put into the basket every package at hand; but it avails nothing if in the end it is a load the South cannot carry.

Nor can the work of developing a negotiating strategy in terms of issues, of institutions, of timing, for example, be done only in advance. It is work that requires constant updating responsive to unfolding developments in the world economy, in the fortunes of the North, in the condition of the South, in the evolution of ideas, in the shifting of values and priorities – in short, responsive to the innumerable imponderables that must attend a negotiating process that will probably occupy the remaining years of this century.

It will call for professional service of the highest order placed wholly at the disposal of the South – and of the South in its collectivity. Third World skills from Latin America, from Asia, from Africa and beyond, serving the Third

[5] '*Unity For a New Order*'. Inaugural Address to the Ministerial Conference of the Group of 77. Arusha, 12 February 1979.

[6] *The Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework for Negotiations*. UNCTAD V, TD/236, Annex 1.

World and servicing its negotiators. But it is not only human skills that need to be harnessed to Third World needs. Technological improvements in data storage, retrieval and processing are leading to a widening technological gap between North and South of direct relevance to the negotiating process itself. The South can only hope to redress this imbalance through collective effort of a centralised nature. Decisionmaking must rest with governments, and negotiation must be conducted by their collective instrumentalities like the Group of 77 negotiators; but both processes would be greatly assisted if informed by the most searching work of analysis and policy exploration, and by advice on strategy and tactics that takes account of the balanced interests of the South as a whole.

And, of course, such an organisation would render service beyond the direct and formal negotiations with the North. The still untrodden paths of collective self-reliance, of economic cooperation between developing countries (which is the precondition of TCDC) – all these new frontiers of South-South relations await exploration. Who better to help the South to chart feasible courses into these promising areas of southern cooperation and to make progress along them? Enlarging the countervailing strength of the South, both for its own sake in terms of real development and for its value in the dialogue with the North, is the Third World's first need. An organisation for economic cooperation among developing countries – by whatever name called – is the missing link between Third World unity and southern strength.

Its charter, if one be needed, must be to serve the developing countries in giving substance to their commitment to the NIEO. Its initial areas of emphasis must be promotion and development of ECDC and helping the South to secure practical results from the North-South dialogue. Its character must be essentially technocratic. It should have no negotiating role of its own. In a North-South context, it should provide a technical support system for the South – the negotiating process itself remaining entirely within the domain of governments and the UN system. And, of course, it must come from and belong to the Third World, for from its roots will derive its authenticity. UNCTAD, the Regional Economic Commissions, the new TCDC focus of UNDP, all contribute. Indeed, they must be strengthened to contribute even more. Neither separately nor collectively, however, can they be a substitute – in the era of negotiations – for an 'Organisation' of the South. But, with the South better organised, each could have an enlarged contribution to make. Far from superseding them, the better organisation of the South may be the catalyst for activating their true potential.

This means, of course, that it must be an organisation controlled by the South. While the Nonaligned Movement can certainly help to mobilise political support for such an organisation, the Group of 77 probably provides the most propitious habitation for it; certainly, the Group of 77 is a practicable intergovernmental authority for establishing it and laying down its policy prescriptions. And it must, above all, be financed by the South. The costs bear no relationship to the need that will be served or the service that will be rendered. Working on a budget

of about half that of the Economic Commission for Africa, for example (and using relative shares in contributions to the UN budget), 79 of the Group 77 countries would contribute less than $25,000 per annum and only four countries would contribute over $500,000 per annum. Nor need these be net additions to costs for everyone. An effective Third World 'Organisation' might well help to reduce external staff costs for, at least, some Third World countries – particularly the smaller ones.

Serving Global Interests

A final word about 'confrontation'; for, despite the intensive organisation of the North, there will be a temptation to present the better organisation of the South as an exercise in 'confrontation' and so, by implication, undesirable. Argument about code words is unproductive; but misconceptions must be avoided. What the world needs is a convergence of positions on the essentials of the new order – a convergence that can help to move the international community away from the environment of inequality and hostility that the old order has generated. Constantly widening disparities in the human condition unleash dangerous tensions that are not compatible with global harmony.

They provide the real confrontations that threaten the world. Dialogue about those disparities is bound to be disputatious. The real question is whether that dialogue is to be productive of agreement and so contribute to a more harmonious world, or is to be so mired in discord as to enlarge global instability. The better organisation of the South can strengthen its capability in pursuit of agreement with the North on the key elements in the NIEO. To that end, it is in every sense legitimate, desirable and, indeed, essential. It may be the precondition of transforming our world into one more compatible with the highest interests of all its people.

As the North knows so well, the absence of consensus on change tends to preserve the status quo. It is the South, most needing to change what is – though the North needs to do that also in its longer term interest; it is the South that must carry the main burden of organising for effective change. The human resources exist; they need only to be assembled in the framework of a political commitment and put to work. Such a southern 'Organisation' will be serving in the end the process of development itself and, therefore, all mankind.

For the South, in the era of negotiations, effective unity is the mandate of the world's poor. But without organisation, real unity will be forever a mirage. Certainly, without it, the strength that is supposed to be unity itself will be forever elusive. The Third World has not failed to organise at the national level in the struggle for freedom, in the overthrow of oppression, in the continuing process of nation building. It is time that those domestic lessons of organisation were applied by the South to its global objectives. If they are not applied, if the Third World does not organise for the era of negotiations, even the fruits of victories already won at home could yet be lost. And all the world, not just the poor, will be the poorer.

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION: MYTHS AND SHIBBOLETHS

Altaf Gauhar

I

Free Flow of Information: the doctrine

It is generally believed that the problem of international flow of information assumed importance and started attracting the attention of the UN and its agencies after the end of World War II.[1] But the story began at least two years earlier. Schiller suggests that the genesis of the doctrine 'no barriers should prevent the flow of information among nations' is roughly conterminous with 'US global hegemony'.[2] According to Schiller the concurrent emergence of 'the policy of free flow of information and the imperial ascendancy of the United States' was not fortuitous, the first element being a prerequisite for the second. By 1943 the US could see itself emerging from the conflict 'physically unscathed and economically overpowering'.[3] The horrors of Nazi occupation and the Fascistic deployment of the mass media made the times particularly propitious to advance the concept of freedom of expression as an antidote to 'the indoctrination of national thought in the direction of hatred and mistrust'. Free flow of information thus came to be associated with hopes for peace and rehabilitation.

The British controlled the oceanic cables at the time. It was their 'administrative and business organisation of news and information which held the colonial system together', promoting its advantages and insulating it from external assault. The Americans, therefore, had to penetrate the British worldwide communications network, and free flow of information was the instrument which they selected to dislodge the British from their dominant position. Soon the lines were drawn between Associated Press (AP) and Reuters. In a language remarkably similar to current Third World rhetoric, Kent Cooper, the AP Executive Manager claimed that by precluding the American agency from

[1] C Horton (ed), *The Third World and Press Freedom*. Praeger. 1978. Roger Tatarian's papers on 'News Flow in the Third World: an overview' (pp 1–19) provides a useful background to the information debate.

[2] H I Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination*. New York: International Arts and Science Press. 1976, pp 24–5. For much of the historical information I am indebted to this work in particular. All the quotations in this section are from this book unless cited otherwise.

[3] The US concept of postwar arrangements, particularly with regard to 'decolonisation', differed significantly from that of Churchill, giving rise to divergent news management and publicity policies.

disseminating news abroad, Reuters and Havas were trying to keep out AP competition, to present American news disparagingly to the US, and to present news of their own countries most favourably and without fear of contradiction. They glorified themselves by reporting great advances in English and French civilisation the benefits of which were being bestowed on the world. Britain's control of the oceanic cables had 'brought Australia, South Africa, India, China, Canada and all the British world instantaneously to London on the Thames'. The *Economist* retorted 'democracy does not necessarily mean making the whole world safe for the Associated Press.' The Americans had to wait for two decades before US companies, with huge government subsidies, developed satellite communications which were to end the British monopoly in the field of information. Information became a highly competitive commercial proposition, and news a hot commodity. Any area of influence carved out by a news agency represented a consumer market, its growth and expansion keenly observed and aggressively pursued by rival news suppliers.

A new relationship was gradually evolved by the western news agencies. Despite fierce internal competition they closed their ranks and presented a united front on the issue of free flow of information. William Benton, the US Assistant Secretary of State said in January 1946, 'The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to the expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures and other media of communications throughout the world . . . Freedom of the press – and freedom of exchange of information generally – is an integral part of our foreign policy'.

The issue of free flow of information was thus converted into a question of foreign policy and a contest for the information market. A commercial proposition was turned into an ethical imperative providing 'a highly effective ideological club against the Soviet Union and its newly created neighbouring zone of anti-capitalist influence'.

Schiller recalls that as early as June 1944, the Directors of the American Society of Newspaper Editors adopted a resolution urging both the major political parties in the country to support 'world freedom of information and unrestricted communications for news throughout the world'. In September 1944 the two Houses of Congress adopted a concurrent resolution based on the recommendations of the editors. Congress expressed 'its belief in the worldwide right of interchange of news by news gathering and distributing agencies, whether individual or associate, by any means, without discrimination as to sources, distribution, rates or charges: and that this right should be protected by international compact'.

A delegation nominated by the American Society of Newspaper Editors in conjunction with the AP and United Press International (UPI) travelled by Army Transport Command planes visiting twenty two major cities and eleven Allied and neutral countries in the spring of 1945 to 'personally carry the message of an international free press into every friendly capital of the world'.

In the meantime the newly created UN and the related UNESCO had endorsed

the concept of free flow of information. The UN had fifty one member states at the time of whom two fifths were Latin American and susceptible to US pressure. A special section on free flow of information was created in the Mass Communications Division of UNESCO. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Commission on Human Rights in February 1946 and shortly afterwards empowered it to set up a sub-commission on freedom of information and the press. By the end of the year the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(1) which declared that 'freedom of information is a fundamental human right, and is a touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated'. And freedom implied 'the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters'.

Thus, in less than six years, free flow of information became a fundamental human right and a criterion of all other rights. No hindrance would henceforth be countenanced in the exercise of this right. Journalists must be free to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without any limitation, restriction or restraint.

The UN Conference on Freedom of Information, 25 March-21 April 1948, in Geneva, was dominated by the Americans. William Benton, Chairman of the US delegation, announced that the US would do everything within its power to reduce barriers to the flow of information among men and nations. He disclosed that it was the US aim to establish continuing machinery in the UN to 'keep world attention focused on the vital subject of the freedom of expression within and among nations'.

The British were becoming suspicious and apprehensive of this enlargement of the doctrine of free flow of information. The *Economist* commented that the impression of most delegations in the Geneva Conference was 'that the Americans wanted to secure for their news agencies that general freedom of the market for the most efficient which has been the object of all their initiatives in commercial policy – that they regard freedom of information as an extension of the charter of the International Trade Organisation rather than as a special and important subject of its own. And the stern opposition which they offered to Indian and Chinese efforts to protect infant national news agencies confirmed this impression.'

By the 1960s most of the developing countries were flooded with American cultural material, films, television programmes, magazines and periodicals. American news agencies had made deep penetration into the Third World market. Nascent and fragile national news agencies and newspapers were submerged under a flood of words released by AP, UPI and Reuters. These news agencies would not even allow national news agencies to undertake domestic distribution of their messages.[4] They insisted that they must have the freedom to provide material direct to the newspapers. The attitude of foreign

[4] The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan could not persuade the UPI to distribute agency material through any of the national news agencies. Repeated decisions taken at cabinet level were ignored. The agency would ask for extension of time a few days before the expiry of the time limit fixed by the government. Earlier, UPI had accepted such arrangements in India.

news agencies prompted the Prime Minister of Guyana to say, 'A nation whose mass media are dominated from the outside is not a nation'.

The Soviet Union saw the doctrine of free flow of information as a fierce rival – a potent and sophisticated instrument of influence devised by the West. While it could catch up with media technology and produce the required hardware, managing the media was a different game. To acquire the necessary operational skill to match the manoeuvrability of western 'mediacrats' the Soviet Union would have to change its whole political system, certainly its citizen-state relationship – a price too big to pay.

And UNESCO became the battleground. The UN Conference on Freedom of Information had earlier noted the deficiencies in worldwide mass communication facilities and recommended the development of national news agencies. In 1959 ECOSOC requested UNESCO to undertake a worldwide survey of mass communication facilities. This was done in a series of regional meetings with media and government representatives. The emphasis up to this point was on physical facilities in the field of communications. The western news agencies came in for criticism but mainly on account of their location in the West which inevitably influenced their treatment of news.

The emphasis was shifted in the two meetings of experts in Bogota, Columbia, in July 1974 and in Quito, Ecuador in June 1975. The need for 'nationalising' news and information functions now came to be clearly recognised. The western press became alarmed by this development. The Inter-American Press Association, representing some of the most prestigious newspapers in the US, nominated a delegation to participate in the Latin American Inter-Governmental Conference in Costa Rica in July 1976. The delegation raised a storm in the Conference. But no amount of noise and bluster could suppress the fact that some of Latin America's biggest newspapers were owned and controlled by a few families. The communication channels were all under the technological control of the West.

At the 1974 UNESCO Conference the Soviet delegation presented a 'Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid'. The US delegate, William G Harley of the US Commission for UNESCO thought that the title alone was 'reason enough to postpone it'. He saw in the proposal 'a Soviet plot to extend the USSR philosophy of state control of the media into the international sphere and thereby give it UNESCO sanction'.[5]

The two sides now started buckling to a showdown in the nineteenth UNESCO Biennial General Conference scheduled for October-November 1976 in Nairobi. The Executive Vice-President and General Manager of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) saw the Conference as 'possibly the world's greatest challenge to a free press'. UNESCO, he warned, had to be rescued 'from its flirtation with the policies that would serve the aims of tyrants

[5] C Horton, *op cit*, p 14.

rather than the aims of freedom and liberty'.[6] The US mounted a major diplomatic effort in Third World countries to mobilise support against the Soviet resolution. To leave UNESCO in no doubt, the US conveyed to the Director-General an implicit threat to withdraw from UNESCO should the Organisation persist in following the Soviet initiative. Before the Conference the US had allowed its contributions to fall in arrears to a very substantial level.[7] The US withdrawal would have financially crippled the Organisation. It was in this environment that the draft Declaration came up before the Conference in Nairobi and was postponed for consideration until the General Conference in 1978.

II

UNESCO Declaration

On 22 November 1978, UNESCO adopted a Declaration on the mass media after weeks of wheeling and dealing. The western press greeted the Declaration with a tremendous sense of relief. For months influential newspaper editors had been warning that the original draft Declaration, if adopted, would result in government control of the press. Louis Heren, Deputy Editor of *The Times*, writing under the caption 'Muzzling our Watchdogs' said there was 'a very real danger that UNESCO will eventually be allowed to condone, perhaps endorse, censorship of the press, television and radio'. Third World countries were assured by western governments and press that they had nothing to gain by taking up a posture of confrontation against the western news agencies whereas a great deal could be gained in jobs and financial resources through cooperation. Key Third World delegates in the Conference were encouraged to adopt a realistic and pragmatic approach. A negotiating alliance was forged between western delegates and 'free press' advocates from some of the developing countries, while the Soviet delegation secured support from representatives of authoritarian regimes in the Third World. The collusion was complete.

The *Economist* saw the draft as a threat to press freedom. It would make member states responsible for the activities of their press and broadcasters and convert the media into an instrument to be used in the service of the state. The revised version of the draft was 'even less acceptable to those concerned with press freedom than was the previous revision of a revision which appeared last December'. UNESCO, advised the *Economist*, should again stall the Declaration and 'the Director-General, Mr M'Bow from Senegal (who would like to become Secretary-General of the United Nations) can arrange it'.[8]

In the West the final Declaration was seen as a reprieve. The threat to press freedom had been successfully blunted. Two days before the Declaration was adopted, the US delegate William G Harley said that the UNESCO programme on the subject of world communications was moving in a promising direction. The proper role for UNESCO was 'to emphasise practical assistance for de-

[6] *ibid*, p 16.
[7] The total amount due from the US at the time was around $90 million. An amount of $3.2 million was paid just before the Conference.
[8] *The Economist*, 16 September 1978, p 17, 'No, No, UNESCO'.

veloping countries in order to help strengthen their communication capacity'. The US Government would be willing 'to join in efforts to help develop the ability of all peoples to exchange information'. Such an approach, Harley advised, was 'far preferable to ideologically loaded treaties'. Any substantial change in the existing information system 'must come as the result of cooperative efforts of all countries'. The US delegate concluded, 'Although the United States has always maintained that the mass media Declaration should never have been undertaken, it is well known that our delegation has been involved in intensive negotiations over the past three weeks to determine if this issue can be resolved in a manner which will not disrupt our joint efforts in the communication field'.[9]

The Soviet delegate Yuri Kashlev, on the other hand, maintained at a press conference on 23 November 1978 that the spirit and the idea behind the Declaration remained the same as in 1976. Well might he have felt satisfied that for the first time an authoritative international document had affirmed what he saw as the need to combine freedom of information with the responsibility of the mass media. The Soviet Union had successfully diverted attention from its own information order and emerged as a champion of the free flow doctrine. The entire debate had been devoted to questions of interest to superpowers, while Third World representatives served as willing tools or as innocent spectators.

It is necessary, however briefly, to examine this authoritative international document. According to Dr Mankekar, the Declaration amounts to 'much semantic jugglery'. The 'New World Information Order' becomes 'the establishment of a new, more just, and more effective world information and communication order'.[10] All references which could be construed as authorising governments to interfere with the media are deleted. The demand of the developing countries for a free and balanced flow of information is reaffirmed in more than one article.

The preamble to the Declaration[11] recalls that member states of UNESCO 'believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge' are agreed and determined 'to develop and to increase the means of communications between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives'.

The words 'unrestricted pursuit of objective truth' are important as they provide mandatory force and legitimacy to the doctrine of free flow of information. Devoid of truth, the whole edifice of free flow of information would collapse. In a subsequent section I shall endeavour to show that the mass media, as at present organised and operated, cannot be employed 'in the unrestricted

[9] US statement to UNESCO on Communications. Paris, 21 November 1978, released by the International Communication Agency, US Embassy, London.

[10] Chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Press Agencies Pool of Nonaligned Countries. 'UNESCO: much ado about nothing'. *Intermedia* 7(1) 1979.

[11] Emphasis added. The full text of the Declaration is reproduced at the conclusion of this article (pp 75-77). The Declaration was endorsed by UNESCO's146 member states after eight years of debate.

pursuit of objective truth'.

Article I of the Declaration refers to the need for 'a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information' in the strengthening of peace and international understanding, in the promotion of human rights and in the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, and declares 'to this end the mass media have a leading contribution to make'. Neither 'information' nor 'better balanced dissemination' is defined.

Article II recognises freedom of information 'as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedom' and provides that information should be available to each individual from a variety of sources so that he should be able 'to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively'. Journalists and other agents of the mass media must be assured of 'the fullest possible facilities of access to information' and guaranteed, in their own country and abroad, 'the best conditions for the exercise of their profession'. Who will assure these facilities and guarantee these conditions? What kind of people will come in the category of 'other agents of the mass media'?

Article III repeats that the mass media have an important contribution to make in countering racism, apartheid and incitement to war but does not indicate how this contribution is to be made.

Article IV recognises that the mass media 'have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace, justice, mutual respect and understanding' but fails to suggest how the media should play this part.

Article V provides that the points of views of those who consider that the information published or disseminated about them has seriously prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understanding should also be disseminated. By whom? In what manner? And when?

Article VI requires that inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries and between those countries should be corrected. The mode and mechanism of correction is not mentioned.

Article VII contains yet another reference to human rights and to the contribution which the mass media can make in the establishment of a more just and equitable international economic order. Since the 'New International Economic Order', a concept always in dispute, is getting outdated, the media could perhaps make their contribution by suggesting an appropriate epitaph.

Article VIII suggests that training programmes for journalists should reflect the principles of the Declaration but does not recognise that these programmes must be conducted by member states in accordance with their cultural needs.

Article IX expects the international community to contribute to the creation of the conditions of a free flow and more balanced dissemination of information and re-emphasises the conditions for 'the protection of journalists and other agents of the mass media in the exercise of their functions'. UNESCO is acknowledged as 'well placed to make a valuable contribution in this respect.' There is no indication how the international community or UNESCO will fulfil this expectation.

Article X repeats the indispensable need for creating conditions which should

enable 'organisations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of information to achieve the objectives of this Declaration.' Sub section 2 underlines the need to encourage 'a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information.' Sub section 3 recommends the provision of adequate conditions and resources to the mass media in the developing countries to strengthen and expand their working through cooperation among themselves and within the mass media in the developed countries. Sub section 4 underlines the need for bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information among all states. No means are provided for the implementation of these recommendations.

The concluding Article XI, while re-emphasising the need 'to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media', acknowledges that this must be subject to 'due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of member states'. Who will decide whether conditions in a particular state are favourable? What is one to understand by 'due respect'?

The Declaration does not pretend to resolve any problem. It does not seriously address itself to the problems faced by Third World countries in developing mass media facilities at their national levels in accordance with their cultural needs and traditions. It merely restates the position of the major contending parties in the least unacceptable form, describes the functions and responsibilities of the mass media, and their relationship with the state, without, in any manner, disturbing the status quo. But all that was swept under the carpet is already beginning to bristle.

The Sean MacBride Commission,[12] just four months after the adoption of the Declaration, circulated a document about the protection of journalists in preparation for the UNESCO Conference scheduled for May 1979. The *Economist* asked whether Mr MacBride was aware of 'the repressive potential of what is going on under his name'. He had 'little grasp of how journalism actually works'. The Commission was looking for 'a formula to harmonise two utterly different philosophies of the press'. Such harmony was not attainable for the reason that 'a good chunk of the world's press is free to gather facts and to report and analyse them as it chooses. The rest sees the press as an instrument of the state'. It was this irreconcilable conflict which had produced the fight at UNESCO in November 1978. The package that emerged as the UNESCO Declaration contained a stipulation that journalists should be assured of 'protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession'.[13] This was becoming the new battleground and 'the existence of the MacBride Commission has allowed the repressive ideas rejected in November to re-enter the arena'.[14]

Back to square one. The UNESCO Declaration, which was not binding on

[12] International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems set up by UNESCO in 1976 under the chairmanship of Sean McBride, former Foreign Minister of Ireland.

[13] Last November, in a most unreassuring, if vague provision, UNESCO's Declaration on the Mass Media pledged to 'protect' journalists. 'Who needed UNESCO's "protection"?–the question all but asked itself,' commented the *Washington Post* on 10 April 1979 in an editoral captioned 'UNESCO's Protection Racket'.

[14] The *Economist*, 31 March 1979, p 11.

member states, did not succeed even to the limited extent of expressing good intentions in clear language. All the reservations were adroitly incorporated in a document of consensus, when, in fact, there was no agreement on any major issue.

The information debate has proved one thing: the doctrine of free flow of information is at best a partisan doctrine. It was conceived and propagated by western governments and news agencies and is now contested by the Soviet Union which is aggrieved because it finds itself 'out-messaged'.

Historically, there is no justification to treat the doctrine as an embodiment of any fundamental human right. It is not. In the next two sections I will try to show that the doctrine does not qualify for such a status even on professional grounds. Free flow of information is a shibboleth which will no longer serve as a password.

III

How the Western Press Actually Works

The western press is liberal but that does not make it free of all cultural or ideological constraints. The word 'liberal' is not synonymous with freedom. Liberalism is an ideology which has had a historical affinity and compatibility with imperialism. There is a certain crusading quality in liberalism which impels its devotees to carry its benefits to others, even against their will. After all, the objective is to enrich the options available to the people. Liberal society and what is called the liberal press, for all its tolerance and dedication to freedom of thought is profoundly suspicious of, and often hostile to, ideologies like communism and Islam. The *Economist*, one of the West's most influential liberal journals, claims that the western press is free to gather, report and analyse facts as it chooses.[15] But the choice is made not in a cultural vacuum but within the liberal tradition. Western journalists do not descend from the heavens, nor do they float around like bees, free to pollinate truth wherever they find it. They are given specific assignments which they fulfil according to specific editorial directions.

To illustrate this, let us see how the *Economist* itself gathers, reports and analyses facts. Take the events in Iran leading to the Shah's ignominious departure.

The people of Iran were protesting against the monarchy and the apparatus which governed their lives. The Shah of Iran used whatever force he could to sustain his rule, but by December 1978 it had become clear that he had lost his authority. The *Economist*, one can assume, had access to all the facts in the Iranian situation and this is how it made its choice between December 1978 and February 1979.

9 December 1978. It saw the triangle of territory between Kabul, Ankara and Addis Ababa as 'the hole in the heart of President Carter's foreign policy'. It forecast that 'a year later the Shah's Iran may be disintegrating'.

[15] The *Economist*, 16 September 1978, p 17.

16 December 1978. On the cover was the Shah's picture under the banner 'All Fall Down'. The main story claimed that 'the uprising against the Shah in Iran faces the West with what is potentially its worst crisis in 25 years'. How? 'Iran is not just a major oil supplier. It has also been the major local protector of western interests.' The West therefore could, 'afford to be more outspoken than it has yet been in stating its vital interest in Iran in its determination to uphold it'. The time had come for the West to 'express historic support for the Shah and forswear internal intervention'. Lest the message should be lost on the Americans they were specifically told that 'the small, mostly British, presence on the western bank of the Gulf needs to be made larger by the Americans'.

12 December 1978. 'While the blood was flowing, Iran's oil was not.'

6 January 1979. The caption on the cover ran 'When Emperors Lack Clothes'. Iran was now 'in the hands of its urban mobs'. The Shah had not been a wicked emperor. 'He even tried to be a reforming one.' There had been no economic mistakes as real income had risen by over 15 per cent a year. The people were exhibiting 'ungrateful resentments'. The Shah as a national leader had done great things for his country and that is what made him 'controversial'. It was a mistake to assume that 'a people who are growing richer will learn to love their ruler'. But why had Iran's middle class failed to 'turn out in the Shah's support against the rioters in the streets'? There were two conclusions: that in future when the people turn against their rulers the West should 'be more adept in finding new fences to perch on'; that the alternative to the Shah in Iran was 'presumably a military government'.

20 January 1979. 'After the Shah, Before the Deluge', said the headline. The Shah's departure encompassed 'two astonishing political facts': the solidarity of his opponent's purpose and 'the Shah's willingness to take heed'. It could no longer be denied that the Shah 'had for the last 15 years of his 37 years of rule gathered total power into his own hands', but that was 'for reasons of national rather than personal ambition'. The military alternative was now 'the least unacceptable one left'. The situation in Iran would be decided by 'who controls the streets'. The 'street' was now the 'mosques' street power'. It was suggested, 'if after Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran he tries, as he has promised, to purge and punish the armed forces then the soldiers would strike back'. Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister appointed by the Shah 'could be shown to have substantial backing: from the army, from the large middle class, sections of the student body and even from many of his erstwhile colleagues of the National Front'. But, put together, all these counted for little 'against the street'.

27 January 1979. 'It is almost but not quite the street confronting the men with the guns,' it wrote.

3 February 1979. Khomeini's arrival was 'the coming of an obdurate Messiah'. It had been 'demonstrated unhappily that violence in the streets gets results

even from the army'. The people of Iran were 'half in love with easeful death'.[16] The youngsters had demonstrated 'a sort of demented gaiety'.

10 February 1979. There was nothing to stop 'Iran's slide'. The only hope was the army, 'still a more or less coherent force'. The answer was 'to bring dedicated army officers and dedicated Mullahs together'.

17 February 1979. The change in Iran was a revolution but still 'unfinished'. The West must learn to live without Iran's oil.

24 February 1979. Khomeini had succeeded because the Iranian army suffered from certain structural weaknesses. The armed forces were not allowed to act effectively in time. They were confused, then paralysed 'when the Shah and his American advisers held them back from seizing power in the period when the Shah was visibly teetering'.

This is how facts were chosen and analysed. But the *Economist* was not alone in presenting events in Iran in this particular way. This is exactly how the American media were treating Iran. *The Columbia Journalism Review* said 'by and large the American news media routinely have characterised the Iranian conflict as the work of turbaned religious zealots in league with opportunistic Marxists rather than – as they might have – the reaction of people outraged by a repressive regime. By doing so the press has helped to misinform American public opinion and narrowed the range of debate on this bellwether foreign policy crisis'. Nearly all press accounts of demonstrations from January to mid-November 1978 'dwelt on the theme that reactionary religious forces, with the help of leftists, were pitted against a determined Shah attempting to drag his backward and stubborn people into the twentieth century'.[17]

The *Review* concluded that 'it is the inability of American reporters to understand the position of the Shah's modernisation plans that is the key to their overall failure to explain what is going on in Iran.' But is that fair? How could all the American journalists have been simultaneously afflicted by an unprofessional inability to dig 'more deeply' into the situation? Was it a face saving device for the US government to claim that they could not correctly appreciate the developments in Iran because their intelligence agencies had failed them? Why did the press misinform the people?

There was, in fact, no failure of the intelligence agencies or of the reporters. The western powers knew exactly what was going on in Iran because they had themselves created the situation which served their interests and operated against the interests of the people of Iran. The failure was not of intelligence but of the instruments which had been fashioned to help the Shah to suppress his people. The western press picked up and analysed the events exactly as

[16] Other observers found nothing 'easeful' in the events in Iran at the time. 'In Mashed, in the east of Iran, in Kavin, to the west of Tehran, and in Khorramshahr, enormous bloodbaths have been the result of tanks driving into the crowds. . . . The government registers nothing. . . . The relatives who approached the military authorities to reclaim their dead for a reasonable burial have to pay a tax before they are given the body, a surcharge of over $200 (£100)—a bullet tax. If you cannot pay, you don't get the corpse.' Eye witness account by Nic Brink, *The Leveller* (24) 1979, p 23.

[17] A Dorman & E Omeed, 'Reporting Iran the Shah's Way'. *Columbia Journalism Review* Jan-Feb 1979, pp 27–33.

should have been expected, within the liberal framework and in support of western interests. They selected facts and presented them according to the liberal tradition – an Islamic revolution could not but be seen save as a threat to liberalism. To assert that 'the Shah's version of events would not have seemed so plausible had journalists understood the country and its recent history better',[18] is to underestimate the professional competence and skill of western reporters, many of whom have a profound knowledge of Iran and of its history.

IV

Truth and Credibility

The western press failed to fully understand the events in Iran in their correct perspective for two reasons. One, the cultural orientation of the western journalists, and the other, the inherent limitations of the mass media, an aspect not yet fully explored by communication sociologists. Time and space impose compelling constraints and pressures on the agents of the mass media to which seekers after truth in other fields of enquiry are seldom subjected, certainly never to the same degree.

The doctrine of free flow of information draws its force and legitimacy from the assumption that the mass media are devoted to the 'unrestricted pursuit of objective truth'. Books on information maintain that a free press tells people the 'truth' about an event in the terms in which it occurred. The editor of the *Sunday Times*, Harold Evans suggests 'the first duty of an editor may be the truth. . .'[19] A H Raskin, Associate Director of the American National News Council says, perhaps ironically, that the press has come to visualise itself 'as a stainless champion of truth. . .'[20]

What is media truth? Is it the same as truth? Truth means endless search, based on reflection, investigation, interpretation and discovery, and whether absolute or relative, truth has an independent existence. It does not depend for its emergence on deadlines. Nor does it have to be governed by the availability of space. The value of truth is not determined by its acceptability or plausibility. An inadequate, distorted, even false account of an event can be made acceptable and plausible by the media but objective truth must rely on its validity and not its presentation.

The mass media and their audience have a symbiotic relationship, each sustaining the other. Acceptance by the audience sustains the media, though the media too have the power to condition their audience. And this relationship subsists within the limitations of media time and space. A newspaper has no use for a reporter who does not observe the deadlines. Faster and better printing, recording, reproduction and communication techniques might enlarge the facilities and the scope of the mass media, but they cannot liberate them from the limitations of time and space, which must, in the end, determine the type and the size

[18] *ibid*, p 30.
[19] *The Media Reporter* 3(1) March 1971, p 6.
[20] *ibid*, p 10.

of 'truth'. It is media technology which dictates the shape of truth.

Naturally, the agents of the mass media like to imagine themselves as agents of truth but the limitations of the mass media are always diminishing their pretensions. They cannot but be topical and interesting to remain in print. They talk of truth but the god they serve is the god of credibility. Media truth has to be credible – it must have the right 'intro' and the right 'peg' before it becomes readable or gains acceptance. Truth and credibility are not mutually exclusive or antithetical, for credibility does not imply the absence of truth: it implies an unavoidable relationship between the mass media and their audience. Truth can survive without an audience. Mass media cannot, hence the imperative of credibility.

Certain important consequences flow from this distinction between truth and credibility. One begins to see the real nature of the mass media and the functions they perform in the West where they have been developed to a high level of technical and professional skill. Since they can purvey only a plausible and acceptable form of truth, the claim that their agents are engaged in an unrestricted pursuit of objective truth is, at best, an overstatement.

What does the reader want? What would the viewer accept? These are questions of primary importance for media managers – owners, editors and producers – and the form, quality and character of media products are determined by the answers to these questions. A complete identity with the audience (without loss of detachment) and respect for audience response and sensibility is essential editorial equipment. It is this identity which enables the managers to manipulate and mould their audience in an environment of truth. Now, one can enter into such a relationship only with a specific audience – an audience with which one has some cultural affinity. No editor would set out to develop a personal equation with an undefined global audience or with an audience completely beyond the ambience of his newspaper.[21]

The audience and its particular environment is, therefore, of crucial importance for the mass media. The audience remains the source of all media values even though, as we shall see presently, the mass media have turned a large section of their audience into passive recipients of information, capable of response but not initiative.[22]

[21] H J Gans, *Deciding What's News*. New York: Pantheon. 1979. The author makes some perceptive observations on American values which dominate foreign news (p 37), audience considerations (p 159 and pp 214–48) and credibility (p 200). The reluctance of American mass media to report poverty news should be of interest to Third World leaders who plead for sympathetic treatment of their problems. 'The poor appear in the news less often than the upper class. . . . ' (p 26).

[22] A Smith suggests that the values of a journalist are established 'under constant pressures within the society he serves; there is a tension between his existence as a free or creative craftsman and the nexus within which he works.' He adds, 'The Americans found Havas and Reuters presented them with material which American readers did not want to read. There was an ethnic bias running through all the agencies, but within each geopolitical area the news agency created the idea of there being an irreducible core of pure fact. The newspaper's task was to take this fact then embroidering it, adding comment, rearranging it, personalising it, twisting it perhaps into pure propaganda, but always at the base there was *an event* which had been observed and primarily recorded with supposed completeness and accuracy.' *Politics of Information: problems of policy in modern media*. London: MacMillan. 1978, pp 145–9.

Gunpowder transformed the strategy and technique of warfare. The printing press revolutionised the extension of knowledge. Today, the means of mass communication exercise an irresistible influence on the human condition. The whole world is under their spell.

With the extension of satellite communications, familiar notions of distance are fast disappearing. Sound, colour and movement are crystallising into a dramatic moment of instantaneous transmission covering the globe. Nothing like this has been experienced by man before, accustomed as he is to working and thinking within the limitations of his own time and space. A man may be living in a cosmopolitan city or in some remote desert and yet a voice or an image can be conveyed to him without any perceptible loss of time. He sees the final knockout blow delivered in a ring thousands of miles away at the same moment as the crowd in the stadium. The means of communication have acquired a speed and compulsion without precedent in human experience. If you have an idea all you need is transmission facilities and technology – time and distance no longer present any hurdles. The result is that nations possessing the necessary resources and skills have become the originators of information and knowledge. They have the power to transmit their message at an incredible speed creating the maximum impact on a global scale. The rest of the world is at their mercy.

The mass media have robbed man of his option to choose and to evaluate facts for himself. He is being constantly informed, persuaded and compelled. It is no longer the question whether information should be made available to him or not – he cannot escape it – the question is *what* information is going to be made available and by *whom*. A growing number of human beings are becoming passive under the relentless assault of words and images unleashed by the mass media. They have no time to reflect. Information, with all the appearance of completeness and plausibility, wrapped in an attractive capsule, is delivered to them by the hour – the dosage is so massive they can only swallow it. The mass media have made the people information addicts, who must get their shots to soothe their nerves. They do not ask for primary evidence to judge for themselves the nature and value of the information provided to them. They are given 'all the news' – supposedly corresponding to facts, and 'all the analysis' – supposedly fair and objective.

The whole process of collection and selection of facts, and their presentation, is controlled by what might be called the editorial mind – the inspiration of all information. The editorial mind is a corporate entity, not an individual unit. It represents the collective conscience of the community. For all the differing shades of opinion, the editorial mind symbolises the social order and all its accepted values. It is this mind wihch picks up facts and ideas and puts them across in a carefully arranged sequence. The most important news appear in banners to hit the reader most forcefully. Then follow one or two carefully phrased headlines which indicate the weight he should give to different aspects of the news. The story is printed in varying typefaces: the 'intro' is easier on the eye, and makes the reader believe that he is examining the event,

which he has come across in the headlines, and interpreting it for himself. He rarely gets to the actual text of the statement, which is printed in smaller type. The end result is that he accepts the message conveyed to him in the headlines, as if it were a verdict. In radio and television, the editorial mind acts with greater immediacy and authority. The television screen is a *tabula rasa* on which are inscribed some sacred texts. People wait for their newspapers and their television and radio news as for a revelation from the unknown. They identify themselves with the commentators because they alone can explain to them the signs perceived in distant lands. This goes on from morning till late at night, until they collapse into their beds saturated with information.

The editorial mind makes the products of the mass media acceptable to the audience, and establishes a relationship of credibility – not objectivity or truth. It first selects what it considers significant and then determines the style and the words in which it is put across to ensure immediate interest and acceptance. The object is to persuade the reader to believe – he must not entertain any doubt. He should have the assurance that facts are being looked at from all angles by someone in whose competence and integrity he has confidence. He must also have that comforting feeling that all that is being done for him by someone who has his welfare and enlightenment at heart. This is what ensures the allegiance of the reader and establishes the credibility of the editorial mind. It is under the cover of credibility that facts are selected and given weight according to a predetermined scheme of values, priorities and emphases. Events are given a slant which people come to accept as the truth. And when the mass media embarks on a campaign, as they did when President Sadat decided to visit Israel (it was a massive switch-on throughout the western world), a wholesale transformation of attitudes can be brought about instantaneously.

The mass media for all their reach and impact are related to a specific audience, and the product is selected and presented by an editorial mind representative of that audience. Western news agencies and newspapers are the products of a western editorial mind directed to a western audience. The Third World is an irrelevant audience. Irrelevant editorially, not politically. There is no compatibility of interests and objectives between the Third World audience and the interests and objectives of the western editorial mind controlling and operating the mass media. It is this factor of irrelevance which makes the Third World a particularly easy target and invites charges of cultural imperialism and western domination.

Article II of the UNESCO Declaration recommended, 'Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively.' Nothing could be more fatal to the present structure and operations of the western mass media. If facts could be checked and evaluated, the mass media would lose all their credibility. The game is not to allow the individual either time or opportunity to appraise events objectively.

V

A Restatement of Issues

Where does that leave the Third World? Without a national press and without an independent editorial mind. Most developing countries have newspapers, television stations and broadcasting facilities but they have no press. Newsprint combined with printing facilities does not make a newspaper, as the Arabs know, just as a chain of newspapers does not make a press, as the Asians and the Africans know. What is meant by the press? Two things, a social consensus on values and goals, and a commitment to articulate that consensus. A community expresses itself through its press which serves both as its conscience and as an embodiment of its beliefs and culture. People protect their press as they protect their conscience. Why have the developing countries failed to evolve a national press and an independent editorial mind which could give full creative expression to their identity and destiny? Here are some of the reasons:

a) Political structures in most Third World countries are elitist oriented. The mass media are seen by the ruling classes in these countries as a threat – an instrument which, in the hands of their opponents, could prove highly dangerous. Simultaneously, governments see the advantage of manipulating and using this instrument against their opponents. Hence, their desire and insistence to have a rigid and direct control over the mass media. Governments believe they alone can be trusted to operate the mass media in a responsible, positive and constructive manner, that is to consolidate their own position. They never pause to consider that the press in the West was developed through debate and dissent. The Third World will not have a press if governments go on suppressing all voices except their own.

b) The ruling classes in the developing countries are the product of colonial educational systems. They speak a language which is not the language of their people. They live in an environment to which ordinary men and women have no access. While this alienates them from the masses, it makes them natural allies of their erstwhile masters in metropolitan societies. The western mass media provide a continuing common cultural link between these two groups.

c) Considerable quantities of sophisticated media technology are imported into developing countries without necessary operative skills at the national level. Western media products are injected into national information systems which encourage imitation of foreign life styles and discourage domestic creative possibilities and innovations.

d) The mass media are in a state of rapid technological development. The linotype is already on the junk heap and computer composing is coming in with vastly improved scope and speed. As a result the mass media have stretched the time unit available for the presentation of information. What required an hour can now be produced in minutes, thus releasing valuable time for greater coverage in terms of quantity and areas. Pre-recording and pre-composing techniques are dividing the timeless from the time-bound items, giving the

professionals more time to refine their products. Modern techniques which are helping to expand available time are also enabling the mass media to expand their audience. Simultaneous composing and printing from different locations is adding extra millions to newspaper audiences, just as improved recording and relay facilities are multiplying radio and television audiences. Technology is making it possible for different media techniques to be used in conjunction to produce greater impact. The developing countries are largely unaware of these developments and continue to serve as a passive market for highly sophisticated mass media products. For the Third World the choice is either to master the mass media or be mastered by it. If change is what the Third World is after, then it should be recognised that the mass media represent the most potent factor of change today.

e) The mass media are not just equipment and machinery. They are a powerful means of communication for the human mind at the transmitting as well as the receiving end. Divorced from the mind they are mere paper, disc, metal and wires waiting for life. Only a mind fully attuned to the culture, sensibilities and the needs of its audience can put them to effective use.

f) If every country possessed equal or comparable media facilities and skills, the question of balanced and free flow of information would be decided by competition on the basis of equality. But these resources are not equally or equitably distributed. Instruments and techniques of information have been developed unevenly in different parts of the world. That is why the information debate is conducted in quantitative terms – weaker communication states asking for more positive news about themselves.

g) Communication resources are not just unevenly distributed. They are controlled by the West. The industrial, scientific and technological developments in the last 200 years have placed the industrialised countries of the West in a highly advantageous position. Newspapers, journals, radio, television and films have all been developed in the West, where the required technological skills have also been mastered to operate the mass media.

It is this inequality of media resources and technology which is at the root of the problem of cultural imperialism. People committed to a particular way of life find themselves inundated by messages emanating from people who do not share that way of life and complain about massive intrusion in their culture. Any step taken by them to impede the flow of these messages inevitably invokes the charge that they are obstructing the flow of information and are thus violating a fundamental human right.

Earlier, Britain was able to dominate the world information system through its control of the oceanic cables, and American news agencies had to embark on a long crusade to gain access to the communication market. It was only after the US had acquired the mastery of satellite communications that a relative balance was achieved within the western world. Today, the Third World is faced with a similar problem of inaccessibility and inequality. The developing countries are vulnerable on two counts. First, most of them do not have the financial resources to acquire communication technology and skills. This exposes them to cultural

inundation from the developed countries of the West, which not only provide them with the communication facilities but also operate those facilities for them. Secondly, those developing countries which have the financial means to develop the mass media lack national will, political cohesion and a tradition of dissent and tolerance to encourage the growth of their press.

The position is further complicated by the fact that wherever a developing country tries to have a free press the major powers do not hesitate to manipulate it to their advantage. The Americans have a free press at home but they lose no opportunity to control the press abroad. Beirut had a press but its independence was often exploited by major powers. Hong Kong is a paradise for publishers, yet who will claim that Hong Kong has a free press?[23]

It would be naive to suggest that given adequate financial and technical resources you could have a free press. Do the oil producing countries lack the financial resources to have a press of their own? They could import the most efficient equipment and technology and train their journalists, cameramen, producers in two or three years. But they are not inclined to move in that direction. Even the newspapers they have are not permitted to carry any opinion column. The reason is not lack of resources but lack of vision. India had developed a strong free press but it took Mrs Gandhi less than four weeks to turn much of it into a supine medium.

How should the Third World deal with this problem?

Neither Schiller, who talks of national communications policies,[24] nor Juan Somavia who, following Schiller's analysis, puts forward some practical proposals, provide an answer. Schiller feels that the system of domination could be transformed to replace the prevailing exploitative structure. How? He talks vaguely of a pattern of priorities under which the highest preference would be given 'to central planning and strict controls over economic life' to give the dominated states 'a breathing space, a pause, before rushing into ill judged or unassessed transfer or applications of technology of more advantage to investing foreign enterprise than to local living.' Who will evaluate and select the right technology? How will priorities be established? Schiller nurses the hope that given a breathing space the world system might disintegrate. But national policies cannot be built on that hope. When Schiller proceeds to draw up policies, he only succeeds in offering some general advice. Dominated cultures should cultivate self reliance through an awareness of current technology, a high level of informed selectivity, and a continuing effort towards popular mobilisation of

[23] Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I. Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session 1976: Report No. 94–755, pp 179–203 and p 453. 'The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been engaging academics and journalists for intelligence purposes. Journalist organisations were financed to promote "a favourable image of America". About 50 American journalists or employees of US media organisations were "part of a network of several hundred individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda" ' (p 192). The House Select Committee on Intelligence was, however, assured by William Colby, former Director of CIA that 'our operations are focussed abroad and not at the United States in order to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view'.

[24] Schiller, *op cit*, pp 68–109.

indigenous cultural-information activity. These are not policies, only a passionate statement of intentions and hopes.

Somavia argues that information is not a 'commodity' but a 'social function'. He adds, since information confers power, 'every society should be organised so that those holding power are socially responsible for its use'. To whom? Somavia concludes unconvincingly that the guidelines developed for other spheres of responsibility could be applied to information also. By whom? Following this, Somavia proposes a 'framework of legal and social accountability for the information activities of the agencies.'[25] Almost as an afterthought he recalls the need for developing countries to evolve 'alternative information channels'.[26] How should these channels be evolved? To what objectives would they be dedicated? These questions are not even formulated.

Let me separate the two issues which have dominated the information debate during the last eight years, because neither is relevant to the central problem. First, Third World delegates in international conferences have been asking western news agencies to give greater coverage to what they call positive development news. Secondly, the West has been asserting the right of journalists to have unrestricted access to sources of news in the developing countries.

The foregoing analysis should give some idea why the western mass media cannot evolve a new brand of journalism to meet Third World requirements. Western news agencies and newspapers cannot serve Third World causes or audiences. They have their own cause and their own audience and their business is to serve that audience.

Third World representatives have mixed motives in asking western news agencies to give them a good press. They know their own media have no credibility. A helpful word from abroad might improve the image of the government at home. A single appreciative comment published in a foreign newspaper is cabled by embassies for prominent reproduction in domestic press. All this is meant to induce the people back home to ignore the inequities to which they are subjected and, instead, bask happily in the respectability their governments are being accorded abroad. How nice to know that their wicked king is, in fact, a reformer and their tyrant, in truth, a moderniser.

The Third World demand for greater coverage of positive developments has no relevance to the demand of the people for full and accurate information. It has no prospect of acceptance either. The western media would lose their credibility if they set out to portray in positive terms situations which were perceived negatively by the relevant audience.

The demand of the West that journalists should have free access to news is

[25] J Somavia, 'International Communications and Third World Participation: a conceptual and practical framework'. Paper presented at a seminar in Amsterdam, 5–8 Sept 1977. The MacBride Commission seems to be following this idea. The *Economist* is already alarmed, 'Who is to decide when the press has erred? Within any single country, press councils or other bodies "administered by the Organised profession". Reigning over all, Mr MacBride's own triumphant concoction: a "round table" of press councils and journalists' organisations which would meet every year under "UNESCO's banner".'

[26] J Somavia, 'The Transnational Power Structure and International Information: Elements of a Third World Policy for Transnational News Agencies'. *Development Dialogue* (II) 1976, pp 15–28.

primarily directed at the Soviet Union. Western journalists have no problem of access in most Third World countries. And if any hindrances are created they are in a strong enough position to overcome those. The prominence given to these demands has diverted the attention of the Third World from the real issue. It is time to restate that issue.

Third World countries need a national press acting as their conscience, and as an independent medium of expression reflecting social consensus and the people's commitment. This need cannot be fulfilled by an organisation like UNESCO or any North-South forum. Any concessions wrested from the western mass media will be no substitute for a free and independent national press.

Is there some ray of light? The kind of political compromises and makeshift arrangements which ruling groups in the Third World had established after independence are being discredited. The realisation is growing that political freedom without economic and cultural freedom means nothing. Perhaps the elitist groups are beginning to see that their interests lie in cooperation with the people. They may now be willing to think about the functions which the press performs in a society. The press is as much a vehicle of expression, as a custodian of social norms. More than that it serves as a mediator between the government and the people.

How does an independent press develop? Not through government fiats but through the struggle of the people. A free press was established in England through a process of dissent. The newspapers attacked the government, and all the institutions which appeared to threaten the rights and liberties of the citizens. It was in the process of protecting individual liberties that freedom of expression was established as a right. No government conferred that right willingly: it was a prolonged struggle in which each test case advanced the cause. The press became free only when the full range of individual liberties and democratic rights was recognised. Freedom of expression was used in the defence of other rights and thus the press became the guardian of civil liberties.

External factors and difficulties such as inadequate resources and the domination of western news agencies do not explain or justify the absence of a free press in the developing countries. The Third World must look inward and carry out a ruthless investigation into its policies and attitudes toward the press. A free press does not exist in most developing countries because national governments would not allow it to develop as an independent institution, a free and powerful agency of cultural expression.

A free press implies fundamental changes in the overall nature and structure of society and in the nature of governments. This can only come through struggle and suffering, not through voluntary political or administrative decisions on the part of governments.

Among the natural human urges are: the will to survive, and the will to express. People become one on the basis of identity and they remain one in pursuit of a common destiny. Any social or political order which militates against the identity and destiny of a community alienates itself from the people.

Identity is expressed in terms of beliefs, language, traditions and a shared view of life. Destiny is expressed in terms of hopes and aspirations for the future which are determined by the scheme of values and the goals which a community adopts for itself. Both are part of an evolutionary process in which all members of the community have full participation. This is how a community develops consensus which binds it together. It is a growing and dynamic process which can be stalled by alien intrusion or inner stagnation.

When vested interests within a community try to dominate this process, radical forces are released which sometimes gather enough strength to liquidate those interests and the process is reactivated.

For its evolution the process depends on debate and dissent. If debate is curtailed and dissent prohibited, the process ceases to be productive. The prevailing consensus then turns into a repressive and frigid framework. A strong tradition of tolerance is essential for the evolution of social consensus in a cooperative and creative manner.

Social consensus is expressed generally in principles and not as a set of inviolable injunctions. Too rigid and dogmatic a formulation of consensus soon begins to hamper its evolution. The formulation must leave enough room for individuals to hold different opinions, and to follow different routes, within an agreed framework.

Since discussion and tolerance are essential to the evolution of consensus in a community, the press has a role to play from the very start. To suggest that a social consensus must first develop before a community can have its press, shows ignorance of the process through which consensus is developed. Without the press the community cannot express itself. When Third World leaders complain of lack of social cohesion in their countries or express anxieties about their fragile structures, they do not realise that it is the absence of a free national press which makes their social orders even more fragile, and the lack of cohesion even more pronounced. The suppression of the press does not strengthen political structures nor does it create a sense of cohesion among the people. It only erodes creative potential.

The popular argument in the Third World that the press must first learn to be responsible before it can be allowed to operate and develop freely is brazen sophistry. The press cannot be more responsible or conscientious than the community. When the members of a community agree to abide by certain rules of behaviour within the social consensus, they are deemed to act responsibly. So does the press which acts as a guardian of that consensus.

Press freedom is not some idyllic state in which there are no inhibitions, restraints, or limitations. Stephen Hearst stated in a confidential memorandum that the British Broadcasting Corporation 'must work within the value system set by western democratic assumptions. It is dependent on the political and cultural will of a democratic nation'.[27] That is how the BBC sees its role in society. It recognises the value system set by western democratic assumptions and willingly submits to those assumptions. Indeed, it preserves and promotes

[27] *Encounter*, London, May 1979, pp 10–19.

those assumptions. It remains 'constantly aware of the ground its own roots are planted in' and 'equally aware of the limits its own liberalism must ultimately set to allow it *to stay alive against totalitarian forces of various persuasions*' (emphasis added).

Unfortunately, there is little realisation that a weak and suppressed information system invites foreign cultural infiltration. By suppressing the national press the governments do not suppress news. They only make it easier for foreign news agencies to report news to their people with much greater impact. In a controlled area everything becomes news. The External Services of the BBC have built up a large audience in the Third World. How? Not by acquiring some special insight into the problems of developing countries, but by just reporting news which is not allowed to be published or broadcast nationally. By suppressing the national press, Third World governments have made their people easier targets of domination by the western mass media. When the western media report anything positive about a Third World country, the home audience treats it with cynicism. But when they report anything critical it is accepted with enthusiasm. Western reporters can become authoritative intrepreters of events in the Third World in a two week sojourn. Opposition elements lionise them, though when they come into power they are the first to criticise them for distorting the news.

Once it is grasped that the human urge for expression cannot be arbitrarily controlled, then it would become easier to accept the need for a free national press. However severe the control and however prolonged the period of suppression the press can liberate itself within moments when the lid is lifted. Autocratic rulers have discovered to their amazement how a weak and emasculated press turns into a fierce and wild adversary when their hold begins to loosen. Governments can control the press, but only for a time and since no government lasts forever the press will not remain suppressed forever.

Developing countries must have free press. Without that they will remain incoherent, inarticulate and constantly exposed to alien cultural domination. If Third World governments will do nothing to liberate their countries from exploitative foreign influences the people will – whatever the cost. The battle for a free press must be fought by academics, writers, journalists, teachers and students against their own governments as much as against foreign agencies.

Following is the text of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration of Fundamental Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism Aparthied and Incitment to War. It was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference by acclamation on 22 November 1978.

Preamble

The General Conference,

1. Recalling that by its Constitution the purpose of UNESCO is to 'contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Art 1, 1), and that to realize this purpose the Organization will strive 'to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image' (Art 1, 2),
2. Further recalling that the Constitution (of) the Member States of UNESCO, 'believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, and agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives' (sixth preambular paragraph),
3. Recalling the purpose and principles of the United Nations, as specified in the Charter,
4. Recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and particularly Article 19 which provides that ' everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, Article 19 of which proclaims the same principles and Article 20 of which condemns incitement to war, the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred and any form of discrimination, hostility or violence',
5. Recalling Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965, and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973, whereby the States acceding to these Conventions undertook to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, racial discrimination, and agreed to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations,
6. Recalling the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965,
7. Recalling the declarations and resolutions adopted by the various organs of the United Nations concerning the establishment of a New International Economic Order and the role UNESCO is called upon to play in this respect,
8. Recalling the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1966,
9. Recalling Resolution 59 (I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted in 1946 and declaring

   'Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated. . . . Freedom of information requires as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent;. . .'
10. Recalling Resolution 110 (II) of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda which are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,
11. Recalling Resolution 127 (II), also adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, which invites Member States to take measures, within the limits of constitutional procedures, to combat the diffusion of false or distorted reports likely to injure friendly relations between States, as well as the other resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the mass media and their contribution to strengthening peace, thus contributing to the growth of trust and friendly relations among States,
12. Recalling Resolution 9.12 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1968 reiterating UNESCO's objective to help to eradicate colonialism and racialism, and Resolution 12.1 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1976 which proclaims

that colonialism, neo-colonialism and racialism in all its forms and manifestations are incompatible with the fundamental aims of UNESCO,

13. Recalling Resolution 4.301 adopted in 1970 by the General Conference of UNESCO on the contribution of the information media to furthering international understanding and cooperation in the interests of peace and human welfare, and to countering propaganda on behalf of war, racialism, apartheid and hatred among nations, and aware of the fundamental contribution that mass media can make to the realization of these objectives,
14. Recalling the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twentieth session,
15. Conscious of the complexity of the problems of information in modern society, of the diversity of solutions which have been offered to them, as evidenced in particular by consideration given to them within UNESCO as well as of the legitimate desire of all parties concerned that their aspirations, points of view and cultural identity be taken into due consideration,
16. Conscious of the aspirations of the developing countries for the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order,
17. Proclaims on this.....day of.....1978 this Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War.

Article I

The strengthening of peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media have a leading contribution to make. This contribution will be more effective to the extent that the information reflects the different aspects of the subject dealt with.

Article II

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedom, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.
2. Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.
3. With a view to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights and to countering racism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason of their role, contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories.
4. If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.

Article III

1. The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racism, apartheid and incitement to war.
2. In countering aggressive war, racism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are *inter alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all peoples, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and the equitable settlement of international disputes.

Article IV

The mass media have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and understanding, in order to promote human rights, equality of rights as between all human beings and all nations, and economic and social progress. Equally they have an important role to play in making known the views and aspirations of the younger generation.

Article V
In order to respect freedom of opinion, expression and information and in order that information may reflect all points of view, it is important that the points of view presented by those who consider that the information published or disseminated about them has seriously prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understanding, to promote human rights or to counter racism, apartheid and incitement to war be disseminated.

Article VI
For the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity, flow of information, which will be conducive to the institution of a just and lasting peace and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries, and between those countries. To this end, it is essential that their mass media should have conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and to cooperate both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

Article VII
By disseminating more widely all of the information concerning the objectives and principles universally accepted which are the bases of the resolutions adopted by the different organs of the United Nations, the mass media contribute effectively to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to the establishment of a more just and equitable international economic order.

Article VIII
Professional organizations, and people who participate in the professional training of journalists and other agents of the mass media and who assist them in performing their functions in a responsible manner should attach special importance to the principles of this Declaration when drawing up and ensuring application of their codes of ethics.

Article IX
In the spirit of this Declaration it is for the international community to contribute to the conditions for a free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information, and the conditions for the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of journalists and other agents.

Article X
1. With due respect for constitutional provisions designed to guarantee freedom of information and for the applicable international instruments and agreements, it is indispensable to create and maintain throughout the world the conditions which make it possible for the organizations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of information to achieve the objectives of this Declaration.
2. It is important that a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information be encouraged.
3. To this end, it is necessary that States should facilitate the procurement, by the mass media in the developing countries, of adequate conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and that they should support cooperation by the latter both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.
4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights, mutual advantage, and respect for the diversity of cultures which go to make up the common heritage of mankind it is essential that bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information among all States, and in particular between those which have different economic and social systems, be encouraged and developed.

Article XI
For this Declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of Member States, to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the corresponding principles proclaimed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966.

COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

Soedjatmoko

With the onset of the information age, it has almost become commonplace to discuss in broad and general terms the impact communications have had on almost all aspects of our lives. From the size and mode of the operation of business enterprises and government organisations, population movements to and away from urban settlements, the style of politics, the arts, to lifestyles, interpersonal relationships as well as international relations, they have all in one way or another, sometimes directly and sometimes subtly, been influenced by modern communications. Still, our systematic knowledge about the impact of communications on whole cultures is extremely limited. Despite some impressive pioneering work, the communications research field is still relatively new and fragmented, while the comparative study of macro-social systems in sociology and anthropology is still in search of an agreed methodology. Almost inevitably then, any venture into this field will have to be impressionistic, and highly tentative.

Extent of Ignorance

The extent of our ignorance in this area becomes even more obvious when we turn the question of the impact of communications on Third World cultures around and address it to the industrialised West, before dealing with its impact on developing countries. There is, for instance, no question about the fact that mass culture is a product of modern communications. It is not difficult to remember the concern that this development engendered among the protagonists of the high culture of the West. The homogenisation of modern man and his increasing other-directedness, the growing superficiality and spiritual emptiness of modern life, the coming revolt of the masses, the rapidly changing fads in dress and music, and in general the high volatility of moods and lifestyles, culminating in mindless consumerism, were concerns which at one time or another over the last fifty years have dominated intellectual discourse among the *culturati* of the West. Still, what one observes now are phenomena which seem to run counter to those earlier tendencies. One can see a new assertiveness of the individual, a new concern for personal identity, a search for authenticity, and a

* The views presented here are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect those of the Indonesian National Development Planning Agency to which he is an adviser.

new privatism. There also seems to be an emergent emphasis on a new particularism of both a local and ethnic kind.

Modern communications and cybernetics have made possible the growth of large organisations with large bureaucracies. They did lead to the growth of large government bureaucracies as well as of large business enterprises which subsequently became the major engines for economic growth, but these did not lead to the growth of the larger political entities which had also become, at least in principle, possible. Rather, they seem to have led to alienation, a declining willingness to identify with the concerns and symbols of the nation state, a corresponding commitment to local politics and community related activities, and a yearning to return to smaller social and political units in a search for modes of production and of living on a smaller and more human scale.

Cultural Identity

It is probably true that the traditional differences in national character have become blurred, at least as perceived from the outside. Still, the stereotypes that distinguish a Frenchman from a German, an American or an Italian or a Russian, seem to stick with an almost irrational persistence, despite the similarities in fashion, dress and consumerist lifestyles. At the same time, one has to conclude that, seen from the inside, the sense of separate cultural identity as the expression of a nationally shared subjectivity does not seem to have diminished a great deal, despite the homogenising impact of modern communications. The political assertiveness of language as a focus for cultural identity has turned out to be a problem defying the conformities of mass culture. Phenomena like these make one realise the multiplicity of levels within a culture, and their different susceptibility to the impact of modern communications. They raise also the broader question of the relationship between improved availability of, and access to, information, and the profound shifts in value orientation which are now so clearly discernible in the West. While it is true that availability and access to information was an essential precondition for the rise in productivity, one wonders whether these had not also something to do with the apparent loss of the work ethos in the West. Also, increased communication has led to more efficient production, and in many ways to more rational behaviour. But what has made the ultimate irrationality of the continuing arms race between the super powers so impervious to the rationalising impact of information availability? For all the rational sophistication that has gone into the calculus of mutual nuclear deterrence, the nuclear arms race can only be seen as an expression of basic irrationalities of the major information-intensive civilisations in the world.

In addition, the information and knowledge explosion does not seem to have led to the complete secularisation of western society as, at first, it seemed it would. On the contrary, it has not prevented the resurgence of religiosity, reflected in the number and kinds of religious cults, the increasing number of reconversions, first to fundamentalist Christianity, and the subsequent movement from this into the more establishment churches in the United States, although

this is less true in Europe.

It is then, at least for the time being, almost impossible to make clear cut and unambiguous statements about how exactly modern communications have affected western cultures. We are all aware that somehow communications have played an important role in what seem to be the swings of a cultural pendulum. But our understanding of their precise correlation is very inadequate, and there is not much that we can say about this, except that communications have considerably added to the amplitude and possibly the frequency of these swings.

North and South

It would be, therefore, even more unrealistic, in turning the question towards the cultures of the Third World, to hope to get more than impressionistic, intuitive and speculative answers, which may however still have some heuristic value. Before doing so however, one remark should be made about the North–South context within which the question is posed. The question itself obviously is a valid one, and one which engages the minds of many people, especially in the South, but also in the North.

There is a genuine concern that as a result of the expansion of modern communications across the globe, some Third World countries will lose their cultural identity, and that other cultures may be destroyed or at least marginalised. The plausibility of this happening, however, very much depends on whether western – and to some extent also Soviet – dominance of modern communications, in terms both of infrastructure and information flows, will continue indefinitely.

During the last decade, however, profound changes in global power configuration have taken place and continue to take place. There has been a considerable diffusion of power across the globe, as well as a reduction of the relative power of the West even though, in absolute terms, United States power may have increased. And we are witnessing the emergence of new powers, both on the global as well as on the regional level. It may well be that we are at the beginning of a major process of fundamental historical change which will eventually see the emergence of a number of major non-western civilisations, a Sinitic, a Muslim, a Hindu and perhaps a number of others, taking their place side by side with western civilisation, on a basis of rough parity. It is now no longer possible for the West unilaterally to impose international solutions, let alone a viable international system on the international community, without the consent of the Third World, however divided it is within itself. Undoubtedly, at some point such shifts in power relations will find their reflection in the sharing of control over international communications, through the Third World's participation in making the decisions that will ensure a more equitable allocation of both broadcasting and non-broadcasting frequencies, in the allocation of electronic spectrum use, and of satellite parking slots. Also, through participation in the policy decisions affecting the symmetry and asymmetry of information flows, the question of prior consent for transborder home reception,

the production of communications technology, and decisions on definitions of privacy, transborder data flows, and the developing countries' capacity to develop their own media. In short, the struggle for a New World Information Order should be seen as a manifestation of the Third World's determination to act no longer as the passive periphery to the West's active centre.

It therefore matters a great deal whether one tries to respond to the topic under discussion from a future perspective of continued western dominance, or from the future perspective of a pluralistic world in which power disparities have been considerably reduced. In the first case, the major problem is the struggle of Third World countries to retain their cultural identity against the onslaught of homogenising western dominated communications. In the second, the problem is the largely autonomous socio-cultural transformation of Third World countries, the process of the redefinition of their cultural identity, and the manner in which interaction and communications with other cultures take place.

Unless the world breaks apart into an inherently unstable collection of self-sufficient groupings, it is most likely that the North and the South, the East and the West will be linked together by broader or narrower bands of what might be called cosmopolitan culture, shaped by modern communications, covering rules of behaviour and, to some extent, lifestyles also, shared by important parts of the elites in the various countries, but also covering activities in the fields of industrial production, international commerce and the exchange of information and knowledge, science, technology and culture. This cosmopolitan culture, for the moment mainly rooted in western cultures, but later inevitably and increasingly, fed and stimulated by the world's non-western cultures as well are, and will continue to be, a major carrier of universal humanistic values, expressive of a growing sense of global human solidarity, as well as of a growing understanding of the fragility of the globe's ecological system, now dependent for its maintenance on humankind's mutual dependency. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this band or these bands will also be the dominant factors in the political and socio-cultural dynamics of the large non-western civilisations in the world.

The Ultimate Questions

The essence of a culture is defined by its responses to the ultimate questions of human existence: death, hope, tragedy, love, loyalty, power, the meaning and purpose of life, and the place of the transcendental in human existence. The responses to these questions may be affected by science and technology, and by the secularising impact of modernisation, but need not necessarily be destroyed by them. Considering the indications that modern man in western society now seems to be increasingly unwilling to live permanently in a totally secularised world, it is rather unlikely that in those parts of the Third World where the traditional social systems have been largely shaped by religion, we will see the same degree of secularisation which has characterised Western modernisation, even though changing social structures are bound to affect religious perceptions

there as well. It is quite likely that the great civilisations of Asia, at least, will show the same degree of resilience and historical continuity which has taken them through both the colonial and post-colonial era. Moreover, in many parts of the Third World today, we can observe the beginning of a moral and religious backlash against the materialism, commercialism, consumerism and greed which seems inevitably to accompany the development and modernisation process. This backlash is of two kinds. In the first place, a neo-fundamentalistic reaction hostile to modernisation. Secondly, a religious counter-modernisation, not hostile to modernity *per se*, but insisting on its moral and religious re-interpretation as a basis for the development effort. Many of the cultures of the Third World will therefore retain their distinctive features, despite the sharing of universalistic values, intellectual orientations, and fashions, as well as lifestyles of Third World elites with the West. The case of post-war modern Japan seems to argue against this thesis, but American protection and Japan's successes in production and exports resulting from their mastery of science and technology, may simply have delayed the point at which Japan will culturally come into its own, resolving its insecurities about the meaning of its civilisation and about its role in the world beyond the sales of automobiles and electronic hardware.

Alternating Waves

History also shows that in the process of interaction with other cultures, countries go through alternating waves of openness and lack of it towards external influence. The opportunity cost of closing its boundaries may come very high to a country, in terms of sharing in the advances of science and technology, but for the sake of maintaining cultural continuity and national integrity, resort to it may have been taken only when the mediating mechanisms or filtering processes which integrate external influences and information into the cultural life of a nation became overloaded. Of course, there is obviously a point where such isolation becomes disfunctional. We have seen such alternating waves of openness and lack of it of non-western cultures in the face of western science, technology and power in Japan's and China's history, but also in the history of Imperial Russia and even of the Soviet Union today. It is to be expected that in the years to come we will at times see more expressions of this recurring need for privacy. This should be simply a matter of national sovereignty and privilege, were it not that such isolation from, and such impediments to, the free flow of information, quite often, at the same time, facilitate the suppression of dissent at home.

Another tendency reinforcing the continuity of cultural identity is the increasing power and the expanding role of the governments of nation states in the Third World. Ironically, this may in part be the result of growing interdependence and the legitimate desire of such governments to maximise their interests in the shifting patterns of international power. In this process, which in economic terms involves rearrangements in the international division of

labour, and the struggle for a New International Economic Order, the governments of these states have become the prime negotiators with the outside world. These extensions into the international field of the decolonisation struggle inevitably strengthen the sense of national and cultural identity. A great deal of power, of course, has also accrued to governments of developing countries as a result of their role as the main development agent in the country. For these purposes, the expansion of the domestic communications system becomes an essential instrument to these governments. This leads us to a consideration of the impact of development on the communications system and *vice versa*, as well as of the impact of the latter on the cultural identity of these countries.

Different Trajectories

It is becoming increasingly evident that the large and populous developing countries will be unable to solve their problems of deep and widespread poverty and of massive rural unemployment by replicating the western model of industrialisation through the gradual enlargement of their modern sectors. Through the development of indigenous rural technology, taking it gradually up to subsequent steps on the technological ladder, while simultaneously developing the social organisation which will allow rural people to maintain command of their technologies and not relinquish it to the cities; through the development of appropriate technology, and the dispersal of modern industries in rural areas with appropriate linkages to rural productive capacity; these countries will have to follow a different industrialisation trajectory from that of the West. It is heavy emphasis on rural and regional employment-creating development that will lead to a different structural transformation of these societies and to different systems of production of goods and services, as well as to different urban-rural configurations. This course of development would take more time in its initial stages, but would broaden the base of development so as to include the whole of society, especially the rural poor and unemployed, turning their energies into a basic resource. It is essentially a process of revitalising the bottom income levels of society through stimulation of self-organisation and management, rather than the mere implantation of technology, capital and skills from the outside. This would lead to the growth of largely self-reliant social systems, suitable for high density living at relatively low per capita income, but also ones that are resource-conserving and ecologically responsible. Poverty and demography, therefore, are forcing upon these countries a development strategy which may lead to alternative forms of social organisation, which might be less prone to many of the problems that have followed in the wake of western industrialisation: alienation, atomisation, spiritual emptiness and consumerism.

Part of the search for different ways in which to organise the nation towards these ends, will have to include the development of greater capability for self enjoyment through continued active participation in the arts, and not through passive listening or viewing. The stimulation of the innate artistic capabilities of

people will have to be an intrinsic part of this effort. The reduction of personal space as a result of very high density living will force the development or sometimes rediscovery of cultural values which will enable people to live together in relative harmony and civility. It will also require the development – or rediscovery – of concepts of inner space, most likely through art and religion. By integrating the whole of man's existential experience in this way, drawing on man's yearning for a return of the 'sacred' in human life, it may be possible to overcome the intellectual dichotomy between religion and science, as well as the inner fragmentation at the personal level which science and present development models seems to bring in their wake. This would make it possible for large numbers of people living closely together, at low and only slowly rising levels of per capita income, to find a sufficient degree of satisfaction and meaning in life through a greater capacity for self-realisation in community, without losing their drive and vitality. It should be realised, of course, that what is desirable and possible need not necessarily happen. In truth, it can be stated that the success or failure of the cultures of Third World countries to achieve such autonomous development towards less exploitative, and more humane, societies of free human beings, will be the measure of the vitality and creativity of their cultures. Still, for the large populous countries, there may be no other way.

Other Scenarios

This is of course not the only scenario that is possible. Different scenarios are already being played out by smaller, less populous countries in the Third World, which have successfully attained a high level of economic well-being by applying the western industrialisation models, and by fully plugging themselves into the network of international trade and communications. Important though these successes in themselves are – and not all small countries have chosen to make that decision – they will most likely be phenomena marginal to the success or failure in terms of their revitalisation and self-renewal of the large, more populous developing countries.

It is by grappling with these problems of poverty and demography, through turning people into a resource for societal growth and emancipation, through increased self-awareness, self-confidence and pride, and through the selection and evolvement of the methods and manner in which these goals are pursued, that the cultural identities of these countries will be transformed, redefined and strengthened from within. They will also be modern, in the sense that they will be capable of dealing effectively and in their own way with the problems of the turn of the century.

It is obvious that in this process of self-renewal of a nation, and a culture, and in this autonomous development trajectory, communications will play a very important role, but only to the extent of their being an indigenous instrument in the service of indigenously and autonomously articulated goals, with regard to overcoming poverty, inequity, oppressiveness, and the transformation of the underlying social and political structures. Such an autonomous deve-

lopment trajectory has, of course, its own information requirements. It needs, above all, an improved capacity to produce relevant, locally generated information which, especially in rural development, is specific to the culture and area of the country concerned. Local relevance will require decentralised, locally controlled programming in collaboration with local farmers, and be responsive to their needs. It will require giving careful attention to problems of suitable packaging of such information in line with local educational levels and intellectual orientations, but also to problems of proper location, and access to communications equipment for the poorest parts of both rural and urban populations, this to ensure equal access to information. The availability of modern communications will reduce, rather than widen, the gap – also in power – between the information poor and the information rich sectors of society. These countries also have to build up their indigenous intellectual and artistic creativity, as well as their indigenous and autonomous capacity in science and technology, responsive to their own problems and aspirations. Indigenous development by itself will, therefore, provide the greatest impetus towards establishing modern communications in these countries. They will not come into being as merely the extension into the hinterland of any international network. The establishment of modern communication networks in the rural areas of these large and populous countries is an unavoidable condition for the maintenance of the momentum of development, because of the increasing inadequacy of the traditional means of supplying information to the rural population: the village headman, and the extension services. At some point in the development process, rapidly changing production and market requirements will create a demand for a volume and a range of information which can only be handled through direct access by the farmer and the rural population in general. It is against this background that problems like the right to privacy and shared control of the international communication infrastructure and policies, and possibly even Third World representation on the board of international news agencies by competent individuals, have to be seen and understood, in the contemporary international debate on freedom of information flow.

Continuous Interaction

Still, global interdependence and the interests of the developing countries in international trade, industrial development and in the international exchange of information in the area of science and culture, require linkages with the domestic autonomous communications system. Moreover, independent access to international news and information by the population would help to keep up the quality, integrity and completeness of coverage of the domestic information system. Nevertheless, in most of these large populous developing countries it is unlikely that the impact of the international system will be much more than marginal to the internal dynamics of the country's autonomous societal growth.

At the same time, global interdependence, intensified and made instantaneous by the development of communications, makes it inevitable that the forging of

these cultural identities will take place in continuous dialogue and interaction, and even conflict with the First and the Second World. In earlier centuries civilisations rose and fell without affecting other civilisations much. Later on we have seen Asian and African cultures succumbing to superior western power. In the information age, however, a change in the constellation of power almost anywhere in the world is bound to affect the global balance of power.

It may well be that only those processes of self-renewal and cultural redefinition encompassing alternative moral visions of man, of his relationship to society and history, to nature and the transcendental, will be viable only if they are compatible with, and meaningful to, others beyond their borders. What may help this search along is the realisation that both the rich and the poor countries, the industrial and the industrialising countries, are all clearly unprepared for the future, and that all the great ideologies seem to have spent their strength, while the large majority of humankind has lost its faith in the viability of the existing international system and has come to consider it as basically immoral. The struggle for redefinition and transformation from within of the cultural identities of the Third World countries should, therefore, be seen as part of a general search among people all over the world for new moral foundations on which a viable international order can rest.

No nation, rich or poor, powerful or weak, can work out its salvation in isolation. The answers we are all looking for cannot be found by any single culture alone. They can only be found together. In both success or failure, the role of communications may well be crucial.

THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Meheroo Jussawalla

Communication technology has virtually revolutionised international relationships over a wide spectrum of activities – political, economic, and sociocultural. In recent years this has been true of the international economic system more than the political sphere, despite the efforts for integration by international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank, GATT and regional blocs like the EEC, the COMECON and the ASEAN. Communication systems play a vital role in international trade flows, currency fluctuations and international capital flows as well as in the operations of multinational corporations and cartels.

Communications and Economics

Advances in communication technology enabled the networks to keep major trading countries, banks and individual speculators continually informed of variations in trade and money flows and were an important concomitant of the numerous international monetary crises that occurred between 1971 and 1973. With the delinking of the dollar from gold, a trade impasse followed involving major trading countries like the US, Japan and Western European States. Communication flows were of crucial significance and on the input of such flows depended the very continuance of the Bretton Woods system. Speculation on currency exchanges, flows of hot money, currency floats, violent fluctuations of interest rates were all stimulated by communication technology, the minute by minute transmission of information across national frontiers and the electronic transfer of funds. The degree of risk and uncertainty present in foreign markets is linked to input and output flows of which information flows are an important input that influence decisionmaking organisations which send and receive these flows.[1]

When the European Economic Community in 1971 formed the joint currency 'snake', their common agricultural policy had to be revised because a revaluation of the mark meant cheaper farm imports into West Germany. To counteract this trend, border tax adjustments had to be introduced. In fact monetary authorities moved so rapidly towards creating 'dirty floats' that central banks had to

[1] R E Baldwin, 'International Trade in Inputs and Outputs'. *Economics of Information and Knowledge*, edited by O M Lamberton. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin. 1971.

intervene to maintain a reasonable level of exchange rate stability for their own currencies. Once again the quality and reliability of information transmitted at the time was not considered adequate and this added to the uncertainty of transactions. For instance, multinational corporations had to adjust their liquid assets to take account of 'expected' currency variations. If revaluation of the mark was anticipated by the news networks, a corporation would make early payments of its debts to West German suppliers and simultaneously purchase marks to hold. Conversely, rumours of franc devaluation would induce the firm to delay payments to French suppliers and offer a discount for immediate payment of bills outstanding in francs. Such protective steps influenced spot and/or forward markets,[2] when taken simultaneously by several corporations.

These examples are cited to emphasise the close links that emerge between international economic systems and communication technology. Such developments could hardly have been generated with the same rapidity and the same crisis atmosphere that threatened to disintegrate the international financial system, without relevant computerised statistics and their rapid transmission to the money markets and central banks of the free enterprise countries.

Very often the media is used to restore or destroy the psychology of confidence in a particular currency. The current continued erosion in the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets is bolstered by information flows regarding the US balance of payments, the domestic price inflation, the inelasticity of demand for oil in the country, all of which generate uncertainty about its future as an international reserve currency. Confidence in the dollar declined so sharply that an alternative European Monetary System was widely canvassed to link the currencies of the EEC and later to organise a European Monetary Fund. This, if done, would be in direct contravention of the functions of the IMF and would jeopardise both the stability of the dollar and the existing payments system. Opposition generated and publicised against the European Monetary System by the networks, enabled the IMF and the World Bank to plan for greater stability in the world monetary system.

Communications and Development

Developing countries were the worst victims of the currency upheavals and the oil crisis. They lacked resources to meet the rising price of wheat, along with the mounting cost of oil, and oil-based products, particularly fertilisers.[3] Their economies lacked the resilience to make the necessary adjustments. While the international communication networks carried information on the latest demands for equipment and consumer goods emerging from the Arab countries, it was the First World that competed for these orders and won them. Third World countries had to be satisfied with supplying unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Their consumer manufactures and products of light industry like electric fans, air condi-

[2] US Tariff Commission, 'Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investments and for US Trade and Labour'. *Report to the Senate Finance Committee 1973*, pp 8-9.
[3] *Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by S Naya *et al.* Bangkok: UN Asian Development Institute. 1976.

tioners, transistor radios, refrigerators, could not capture Arab markets, since they lacked the means of projecting a strong image for their products.

Less developed countries have learnt from experience that an import substitution strategy starts by producing non-durable consumer goods, next it moves to processing of assembly type final products and then to capital equipment. The protective structure set up for this purpose makes the foreign exchange value of imported industrial raw materials and maintenance imports greater than the foreign exchange value of the final product, so that the value added is negative. Prices of import substitutes may be well above the world market level. They have found, therefore, that an export-oriented strategy is more cost effective and likely to become more profitable with the dismantling of tariff barriers and quota restrictions that have operated against them. The flow of capital and transfer of technology has yet to move in the 'preferred direction' in as much as world trading agreements should facilitate flows that would enable poor countries to become more self-reliant and participate more equitably in the good life.[4]

Already a few LDCs such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have been successful in their export-oriented strategies. The EEC claims that it has lost 500,000 jobs in its textile and clothing industries since 1973 because of competing goods from Asia and Latin America. The areas in which these countries have successfully competed, apart from textiles, have been electronic components, television, shipbuilding and structured steel. Their governments have given tax breaks and subsidies to those exporters who fulfil the targeted export quota. In 1970 these four countries together accounted for 2·4 per cent of world exports which increased by 1976 to 3·4 per cent.[5] This indicates that they are moving away from raw materials and soft technology exports to manufactured goods and heavy industry like steel, ships and petrochemicals, and are able to withstand competition in the markets of the First World. Developing countries need to explore international markets for successful export promotion. Already multinational advertising agencies operate in Third World countries and their services could be used at reasonable cost for tapping markets of Europe, America and Japan. Faced with large masses of people living below the poverty threshold, low productivity and high unemployment, LDCs find it difficult to invest in telecommunication services to assist their drive for exports. Only when the cost per unit of hardware and of service agencies declines will they be in a position to acquire these systems.[6]

Two Way Process

It is a two way process that links trade flows with communication flows. Just as Third World countries need to explore developed country markets for their primary products and manufactures, advanced countries need to export their

[4] J Bhagwati, *Economics and World Order*. New York: The Free Press. 1972, p 23.
[5] *US News & World Report*, 16 October 1978.
[6] W Pierce & N Jequier, 'The Contribution of Telecommunications to Economic Development'. *Telecommunications Journal* 44 (11) 1977.

information goods and services to LDCs. The reason is that within industrialised countries the information sector has already reached levels of saturation. Exports from this sector have become inoperative.[7] As far back as 1962, Fritz Machlup revealed that the contribution of the knowledge sector of the US economy had increased from 10 per cent in 1900 to 30 per cent in 1960. This trend increased further to 50 per cent as substantiated by Marc Porat. OECD studies point to similar growth of information societies in the UK, West Germany and France. The information sector in Japan has been moving in the same direction. The saturation analysis of this sector anticipates that diminishing returns may soon set in. A correlation study by Jean Voge, Engineer-General of French Telecommunications, lends support to this thesis when he finds that the growth of the information sector in the US is twice as fast as the growth of the economy as a whole.[8] If this trend continues, and the rest of the economy lags behind, demand for and investment in the information sector will decline, thereby worsening stagflation.

This crisis has its spillover effects for developing countries. The transfer of communication technology to them is already under way with the expansion policies of multinational corporations. The largest market for the surplus output of the information sector exists in developing countries which offer a highly competitive environment. Salomon Brothers estimated in 1975 that the quantum of investment needed to bring the use of telephone and telex to the level of North America would require $5 billion per annum over a period of thirty years.[9] Internal financing by emerging economies is next to impossible. Yet their needs are urgent and they are aware that time is their enemy in the race for development. Their dilemma worsens as population growth overtakes capital formation. The economics of information systems, however, is moving rapidly towards cost reduction. Computer packet switching networks can be used to meet the needs of agricultural research centres. A report to the Ford Foundation shows how multiple access satellite systems can reduce the cost for services, locate activities where maintenance and technical personnel exist and give to LDCs access to advanced technical information bases.[10] The UN is currently using such an Agricultural Research Information System (AGRIS) programme for compilation and distribution of agricultural information to developing countries. In August 1978 India presented a meteorological station to Sri Lanka and by 1980 will have launched the second experimental satellite for earth observation as well as a geosynchronous communication satellite.

New Economic Order

The developing countries want non-reciprocal preferential treatment for their

[7] M U Porat, 'Global Implications of the Information Society'. *Journal of Communication*, (28) 1978.
[8] J Voge, 'Information, Growth and Economic Crisis'. *Inter Media* (5) December 1977.
[9] J M Clippinger, 'Can Communications Development Benefit the Third World?'. *Telecommunication Policy* 1 (4) 1977.
[10] Coladarci & Arnove, *Educational Television: a policy critique for developing countries*. Stanford University Press. 1973.

exports, a reduction in the burden of debt servicing and self-reliant sources for technology adoption. These demands are not new nor inconsistent with existing trends in world trade. What is new is collective bargaining by the Third World and an assertion of commodity power. Commodity power versus food power is only part of the rhetoric. The fact remains that improved communication between the North and South would generate a two way flow of industrial goods, raw materials and information technology. The LDCs are claiming greater equality of opportunity and a bigger share of world trade than they have had so far. They do not want to be relegated, in perpetuity, to the limbo of labour intensive, low degree mechanisation, and intermediate technology, simply because they did not 'inherit' the Industrial Revolution. They want to take advantage of the innovations in science and technology to move their economies on to the turnpike of growth. Their protest chiefly focuses on the restrictive import practices of the First World, and they want a greater role in international decisionmaking. Most countries in the Third World find that transnational corporation contracts and leases are exploitative and there is an unequal sharing of benefits.[11] The existing order is unsatisfactory even from the standpoint of industrialised countries, because they are facing pressures of inflation, unemployment, energy shortage and threats of recession. If there is a semblance of 'reverse dependency', the need for a New International Economic Order becomes crucial. This concept is designed to awaken a recognition that 'the rules of social organisation for markets and for communities have not changed when you reach the planetary level.'[12] The world free market economy, in this context, continues to remain an illusion, as the tension between the two worlds increasingly depends on better communications and deeper understanding of each other's problems.

New Information Order

A recognition of economic disparities between the North and South, and the confrontation stemming from them, has led to the conviction that a New Information Order is called for to reduce tensions. Advances in communication systems are as vital to the Third World as dismantling trade barriers. Such systems will not only enable Third World countries to improve their health and education services, to plan their population growth and to increase their agricultural productivity, but also help them to organise regional trade blocs and promote Third World trade. The needs of different countries for communication systems vary, but essentially the free flow of information goods and services is as important as the free flow of industrial goods and services. In fact, the output of the manufacturing sector depends upon a sizeable input of information goods and services, such as research and design, business machines, legal services, accounting and managerial services. These constitute the secondary information sector and are exported as 'hidden cost' of non-information goods.[13] In a wider

[11]M Haw, 'Into Phase Two: the next critical step'. *International Development Review* (2) 1978.
[12]B Ward, speech at 'North-South Round Table'. May 1978.
[13]M U Porat, *op cit.*

context, information goods provide the basis for capital accumulation. Their prices have an impact upon the balance of payments of trading nations as much as the prices of non-information goods. The markets for the output of the communication sector are competitive because the direct and indirect benefits that flow from their purchase are being competed for by individuals, institutions and nations. As such a New International Economic Order is inextricably linked with trade in communication goods and services as well as in manufactured goods and raw materials. This link has been forged by the market forces of supply and demand.

The information environment of LDCs serves as a constraint in the form of inequity in proprietorship of information. As soon as information goods and services have an economic impact, or one that can be priced, the problem of proprietory rights emerges. Other constraints would be the opportunity costs of investment and the ratio of change projected by the information sector.[14] This ratio depends upon the ability of the developing country to absorb appropriate technology transfer without subjecting itself to 'cultural domination'. For instance, 'data nets' offer great promise to LDCs in the form of relatively cheaper means of technology transfer. A report on a study of the usefulness of advanced communication technology by Ithiel de Sola Pool and Associates at MIT shows that costs and benefits of telex, facsimile, computertime-sharing networks, and multiple access satellite systems are 'appropriate to the needs of developing countries'.

The Beginning

Similar in its approach to the New International Economic Order, the global information order tends to emphasise a balanced flow with Third World countries, and to change the existing structure of the information system in which LDCs are passive recipients of information. They have lacked the leverage to obtain substantial concessions both in the economic and information spheres.[15] A beginning towards a new information order was made in Lima, Peru in 1975 when a draft constitution was sought to be drawn up for a Nonaligned press agencies pool. The economic and socio-cultural counterpart of this event had been the Algiers Conference in 1973. But it was at the 1976 meeting of the information ministers of Nonaligned states, held in New Delhi, that the declaration was made asserting the need for a 'New Order for Information' and affirming it to be of as equal importance as the New International Economic Order. The essential objectives of such an order were equal access to all sources of information and equal control over the use of international transmission channels leading to a balanced flow of news. A concerted effort is under way by national and international organisations to mobilise public opinion on an international scale in favour of eliminating discriminatory practices against

[14]E McAnany, 'Does Information Really Work?'. *Journal of Communication* (28) 1978.
[15]H Schwiller, 'Decolonisation of Information Efforts toward a New International Order'. *Latin American Perspectives* 5 (1) 1978.

Third World countries in respect of the flow of news and access to information. The new order for international communications could be directed towards the encouragement of producing hardware within the Third World so that the costs of transfer of technology and the trend for dependency on imports for hardware would be reduced. For self-reliance in software, the new order could encourage the concept of treating information as a 'social good' which would enable people of the LDCs to participate in decisionmaking that influences their own standards of living.[16] Under the existing system, audiences for the media have been mostly sought after for commercial purposes, whereas under the new order they could be involved for social reconstruction. Such a change would necessitate rethinking on whether media owned and controlled by the public sector in LDCs could be relied upon to generate citizen participation in decisionmaking.

The lip service paid to cultural sovereignty in the process of modernisation of developing economies seems an exercise in futility. As long as gains from communication technology are equitably distributed and do not add to elitism within the economies of Third World countries, cultural integrity should not pose a problem, or hold back such countries from investing in modern information systems. This may sound overly ambitious, but how long can intelligent people cling to the theme that modernisation and industrialisation are alien to the 'culture' of LDCs? Can basic human needs be widely satisfied, or can the majority of their people get two square meals a day, adequate house room and education for their children by clinging to outmoded technology based on traditional culture? People can and do adapt themselves to change if they are convinced that the gains from such change will be equitably distributed.

Convergence and Synthesis

The convergence of the economic order and the information order – or more broadly, a communication order – occurs at the level of technology transfer and the investment it entails. In the realm of politics, it could reduce international tensions and pave the way for greater economic prosperity. After all, communication has been described as the key factor in solving problems of hunger, poverty, disarmament and peacekeeping.

Whereas the new economic order emphasises the expansion of trade flows from the Third World and great receptivity of LDC exports by industrialised countries, the communication order aims at reversing the flow on the assumption that information storage and retrieval has been the preserve of the First World. In both cases there may be a need for a balanced flow, without any one group of countries finding themselves solely at the receiving end.

Since in both the New International Economic Order and the New International Communication Order the need is for an even flow, a critical problem is the communication gap between the economist and the communication

[16]Final Statement of 'Conference on the Role of Information of the New International Order'. Instituto Latino-Americano de Estudios Transnacionales. Mexico City, May 1978.

scientist, both of whom are interested in helping the Third World.

Common ground is not the problem. Both product flows and information flows are subject to the processes of production, exchange and distribution. Both information and non-information goods are subject to opportunity cost considerations and to investment analysis. And optimising investment in either sector requires a full understanding of when and how technology transfers and economies of scale affect unit costs. One of the advantages of integrating the two Orders would be a higher degree of factor price equalisation across trading countries. Communication technology, if it equalises information flows, would simultaneously equalise labour-capital ratios, thereby inducing greater factor-price equalisation. The major assumption for such an advantage would be unrestricted information flows moving towards the widening of free market flows of goods, which otherwise would be deterred by the administered pricing policies of multinational corporations. This has been recognised both by the Nairobi commitment and by the 1978 UNESCO Conference on a New Information Order at Paris.

It is submitted here that the two Orders be envisaged as an integrated whole, instead of each operating in isolation. Only then could Third World countries, haunted by fears of technological domination by the industrialised world, relax their suspicions. This may lead to greater harmony in the comity of nations. A synthesis of the two Orders will entail collaborative planning by international organisations and by policymakers at the national level. Their task will be to frame coordinated agreements for balanced trade and communication flows.

REVIEW ARTICLE:

MODERNISING AGRARIAN COUNTRIES

W Klatt

Economics of Change in Less Developed Countries
David Colman and Frederick Nixson
Oxford: Philip Allan. 1978. 309pp. £10.50. £5.25 pb.
Development and the Problems of Village Nutrition
Sue Schofield
London: Croom Helm. 1979. 174pp. £8.95.
Food Commodities
Bernhard Davies
London: Heinemann. 1978. 346pp. £4.90 pb.
The Political Economy of Food
Edited by Vilho Harle
Farnborough, England: Saxon House. 1978. 438pp. £11.50.
To Feed this World: the challenge and the strategy
Sterling Wortman and Ralph W Cummings Jr
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1978. 440pp. $6.95 pb.
Food and Population: priorities in decisionmaking
Edited by T Dams, the late K E Hunt and G J Tyler
Farnborough, England: Saxon House. 1978. 192pp. £8.50.
Agricultural Development and the Rural Poor
Edited by Guy Hunter
London: Overseas Development Institute. 1978. 113pp. £1.50.
Rural Asia: challenge and opportunity. Supplementary Papers, Vols I-IV
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 1978. 430pp.
Rural Development: learning from China
Sartaj Aziz
London: Macmillan. 1978. 201pp. £8.95.
Studies in Agricultural Economics and Statistics
Selected articles from the Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics
Rome: FAO. 1978. 442pp.

There cannot be any doubt that the colonial era was full of errors of omission and commission. When, following the end of the Second World War, this relatively short period of man's history was terminated, high hopes were raised throughout the world that a millennium of prosperity lay ahead. Since then, many expectations have been disappointed and in all too many places destructive cynicism can now be found where

previously a wholly unjustified state of euphoria prevailed. In countries which are – somewhat incongruously – bracketed as the Third World, complaints are abroad about the legacies of colonialism: the failure of UNCTAD; the futility of the North-South debate; the resistance against a New International Economic Order; and the neo-colonial intentions of multinational companies. However justified these complaints are – and they are at times too sweeping to be helpful – it would be dangerous to overlook the fact that many of the issues are domestic in nature. Where indigenous political, social and economic deformities need to be corrected, this can be done – and ought to be done – domestically, irrespective of any selfish attitudes within the international community, however unresponsive it may appear to be. This community should not be made the scapegoat for failures which, like charity, begin at home.

Of course, stupendous errors were made in early attempts to modernise in a hurry societies which had undergone little change for centuries. At best, the approach was selective and not covering more than one sector at a time. Today it seems incomprehensible that, say, the eradication of malaria with the aid of DDT was carried out without the effects of the operation on the growth rates of population and food requirements being considered simultaneously. However, to blame this folly on the wickedness of donor governments or supranational chemical companies, rather than on the lack of coordination between medical doctors, demographers and agronomists, would amount to a distortion of the facts. The last three decades of contemporary history are full of errors of this kind. Whilst there is no ground for being apologetic about them, it is worth recalling that never in recorded history has there been such an ambitious attempt to alter the course of 'development' on so massive a scale and in so short a time. In this situation, blunders of enormous magnitude were bound to be made even by men of goodwill.

The climate in which this worldwide enterprise of modernisation was undertaken may be illustrated by one or two small incidents which occurred in its early days. At the time when U Nu, a relatively liberal, albeit ineffectual, moderniser governed Burma, an enquiry as to the whereabouts of the reports written by the district commissioners during the British period was treated as though it reflected sabotage, if not treason. Yet these reports, often composed by able men with a vast knowledge of the country in which they served and written in a clear style, were dismissed as irrelevant. On another occasion, at the Villa Serbelloni, where scholars of many lands meet to debate possible solutions to problems of the Third World, only one of some twenty specialists knew of the existence of the Royal Commission's reports on Indian agriculture and its recommendations. Yet these volumes contain a great deal which is still relevant and is not necessarily improved by well-meaning newcomers who treat, say, paddy rice in sub-tropical Asia as R, i.e. a residual, in their planning models.

Specialists in matters of modernisation were no doubt right to dismiss as outdated the Malthusian formula which claims that the population increases in a geometrical progression while subsistence increases only in arithmetical progression. However, not to observe at the same time that our technology progresses geometrically, whilst our social and political institutions change – at best – arithmetically, was an oversight for which all of us continue to pay dearly. Once upon a time, development and growth were regarded as subjects of 'political economy', an art form rather than a discipline

of the exact sciences, but such a broad approach is hardly found in our departmentalised world of today. Rare are those minds with a grasp of modernisation as a process which involves, say, anthropologists and students of comparative religion as much as economists and sociologists, and which is ultimately set in motion by politicians, be they reformers or revolutionaries. In the gleaming corridors of the Palace on the East River or of Mussolini's former Colonial Office it is regarded as bad form to speak of, say, caste or religious taboos as being relevant to the process of modernisation. These subjects are taken as much for granted as were the lower orders in the manor houses of Britain. Yet they are important features of the social landscape which are disregarded at the moderniser's peril. Sceptics should consult the Shah.

None of the books under review have the broad sweep nor the all-embracing knowledge which the modernisers of poor societies so badly need. Yet in their different ways, each one of these additions to the steadily growing literature on questions of modernisation adds something of value. Sometimes the reader would wish for greater brevity. Authors ought to be reminded at times that those concerned with changing the conditions under which the countries of the Third World exist are invariably men in a hurry. Self-discipline and humility are ingredients essential in any dialogue designed to help those concerned with problems of development – a painful process in the best of circumstances. David Colman and Frederick Nixson have written a concise introduction in *Economics of Change in Less Developed Countries*. Their text is easy to understand and not overburdened with econometric ballast. Manchester University, from which they hail, started early after the last war to teach development economics. No doubt partly inspired by the work of Kurt Martin who, as Kurt Mandelbaum, constructed a model in 'Industrialisation of Backward Areas' (Oxford: Blackwell. 1945), the University's pioneering work became known through 'Teaching Development Economics' (London: Frank Cass. 1967). In their textbook, Colman and Nixson give definition, measurement and theory of development their due, before turning to special subjects, such as foreign trade, agriculture, industry and the transfer of technology. Where their own views differ from those of other writers, the authors give a well balanced account of conflicting assessments and remedies offered. Whilst they write well, the reader could have done without such linguistic horrors as 'judgementally' (p 3) or 'villagisation' (p 5). The two authors are rightly concerned about the conflict between high rates of economic growth and inequities in the distribution of existing and newly created wealth. Like other economists, Colman and Nixson have doubts as to whether economic development and the equity of income distribution are compatible. In fact, the question whether conventional economic wisdom is capable of solving the problems connected with poverty and unemployment in underdeveloped countries is raised by most contemporary writers. The confidence of the 1950s and 1960s has been badly shaken. It is increasingly being recognised that social, political and institutional changes have to be related to policies directed at economic growth and redistribution of wealth and income. The authors rightly distinguish between agricultural and rural policies, the first of which tends to increase existing inequalities, whilst the latter offers opportunities for reducing them. In dealing with trade and aid, the authors are critical of certain practices pursued by industrial countries which tend to be detrimental to less developed countries.

In particular, they criticise the low propensity of certain footloose transnational corporations to reinvest their profits locally. However, 'in the last resort it is up to the LDC government to pursue policies which will eliminate the causes of these problems' (p 238).

One of the most prominent signs of a lack of progress is the continued pre-eminence of the traditional sector and its clash of interest with the modern industrial sector. In developing countries, most people still live in villages. Indeed, because of high growth rates of population, the number of rural dwellers tends to increase side by side with urbanisation and industrialisation. Unless the growth of food supplies exceeds significantly that of the population, the increasing number of urban dwellers may deprive their rural relatives of any opportunity to improve their food intake. Considering the numbers involved, it seems incredible how little thought has been given to this particular feature of underdevelopment. To be fair, the Food and Agriculture Organisation developed and publicised the 'food balance' technique, but few surveys of household budgets have been collected. In so far as any such surveys exist, they concentrate on urban households. In her study, *Development and the Problems of Village Nutrition*, Sue Schofield has tracked down nutrition surveys for less than a thousand villages – a trifling fraction of the millions of rural communities which provide homestead and livelihood for up to four-fifths of the population of the Third World. Yet hers is the most comprehensive collection of its kind. The author's slim volume owes its existence to the endeavours of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. In its village studies programme, the Institute, which is nowadays in the forefront of research in this field, treats the rural community as the basic unit of its investigations. As one would expect, the amount of food eaten and its composition depend in the rural areas chiefly on the crops grown as well as on the social and economic status of the individual household. Though the author's sample, of which almost one-third comes from Indian villages, is ludicrously small and distressingly uneven, it reveals enough to allow certain generalisations to be made.

Often the food intake of villagers falls short of minimum requirements. This is particularly so at the bottom of the social ladder and at the end of the season. Signs of malnutrition are by no means rare at centres of food production. Poor families spend up to four-fifths of their income on food, and a similar portion of their intake consists of the crops they grow. Cassava is a particularly meagre source of protein, minerals and vitamins. Diets based on maize, millets and polished rice are also deficient in vitamins. Male adults are invariably better fed than adult women who, nevertheless, are engaged in heavy daily chores, such as carrying water from distant wells, and in seasonal work during planting and harvesting times. The diets of such vulnerable groups as nursing mothers and small children tend to be least satisfactory. All this is known but cannot be said too often to urban planners and politicians. Those unfamiliar with rural conditions may be surprised to learn that the producers of crops grown for sale, though better off financially, are usually less well fed than those producing chiefly for their own needs. Villagers thus have an even lower income elasticity for foodstuffs than urban dwellers. Sue Schofield and her academic supervisors deserve to be commended for a piece of research which lends itself directly to use in the formulation of farming and food policies.

Guides on nutritional requirements and food composition tables have been produced – and improved over the years – as a result of work done by the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Health Organisation. Those interested in the preparation, preservation and storing of foodstuffs can find a good deal of information in a recent publication, *Food Commodities*. Bernhard Davies, its author, writes primarily for the benefit of members of the British hotel and catering business. However, as tourism is rapidly becoming one of the growth industries of underdeveloped countries, this handbook is likely to find its way into the hands of teachers and students at technical schools and colleges which specialise in the art of catering for the palate of the foreign traveller, who may prefer his dull native dish to an exotic alternative which leaves him with gastro-enteritis.

The Political Economy of Food caters for an entirely different clientele. This particular diet was served at Tampere (Finland) during a conference called in 1976 by a group of 'peace researchers', who professed to regard the 'world food crisis' as 'a logical syndrome of the skewed structure of global food economy' (p vii). Whether by choice of location or of participants, the conference provided a platform for men and women who know, in particular, that any dependence on American foodstuffs is equated with neocolonialism. Thus Algeria, by accepting food from capitalist countries, becomes 'an easy target for blackmail' (p 10). Gifts of grain are proof of American 'grain power'. In the capitalist system, 'everything is produced to make money – food constitutes no exception' (p 224). The authors of this tome do not say where food is produced and passed to the consumer free of charge. They are rather lenient when dealing with China's and Russia's refusal to join any 'early warning system' and thus to anticipate food shortages in countries of the Third World. But then, socialist countries 'do not consider themselves responsible for the present economic difficulties of the developing countries caused by the capitalist powers' (p 120). Brezhnev and Kosygin, who helped India during her years of food shortages, may feel rather hurt by the views of their comrades in Tampere. If any representatives of the Third World were present, they must have left the cold North for the tropical South with most of their questions unanswered.

To Feed this World is a work which tries to give answers to at least some of the most burning questions asked in the Third World. Its authors, Sterling Wortman and Ralph Cummings, have been distinguished for their association with the agricultural work of American foundations and aid operations. Both gained their knowledge and arrived at their recommendations by the sweat of their brows shed in many villages of sub-tropical Asia. In addition, Dr Wortman gained some insight into the workings of the communist alternative when in 1974 he led a team of American plant breeders through a large part of the Middle Kingdom. His mission's report is one of the most balanced and most readable accounts of how Chinese farming and agricultural science function. Their wide experience has taught the two authors the respect and humility without which there can be no meeting of minds between 'North' and 'South'. To them, to feed this world is as formidable a task as putting a man on the moon. They recognise that 'the gap between what we have learned and what is applied in the countryside remains enormous' (p xiii). To narrow this gap is what their book is about. The two authors are primarily men of action, though they have full command of the theoretical tools

of their profession.

Sometimes the reader might wish that the authors would curb their flow of words for the benefit of those for whom they write. However, let it be granted that they have a good deal to say, since to them the food problem has to do not only with production but also with purchasing power (distribution). Thus poverty and rural unemployment are uppermost in their minds. They do not shrink from tackling awkward issues, such as land ownership and tenure; neither do they gloss over controversial matters, such as certain aspects of food aid programmes. Clearly they have learned to see the recipient's point of view as much as that of the donor. Like the contributors to the World Food and Nutrition Study of the US National Academy of Sciences (Washington 1977), which they quote with approval (p 94), the two authors are aware of both the great opportunities which modern technology provides and the equally great significance which traditional institutions have. They have no illusions about the obstacles which their 'challenge' and their 'strategy' are bound to encounter. As for institutional changes, Wortman and Cummings do not hesitate to state without any ambiguity that extensive land reforms are substantially confiscatory. They also recognise that decisions on such matters cannot be left exclusively to Governments. They hold that 'associations of rural people can be powerful forces for long-term changes' (p 256). This book ought to be in the hands of every decisionmaker in the Third World.

How to balance a country's population and food output was the subject of a seminar held in 1975 in Rome. It was sponsored jointly by the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE), the FAO and the UN Fund for Population Activities – an impressive gathering of specialists in matters of *Food and Population*. The seminar's papers and findings were considered again for a day the following year during the Nairobi Conference of the IAAE. Kenneth Hunt, formerly the head of the Agricultural Economics Institute in Oxford and a leading member of the IAAE, died whilst editing the proceedings of the one-day discussions at Nairobi. The slim monograph which Dr Tyler of the Oxford Institute completed after Hunt's death does not reflect fully the wide range of the original seminar and the excitement it created among its participants. Those interested in the full dossier of papers will find them in a volume edited by Dr Ensminger under a title of his own, 'Food Enough or Starvation for Millions' .The editor marred some of the discussions by the rather brash manners for which, in the days when he represented the Ford Foundation in Delhi, he was known among some of his Indian colleagues as the Yankee Viceroy. Under him a number of able men did much to help India in her process of modernising agriculture. Outstanding among the papers included in the monograph under review is the one by Ford Sturrock of the School of Agriculture at Cambridge (England). It deals with agricultural production on small farms. Sturrock rightly stresses the need for studies on the family farm as an economic unit – a subject on which he is superbly qualified to speak but which is sadly neglected throughout the Third World.

Another seminar concerned with the poor sections of village communities was organised in 1978 by the Overseas Development Institute in London and held at Ditchley Park. Guy Hunter, whose handwriting is clearly discernible in the formulation of the seminar's policy declaration and its subsequent guidelines, acted as the editor of *Agricultural Development and the Rural Poor*. He had previously become known as

the author of 'Modernising Peasant Societies' (Oxford University Press. 1969) and as a contributor to conferences held at Reading University on 'Change in Agriculture' (London: Duckworth. 1970) and on 'Policy and Practice in Rural Development' (London: Croom Helm. 1976). The latter of these conferences led to the ODI monograph under review. In their policy document the participants of the seminar state that poverty is spreading in spite of the growth of the national product of developing countries. They believe that in this situation uncontrolled technological advance can become social dynamite. More emphasis is thus required on 'changing the economic balance in favour of the mass of small farmers and the rural poor.' (p 9). Whilst the practical guidelines which emerged from the ODI seminar are on the whole sound, its participants were less daring than Wortman and Cummings. In fact, they held that 'to make a direct challenge to local power, without the capacity to give continuous protection . . . is asking for trouble.' (p 37). This is indeed the trouble with most social and political projects.

Although the World Bank and the regional banks of the United Nations are hemmed in by strict rules of 'sound' banking practices, the last decade has seen a shift towards unconventional projects designed to help small cultivators, though Watanabe and Yoshida, the two successive heads of the Asian Development Bank, have pursued a more cautious policy than Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank, in spreading the limited funds of their banking institutions. Even so, the move in the last decade from ready acceptance of technical change, as the prime source of progress, to the recognition, unusual for financial organs, of the fact that unemployment and poverty deserve the banker's attention, represents a significant advance. How far this view will actually influence the Asian Bank's lending policy remains to be seen. *Rural Asia: challenge and opportunity*, which contains the results of the Asian Bank's second agricultural survey, has been reviewed elsewhere (*International Affairs*, January 1979). In the meantime, under the same title four volumes of supporting documentation have become available. They contain much that is commonly known and has been said before. However, Russell Brannon's paper (in Vol III), which deals with the interrelated problems of inadequate employment and inequitable income distribution in developing countries, deserves to be singled out as an outstanding contribution to the controversy about labour creating and labour saving technologies in densely populated rural areas. Herbert Koetter pleads (in Vol IV) for the creation of organisations of the peasants rather than for the peasants – an important distinction – but he stops short of saying that this advice amounts to a demand for political involvement against traditional centres of power in the villages. This deserves to be stated clearly.

Whereas the Asian Bank's second agricultural survey contains references to the process of modernisation in Taiwan, the experience of the People's Republic of China, not yet being a member of the banking institutions of the United Nations, had to be ignored. This subject provided the theme of *Rural Development: learning from China*. As a senior official of the FAO, Sartaj Aziz, its author, had the opportunity of making several trips to China. Also, as a former member of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, he was familiar with problems connected with central planning. Unhappily, his book consists of a disappointingly uncritical account of rural development in post-revolutionary China, in which readily available official documentation has been

disregarded. This section of the book is followed by a second, equally unsatisfactory, part in which the author gives a cursory review of some development projects in Asian countries other than China. Evading the significance of such issues as China's system of irrigation and drainage throughout the ages and her more recent experiments with rural small scale industries, from which other countries could learn, even where they do not share China's present political philosophy, the author concludes that every country must find its own solution (p 108) – hardly a novel discovery.

If this is the best to emerge from the top echelon of the FAO, it is hardly surprising that a good deal of dissatisfaction is voiced whenever the representatives of member countries assemble in Rome. To be sure, some good work has been done, as in the area of nutrition. Other spheres have been neglected by comparison. Thus, FAO has not yet found it expedient to include detailed statistical data on land use and multi-cropping in its annual publications. The results of the world census of agriculture of 1970 has not yet been published. Those of the Indian census published in Delhi in 1975 have so far not even been circulated by FAO in mimeographed form. Farm accountancy surveys in underdeveloped countries, which can serve as tools for policymakers, have neither been encouraged nor collected by FAO. In fact, economic analysis has rarely been handled in FAO by senior members of the profession. Yet subjects like those mentioned above were dealt with competently half a century ago by the small staff of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome – a private venture.

Last year, FAO decided to remove in future all economic subjects which for over twenty five years had formed an integral part of its Monthly Bulletin. This now contains only statistical data. It is thus sad to have to conclude this review with a brief mention of the 'memorial' volume of fifty reprints of articles which appeared in the Monthly Bulletin during the last 25 years or so. FAO *Studies in Agricultural Economics and Statistics: 1952-77* is a well-selected sample of FAO's activities during the quarter of a century in which the countries of the Third World gained a position of their own. The memorial volume contains some of FAO's best contributions to the debate on modernising rural communities and their product. It also reveals by implication where FAO has been weak. It has yet to grasp that the greatest curse of farming lies in its seasonal nature and that measures taken to alleviate the seasonality of work, of input and output, and of income and expenditure are likely to be the most effective means by which to come closer to solving the main problems of underdevelopment than past policies have done.

In most countries of the Third World it is not land that is scarce, but land which is properly irrigated and drained throughout the year. It is such land that can absorb inputs and give output to man and beast for close on three hundred and sixty five days a year. On such land the opportunities for increased employment and holdings of small farm animals are almost limitless. It is here that sub-tropical farming might ultimately win over farming in temperate zones. Instead of producing one crop a year to be sold after the harvest when prices are at their lowest, farming of this kind can provide work and income with a minimum of seasonal variation or – better still – a regular flow of milk, eggs or poultry which make the cultivator as creditworthy in the bazaar as an urban creditcard-holder. As well-watered land is scarce, it is a source of power, and any attempt to redistribute it in favour of the weaker members of the

village community is bound to encounter fierce resistance from the holders of such land. If small cultivators and landless labourers are to have a share in a participatory society, this will only be achieved by their being organised in groups which take an active part in the struggle for a change of power. Any other form of organisation is at best a diversion of energies. In the recent past, there have been two instances of a change of the power equilibrium in the villages: the one which took place under American tutelage during the post-war reform of Japan's land ownership and tenure; and the other one which was carried out in the course of Mao Tse-tung's revolution in China. The political leaders of societies in the Third World have the choice between these two alternatives. It would be dishonest to suggest that there are technological or economic shortcuts which could dispose of the need to make such a choice.

Forum

Information about current research work, seminars and conferences and items of Third World interest will be published in this section. Readers' contributions are welcome.

DESERT AND MAN: A FUTURE?

John Larmuth

'*It is man who creates the desert; the climate only provides the conditions.*'

Le Houerou, 1959.

Increasing desert area is essentially due to the functional biodegradation of arid or semi-arid ecosystems, in general because of human misuse, which renders the population subject to famine triggered by some natural event, for instance, locusts or drought. Mass transhumance in search of food is the inevitable consequence together with extensive ill health, death of livestock, failure of water sources by sandfill and pollution, and a total breakdown of local social, economic and agricultural systems.

Desertified land may be considered to be land where recovery of significant production (grazing *et cetera*) cannot be achieved with twenty five years of management. In a paper entitled *Case Study on Desertification – Tunisia* which was read at the UN Conference on Desertification held in Nairobi in 1977, it was established that there were three main causes of degradation in the study area:

a) the breaking of new ground, particularly with mechanised assistance, leading to profitable crops for a short time before erosion leaves the soil unsuitable for further use and the area is abandoned;

b) overgrazing (and trampling) resulting in edible plant species becoming rare and the ground cover of long lived species being reduced, with consequent degradation and increased run off of scarce rainfall;

c) removal of woody plants for firewood, often by pulling up the plant and thus damaging the root system and/or preventing further growth.

Secondary effects were seen to be the removal of windbreaks and shade required to maintain the soil against windblow and the small plants which protect the soil. Demand for firewood has been put at 1·5 kg (3 lb) per person per day.

The Spreading Desert

In 1872 desert occupied 14 per cent of the world's potentially usable land area (i.e., excluding tundra, polar and high mountain regions permanently inaccessible to agriculture), and in the eighty years up to 1952 a further 21 per cent was

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lost bringing the total to 35 per cent. During the last twenty five years there has been a dramatic 300 per cent increase in the rate of loss so that by 1977 over half (55 per cent) of all potentially usable land became desertified. This is an average loss of 175 million acres every year for the last twenty five years which represents £9,000 million in lost agricultural output each year. Every five years land equal to the whole surface area of the UK becomes useless.

World Total and Usable Land Areas



Source: *Data from UN and other sources*

Usable Land Areas

Of the world population, one person in every seven lives in the arid zone, a total of 630 million, and for every urban dweller of the arid zone there are four people who live in scattered and often remote settlements.

With world population increasing so that it will have doubled in about twenty years or so, and our present cultivated and grazed land area being halved by about 1992, man is faced with feeding four people from the land that presently feeds one, in about fifteen years' time. This process cannot continue indefinitely because it is clearly absurd to consider an infinitely large population being fed from zero cultivable land. Crisis will become manifest long before such a situation arises, and it is likely that we shall see the commencement of large scale famines in ten to fifteen years from now. Almost certainly the traditional famine areas of the southern Sahara, Ethiopia and Somalia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh will be the first to suffer shortages. In the last famine of the southern Sahara between one and two hundred thousand people died directly or

indirectly from the effects of starvation and even now more than a million survivors have not completed the recovery of their land, stock, crops and economic systems. It is predictable that deaths in the next major famine may be five to ten times more than the Sahel total, say, between one and two million. If this number of deaths is horrifying to contemplate, consider the possible volume of refugees requiring total aid from international resources. It is doubtful if such a vast amount of aid would be available in any case.

Ensuring Survival

Urban dwellers are at less risk of starvation because intensive dry land and irrigated farming complexes are easily sited near cities, and because the distribution of food presents little difficulty. But, for a diffuse population four times larger, living in a situation where installation of modern farming systems is impossible due to the immense capital involvement, and where distribution of produce presents untold difficulties, other solutions must be found.

Traditional cropping methods have proved reliable over many centuries, enabling human survival through numerous periods of famine, and are only faltering now due to the unprecedented demand being made on them. Clearly, any survival stratagem for scattered subsistence farming must be based on extension of traditional techniques, and not on new crops and technology whose long term stability in extreme conditions is unknown. The failure risk of capital or technology intensive systems is too high to be acceptable and, in any case, would almost certainly not find favour with farmers due to lack of understanding.

Levels of demand for grazing and firewood are presently in excess of the capacity for renewal of growth, and it is a matter of some urgency to find alternative ways and means of providing firewood and of stimulating or controlling, or both, the regeneration of 'pasture'. The Tunisian study cited earlier, represents a very small beginning and it is imperative that detailed biological research aimed at elucidation of the processes of desertification is continued and expanded.

The last hundred years have been a continuum of warning analyses from the scientific world being ignored because they were not politically attractive. The scale of desert problems now is so great that the work must be carried out with or without political assistance. At present 50 million of the total 630 million arid zone population is under threat of starvation, and the number of people at risk increases with time.

The Economic Impact

There are twenty eight countries, of which twenty three may be defined as poor on the index of agriculture contributing more than 10 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and fourteen of these are extremely poor (agriculture >30 per cent GDP), within the arid zone 'problem' areas.

In order to avoid the human and economic consequences of famine engendered by population growth and desertification it is essential that investigation of the fundamental processes of land degradation is effected without delay. Surprisingly, very little quantified data on the biology of marginal land exists despite the activities of the UN and other bodies over the past three decades. Economic and political information is available and widely disseminated but economists and politicians have little understanding of the real causes of the trends they analyse so painstakingly. The loss of usable land has been estimated at 2,300 million acres to date and, with an annual disappearance of 175 million acres of usable land, the first priority must be the reduction of degradative processes. Only when this has been achieved can the recovery of lost land be considered. In itself, the second of these two tasks is of such magnitude that it would appear to be unlikely that significant progress could be made within the lifespan of several generations. Prevention of further loss can be accomplished providing that research is undertaken, and can establish the framework of knowledge required within the next five to ten years.

Delay now means the exacerbation of existing problems and the probability that starvation and malnutrition, with concomitant health hazards, will become so widespread that there will be little opportunity to correct the fundamental causes. Given the likely death toll and large number of refugees expected in a major crisis, the foreseeable aid requirements are staggering in terms of volume and finance but the eventuality could be largely averted if appropriate action were to be taken now. Humanitarian reasons, let alone political and economic ones, dictate that priority should be given to this area.

Growing More Food

As desert and wasteland now occupy over half the potentially usable land area of the globe, it is obvious that one must look for ways of improving the production of food from these areas.

Present production is marketed in adjacent areas, often centred on towns or large oases, although international movements as, for example, that from Somalia to Saudi Arabia, are not unknown. Desert areas are better suited to meat production than to farming and, in the example just given, exports – principally sheep and goats – in 1975 reached 1·5 million animals, more than five times the mid-1950s volume. But this production is being paid for by rapid destruction of the environment and cannot continue in the long term. If pastoralists are settled in non-desert areas, in line with the current political thinking of most arid zone countries, a valuable food resource will be lost. Other types of farming cannot replace it. In order to preserve this supply of meat there are four basic requirements for herders – shelter, food, water and fuel; and two for animals – water and grazing. Human shelter, based on locally available materials, is rarely a limiting factor but water, fuel and grazing, both the causes and effects of desertification, may be severely limited. Human food, grown locally, is only scarce in exceptionally dry years and is usually available on a scale which

approximates demand.

Export of meat and meat products has led to a monetarised pastoral economy with the inevitable scramble for resources and consequent increase in pressures on the fragile ecosystem. Reversal of these trends may be achieved by good pastoral management effecting a reduction in demand for fuel and grazing, but this can only be successful when the mechanisms of growth and regeneration of desert biotypes are fully understood.

Animals and Desert

Domestic animals differ in their requirements, goats and camels being able to consume tough and thorny plants which are unsuitable for sheep and cattle. Mixed herds clearly make best use of available vegetation by partial cropping of a variety of plant species, whereas an equal sized herd of one type of animal would soon remove its preferred food plants and enforce detrimental ecological changes of the type observed in, for example, the southwestern US, Mexico and the northern Sahara.

Pressures vary seasonally, those in the rainy season usually occurring further from settlements than is the case in the dry season, and reduction of vegetation taking place because plants are eaten before seed has been set. However, the extensive flush of winter growth acts to spread the load so that no one area is excessively grazed, and this process is assisted by a lesser dependence of animals on free sources of water, thus allowing them to travel greater distances in search of food. In the dry season lush growth is not present and animals are subjected to higher temperatures which render a nearby source of water imperative. During the dry season, therefore, locations close to settlements and other sources of water are heavily overgrazed, and it is common to find areas of up to 50 square km which are almost devoid of vegetation. The sinking of further wells aggravates the situation because of the resultant coalescence of barren areas.

The first priority must be a solution of the dry season feeding problem, perhaps by developing drought-resistant fodder crops, to reduce environmental damage in the vicinity of wells and settlements, particularly that done to the long lived woody plants which serve a vital soil protection function.

Domestic animals are able to tolerate drinking water salinity as high as 25,000 parts per million (ppm) for short periods of time but, in the normal course of events, must be restricted to a maximum of 10,000-12,000 ppm in the long term. However, this represents a limit four times higher than the 3,000 ppm human maximum. Levels of tolerance vary with the water content of feed, so that on dry feed the values given above were found to apply to sheep in an Australian experiment but, on green feed, some sheep thrived at a Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) concentration of 19,000 ppm. For a pastoral society a TDS content of 10,000-12,000 ppm would be a realistic maximum for animal supplies during about eight months of the year and, with the better general availability of water and green feed during the wet season, the same animals are subject to lower effective levels of intake.

Desert Plants

The spatial variability of desert soils is considerable owing to climatic irregularity. Given the variety of soil types, chemistry and hydrology it is hardly surprising that desert plant ecology is exceedingly complex despite the general paucity of vegetation. Discussion here must, therefore, be of a somewhat general nature. Much of the information is derived from the Tunisian desertification study mentioned earlier.

Permanent plant cover does not often exceed 35 per cent but this is enough to shade the soil from excessive insulation and to shelter smaller plants from the full rigours of desert conditions. Broadly, a division may be made between 'scrub', composed of ligneous bushes and often small trees, and 'steppe' vegetation consisting of small scale tussocks of unlignified plants. In either case the plants may be widespread at one extreme and, at the other, limited to localised zones of water catchment which increases the effective supply at the expense of adjacent areas.

In order to survive, plants need physiological adaptations to counteract the effects of heat, and the ability to make use of water which is frequently saline. It is the adaptations to survival which give a competitive edge against plants which are less well adapted, but the price is high and commonly paid for by slow growth rates which in extreme cases may take nearly a century to complete a life cycle. Even in less unusual circumstances growth may be three to ten times slower than for non-desert plants. Slow rates of growth limit the carrying capacity for domestic animals which, if exceeded, usually enforces ecological changes from steppe to unpalatable scrub vegetation. Animals must walk between low scrub bushes in their progressively extended search for food as the ecological change progresses and, in doing so, cause widespread damage to the fragile 'rain-beat' seal on the soil surface. Wind and water then remove finely divided soil and plant debris, resulting in the commonly observed phenomenon of small bushes apparently growing on mounds. This process removes protection afforded the roots by soil, increases run off losses of rain water, and the plants suffer. The course of desertification is then in full swing and, should grazing continue, will lead to dereliction of the land. Recovery may require a period of time ranging from tens of years to more than a century.

Providing grazing is maintained within the regenerative capacity, and is by mixed herds for the reasons stated earlier, plant growth and diversity can be maintained and the problems of desertification do not arise. This, of course, presupposes that damage done by trampling of the soil surface is at a level which does not significantly affect albedo or water retention properties of the soil. The distance walked by an animal in search of food is proportionally less if grazing is good and therefore mitigates the effects of trampling.

Germination of seeds, and survival of seedlings, are highly dependent on the presence of stones on open surfaces. Stones provide a physical microsite and rationalisation indicates that there is considerable opportunity for providing such sites artificially, for example by shallow contour ploughing. Additionally

such techniques could increase the rainfall capture potential of the area and lead to much improved plant growth.

The status of desert ephemerals – plants which complete their life cycle within a short period following rains – depends not so much on the level as on the timing of grazing. Ephemeral cycles, from germination to the setting of seed, occur over varying time scales between eight and fifty days, the norm being twenty to thirty days for most species and, if heavily grazed before flowering, the seedstock for the following year is much reduced. These highly specialised life cycles have evolved in conjunction with those of pollinating insects so that where severe depletion of the plant stock has occurred, recovery may be hindered by lack of pollinators.

Water salinity obviously has considerable bearing on plant growth and distribution. Plants are less tolerant of high salinity than are animals. The date palm, one of the best adapted, is able to survive levels as high as 8,000 ppm with restricted yield, full yield occurring at concentrations between 3,500 and 6,500 ppm depending on the composition of dissolved solids.

Why Deserts Exist

It is commonly believed that deserts exist because of the absence of water. In fact this is rarely so. Problems arise due to limiting quality and quantity. Desert drainage systems are mostly endoreic (draining into closed basins) so that dissolved salts are not flushed out to sea but become concentrated by evaporation and accumulate in the long term. Ground water evaporates from the soil with the result that concretion layers are found at or just below the surface, rendering it inhospitable to plant growth, unless rainfall averages are sufficiently high to leach the salt content to a depth below that occupied by roots. Evaporation from drainage basins leaves crystalline deposits, often extensive, on which no higher plants can live. Winter rain causes the removal of salts from areas adjacent to *wadis* and rills because percolation is sufficient to counteract the effects of accumulation by evaporation during the dry season. The same mechanism maintains areas of sheetwash more or less free of toxic levels of contamination. It is clear that water quality may vary spatially from pure rain water intercepted at a surface to near saturated solutions occurring as seasonal lakes. The concept of water, of any given quality, existing as ground water over an extended area is, therefore, not tenable for arid areas.

Acres of Green

Apart from the exploitation of mineral resources, which lies outside the scope of this discussion, the best human use of vast desert areas of the world would consist of food production, and the production of plant crops and acres of green. Ideas of a green desert are impractical for a number of reasons, the most obvious being the limited amount of water available. Most useful agricultural crops require water of a quality potable to man and this is rarely available, in the

amounts required, without the expensive importation of desalinated supplies from other places. The date palm, for example, will use a thousand times the volume of water, for a given size of community, than that required by herding activities. The Tunisian experience has shown that there are very few places where crops can be sown without permanent damage to the soil, and the recommendations are that crops could only be cultivated in the small number of occurrences of drainage basins without salinity problems.

Herding for the production of meat, skins and other animal products makes the best use of naturally occurring vegetation and, if it is kept within the regenerative capacity of the environment, can maintain sustainable yields in the long term. It is clear that the timing of grazing needs to be controlled as well as the absolute grazing load. Much usable land has already been degraded but, given management, could be recovered for the future. There is a clear relationship between water quality necessary for domestic animals and the nature of their food, which could be organised so that less saline water was given for a relatively short period in the dry season while the animals were fed stored fodder and, at other times when green feed is available, could rely on natural sources of water. Small amounts of fodder are grown in the summer but for interseasonal storage a low technology drier is a prerequisite. A simple convection ventilated solar powered device is an obvious first step towards the solution of this problem. Lucerne is widely grown in small settlements at certain times of the year but is capable of almost continuous growth, giving four or five crops over an extended season. If this capability could be realised by drying and storing earlier crops, supplies of fodder would be available during the summer.

Research into the potential use of natural desert vegetation, and the necessary forms of control, should be given high priority. Some specific fields of endeavour may be summarised as:

a) establishment of degradation levels for arid areas of the world, and of local measures which could be implemented to prevent further degradation and speed recovery. The use of appropriate data bases would allow pinpointing of critical areas and the possibility of remedial aid being applied;

b) examination of optimum relationships between man, domestic animals and desert vegetation for sustainable yields;

c) whether goats, as the most destructive animals, could be reduced in number by finding a solution to the problems engendered by their status as family wealth;

d) design of a suitable small scale crop drier enabling the storage of fodder. This is an ideal application for solar energy;

e) evaluation of possible methods to increase water retention by surfaces, and of providing microsites to enlarge the population of desert plants. Experimental methods envisaged are shallow contour ploughing at intervals, sand filling of small rills and gullies, and the use of obstacles for energy reduction of flash and sheet floods which would increase the 'dwell time' of water, and reduce damage caused by uncontrolled flow.

TRANSNATIONALS AND THE THIRD WORLD: THE R&D FACTOR

Sanjaya Lall

In the current tide of interest in the development of technological capability in the Third World, the discussion has focused mainly on two objectives: the transfer and assimilation of imported technology, and the building up of an indigenous research and development (R&D) structure. The role of transnational companies (TNCs) has been considered mainly in the former context.[1] On the positive side, TNCs have been taken to be the prime source of advanced technology, both as direct investors and as licensors and sellers of equipment. On the negative side, they have been accused of a multitude of sins, from overcharging for the technology they provide to distorting the whole pattern of economic development.

While it is not the intention to enter into the larger debate, I would like to explore briefly the possibility that TNCs can contribute to the second objective of technological development, that of strengthening the R&D capability of developing countries. Assuming that the type of technology in which TNCs specialise – usually modern, complex and capital intensive – is beneficial to developing countries, or at least for those which have attained some degree of industrialisation, can TNCs help countries in the latter category by relocating their R&D activities there?

The argument is mainly speculative. TNCs are starting to relocate R&D abroad, but very little of this is going to the Third World. Certainly, in relation to the relocation of production by TNCs from developed to developing countries, the relocation to technological activity is miniscule. However, it is only the start and the signs are that it will grow rapidly in the future. The economic forces which make for a shift in comparative advantage in production also make, though the degree and nature of the influence differs, for a shift in comparative advantage in R&D.

The Evidence

The only country which provides general data on the relocation of R&D by its transnationals is the US. Even here, comprehensive data by industry, collected

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[1]For a fuller discussion see S Lall & P Streeten, *Foreign Investment, Transnationals and Developing Countries*. London: Macmillan. 1977.

by the Department of Commerce, only exist for 1966. A subsequent survey, with more recent information, depends on a sample of 444 firms with international operations, and extrapolates from this to the whole 'universe' of American TNCs.[2] Limited as this evidence is, it reveals some interesting trends.

Expenditure on R&D overseas (developed and developing countries) by US TNCs totalled $1·3 billion in 1975. It had registered an increase of nearly 150 per cent in the period 1966-75, a growth rate far exceeding the 50 per cent increase recorded by the same TNCs in their R&D spending within the US. The years 1966-72, in particular, witnessed a dramatic difference in the growth of R&D overseas and at home: foreign R&D grew at 21 per cent per annum on average, as compared to 5 per cent for the TNCs' domestic R&D, and only 4 per cent for all US industry. While foreign R&D was growing from a much smaller base, there clearly existed a propensity on the part of TNCs to relocate research activity abroad. In the recessionary period 1973-5, the rate of growth of R&D fell sharply both at home and abroad, with foreign expenditures being cut more severely (TNCs generally tend to retrench all their activities more abroad than at home). With a return to more 'normal' economic conditions, we may well see a resumption of the pre-1973 trend.

Foreign R&D constituted about 8 per cent of domestic R&D by US TNCs in the 1970s, having risen from just under 5 per cent in 1966. Since TNCs account for about four fifths of total industrial R&D in the US, this restructuring of innovational activity, if it continues, has important consequences for their home country and for all countries which play host to them.

The industries which accounted for the bulk of overseas R&D by US TNCs were, not unexpectedly, the same 'high technology' ones that conduct most R&D at home. Three sectors – electrical machinery, transport equipment and non-electrical machinery – accounted for 75 per cent of overseas R&D in 1971; the addition of chemicals and instruments brings this to 90 per cent. Almost every other industry, including 'low technology' ones like textiles, food and paper, undertook some overseas R&D, but the sums involved were not very large. There were some odd cases: rubber, a high R&D spender in the US, spent relatively little abroad; while wood and furniture, a low spender at home invested a relatively high amount abroad. The possible reasons for such differences between industries will be explored later.

The evidence for 1966-75 shows that over 90 per cent of US overseas R&D was located in the industrialised world. The Third World accounted for a small but increasing proportion of the total, from about 3 per cent in 1966 to about 9 per cent in 1975. As US foreign investment in the Third World is predominantly based in Latin America and, within it, in Mexico and Brazil, the location of overseas R&D is also similarly concentrated. If anything, the level of concentration is higher. Mexico and Brazil account, at a rough guess, for 6 per cent of total US foreign R&D, or two thirds of R&D in the developing world, while

[2] *Overseas Research and Development by United States Multinationals 1966-1975.* New York: The Conference Board. 1976. A more limited study of five TNCs' foreign R&D is presented in R Ronstadt, *Research and Development Abroad by US Multinationals.* New York: Praeger. 1977.

they account for less than a third of the stock of direct US investment in the Third World. Outside Latin America, US TNCs appear to undertake little R&D in developing countries. The markets of individual developing countries are generally not large enough, and the form of manufacturing activity not of sufficient technical sophistication, to induce the firms concerned to set up research facilities. If any technical work is undertaken, it is usually of a minor adaptive nature to render products such as foods, medicines and cosmetics suitable for local tastes and conditions, or to adapt processes to use local raw materials or to work to smaller scales.

The findings of the Conference Board survey support the presumption that overseas R&D is more for applied development work than for 'basic' research into new products or processes. For high technology sectors, especially the engineering industries, a certain amount of technical developmental work is inherent to the production process so that every production affiliate must necessarily engage in some R&D, unless it is merely a 'screwdriver' type of assembly industry. Thus, as US TNCs become more engaged in the growing capital goods and consumer durable industries of the Third World, their commitment to local R&D is bound to increase. Similarly, for industries such as food and medicines where local adaptation is important, the larger Third World markets are bound to attract a certain amount of applied R&D work.

Data from other major capital exporting countries on overseas R&D is very scanty and anecdotal, but what there is suggests that European TNCs are following the same path as US firms. In some sectors they are ahead of US TNCs: Unilever runs the largest private sector R&D establishment in India; Ciba-Geigy has a large laboratory there; Hoechst has laboratories in India, Brazil and Egypt; and Volkswagen has substantial technological work in progress in Brazil. In others they seem to be somewhat behind, but there is little reason to believe that the pattern is significantly different from that of US transnationals. On Japanese firms, there is not even anecdotal information available, so one must refrain from making any comment.

Economics of Overseas R&D

The few attempts that have been made to describe the relocation of US R&D have not advanced a proper economic analysis of the determinants or the costs and benefits of such relocation. Until more data is collected and rigorous statistical tests conducted,[3] it is difficult to say anything with confidence. In what follows, therefore, one can merely advance plausible hypotheses and draw tentative conclusions. Three issues need examination. Why do TNCs relocate R&D? What are the costs and benefits for the home country? What are the costs and benefits for the host developing country?

[3]Some limited tests based on US data for 1976 have been conducted by the author and reported in a draft paper 'Relocation of Research and Development by US Multinationals'.

Relocating R&D

Different manufacturing industries display widely differing propensities to do R&D abroad as compared to the US. While it is true that R&D intensive industries at home also tend to be large R&D spenders abroad, as far as absolute amounts are concerned, they are not necessarily industries which have tended to relocate their given research activities from the US. In other words, if the 'propensity to relocate R&D' is measured by overseas R&D spending as a percentage of such US spending, high technology industries do not lead in shifting the technological function abroad. Where manufacturing as a whole conducted (in 1966) 7 per cent of its R&D abroad, sectors like wood and furniture (24·4 per cent), soaps (20 per cent), plastics (39 per cent) and food (13 per cent) were low technology industries with a high relocation propensity; while some high technology industries like industrial chemicals (1 per cent), rubber (3 per cent), office machinery (5 per cent), electrical machinery (6 per cent), instruments (6 per cent), and transport equipment (5 per cent), exhibited a lower than average propensity to relocate R&D. There were, of course, some high technology industries with above average relocation propensities, such as drugs (8 per cent), non-electrical machinery (12 per cent) and industrial machinery (24 per cent) and some low technology ones with low propensities namely paper, stone and clay, and metals. This wide dispersion raises important questions of what locational factors are at work in these different industries.

R&D location is the outcome of several complex forces. There are, on the one hand, various economic and historical reasons why TNCs began conducting most of their research at home. First, technological activity at home has provided the most important advantage which firms can exploit abroad, and so has preceded transnational production activity.[4] Secondly, the home country (in the case of the US) has the most developed technological infrastructure, the largest and richest markets for testing new products, and the main production facilities for implementing new techniques. Thirdly, technological activity is highly 'communication intensive', requiring the close interaction of different scientific disciplines as well as of different production, innovational, managerial and marketing functions. Thus, there are inherent problems in breaking off one part of this activity and placing it abroad, in a different cultural, economic and geographical *milieu*.

To counterbalance these forces of inertia, on the other hand, there are factors which compel the relocation of R&D. First, for a number of industries, a certain amount of technological work is inherent to every production centre: food products and medicines have to be adapted to local markets; industrial machinery tailored to specific requirements; furniture designed to suit local climates, and so on. Secondly, R&D is clearly much cheaper abroad than in the US; and other countries, especially in Europe, have well developed scientific and technological structures. Thirdly, certain types of testing, mainly clinical testing of

[4]R Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay*. New York: Basic Books. 1970; S Lall, 'Monopolistic Advantages and Foreign Involvement by US Manufacturing Industries', *Oxford Economic Papers* (forthcoming).

drugs, can be done more easily or cheaply in countries with more lax controls than the US. Fourthly, the communication gap is becoming less important as TNCs establish a more effective international network of management, production and marketing. Fifthly, certain foreign locations, for example Germany or the UK, may be more advanced than the US in certain specific technologies and may attract R&D in those to gain from the 'fallout effects' of their own innovation.

There are, thus, several plausible reasons for expecting TNCs to diversify their R&D activity geographically. In essence, the process is determined by the interplay of the communication and scale economy factors which tend to keep R&D at home, and the growing scale of foreign operations and lower costs abroad which tend to force R&D to overseas locations. Over the longer term, we may expect that industries with innovational processes which do not require a very close relationship between the R&D and other managerial and marketing functions will continue to relocate research, while those which like electronics, instruments or sophisticated electrical machinery do require continuous coordination between them will tend to concentrate their activity at home. Naturally, industries where substantial product adaptation is required will relocate R&D *pari passu* with their growth of overseas production.

Home Country Costs and Benefits

To assess the economic advantages of relocating research activity, we may divide it into two groups based on function: R&D conducted abroad directly related to overseas production activity (or 'applied' research), and R&D related to production in general (or 'basic' research to advance scientific knowledge). Benefits and costs can be considered under two headings: the financial cost of research and its indirect benefits or costs in different locations.

As far as the financial costs of R&D are concerned, it is clear that the US has been, until recently, the most expensive country in which to engage highly skilled labour. Europe has been somewhat cheaper, and developing countries, at least those with a supply of scientific manpower, have been considerably cheaper. For 'basic' R&D work, where the requisite combination of skills is available, it would be economical for TNCs to relocate to countries like India where salaries are low and a considerable industrial infrastructure exists. For R&D work directly related to production, however, and for all other R&D which cannot be 'delinked' from their main markets, this cost advantage will be heavily outweighed by costs of communication and diseconomies of scale. To the extent that developing countries remain small markets in the international scene, they will attract little applied R&D by way of work – and such work comprises the greater part of innovational activity by TNCs. However, where a developing country begins to serve as a major production base (Volkswagen in Brazil or Unilever in India), there will be substantial benefits to the home country of relocating R&D there.

As far as the indirect effects of relocating R&D are concerned, the picture is less clear and may involve some drawbacks. First, the conducting of technologi-

cal work overseas to take advantage of cost differentials may draw the criticism that it is 'exporting jobs' at the scientific level, though this seems somewhat implausible at present. Secondly, it is possible that the shifting abroad of R&D may deprive the home country of important external 'fallout effects'. The methods of conducting specific kinds of research, the skills and experience acquired, the contacts established and even some 'irrelevant' results obtained, all these leak into the surrounding industrial and technological environment by the turnover of personnel and by the interchange that generally occurs between different establishments. While the commercial application of particular innovations will be tightly guarded secrets, of course, a certain amount of beneficial fallout is inevitable.[5] From this point of view, therefore, the relocation of R&D abroad constitutes a loss to the home country.

Host Country Costs and Benefits

The benefits of R&D conducted by TNCs to developing countries are as follows. As far as applied research is concerned the attraction of TNC R&D to support their local production may mean that they receive more 'appropriate' products and technology than they would otherwise. They may gain, for instance, from medicines for local diseases, vehicles for local roads, machinery employing more labour and processes using more local materials. Furthermore, their own enterprises may be stimulated into adopting more modern technology, conducting more research and looking more closely at local needs. As far as basic research is concerned, developing countries may gain from the 'fallout' effects noted above, from the employment opportunities, better training and stimulus given to scientific and technical manpower, and from a line of contact with the scientific community abroad.

The costs of TNC R&D in developing countries may arise in the following manner. First, TNCs may attract the best qualified manpower to themselves or what has been called 'internal brain drain', thus depriving local establishments of talent. Secondly, TNCs may use R&D to produce, not more appropriate products or techniques, but less appropriate ones (for example, more fancy packaging or small but unnecessary model changes) to bolster their market position, or they may exploit lax regulations to test potentially harmful drugs. Thirdly, the benefits of R&D done locally by TNCs may be less than those of R&D done by indigenous enterprises, because the former would be internalised by TNCs and so benefit their global operations while the latter would be internalised by the home country and so benefit its trading position or technological capability. Fourthly, the existence of large and powerful R&D activities by TNCs may suppress 'infant' technological activity by local firms rather than promote it, since the latter may never be able to bear the expense and risk of launching R&D at all. And, finally, TNC laboratories may be used to monitor

[5]This may explain why a relatively low cost country like Britain has chosen to locate an electronics laboratory in 'Silicon Valley' in the US. The beneficial fallout effects may be partly countered by the concomitant risk of losing one's own personnel to other research establishments.

and tap research done locally, though this is not a real danger as far as developing countries are concerned.

The final judgment on the net effects of attracting foreign R&D must depend on the benefits of getting appropriate technology and its 'fallout' effects as against the costs of stifling innovation in indigenous enterprises. This potential cost is not to be treated lightly: some semi-industrialised countries in the Third World have exhibited considerable technological progress when given some protection against foreign technology.[6] Much more, however, needs to be known before we can pronounce on these important matters with any degree of certainty. As matters stand, developing countries can clearly derive some benefit by attracting TNC research activity into sectors where local technological activity is either well established (as with various kinds of equipment design in India) or is non-existent (as with basic medicinal research in most of the Third World) and with little chance of independent success. The potential for advantage is greatest where the technology is susceptible to adaptation to suit local needs and resources, and especially when such adaptation leads to establishing a new export base for manufactured products. But some benefit exist even when 'basic' research is conducted, and these are greatest when local institutions are engaged in similar (rather than 'non-competitive') research. Needless to say, host governments must temper their welcome to exclude research work that threatens the physical well being of their populations – and this danger is important enough to have merited international attention in recent years.

[6]S Lall, 'Developing Countries as Exporters of Industrial Technology', *Research Policy* (forthcoming).

THE THIRD WORLD: CONCEPT AND CONTROVERSY

S D Muni

I have read Peter Worsley's contribution in your second issue carefully and with great interest. In his first work *Third World* (1964) he adopted an innovative approach towards the concept wherein he went beyond the then prevailing strategic and political bias in the ways of looking at the global situation. His latest note, however, seems to be a step backwards from that initial position, in the sense that he moves away from looking at the Third World as 'a distinctly different set of political cultures' and tries to merge it into the pattern of global ideological and strategic polarisation.

I fully agree with Worsley in his refutation of the criteria of economic differentiation (GNP *et cetera*), in understanding global stratification. But what he offers as an alternative is an easy way out. For he constructs a matrix by mixing up economic differentiation criteria (rich-poor dichotomy) with that of ideological-strategic polarities (capitalist-communist dichotomy). Thus this matrix is obviously inclined in favour of the latter dichotomy. As such, his analysis presents the following difficulties:

a) He opens his discussion by viewing development along two foci: political and economic. In terms of the former, he equates ideology with the social system. This is somewhat intriguing as it comes from a sociologist of his stature. The social system is all pervasive and includes in its ambit political, economic, ideological and cultural aspects of human development. I submit that development should be viewed from a sociological perspective – as an all inclusive phenomenon because what we tend to view as separate and distinct developments (like political, economic, ideological, cultural and even strategic) are in fact interrelated aspects of the process of social evolution and development.

b) It is in this sense of development that the poor and rich, as well as apparently communist and capitalist countries of the Third World are collectively distinct and different from the communist and the capitalist worlds. It is becoming increasingly clear that in their developmental experience, contrary to the implication of Worsley's model, they would not follow either of the two existing models. It may be clearly understood here that despite the profession of 'anti-imperialist' strategic and foreign policies pursued by Vietnam, Cuba,

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Mozambique and Angola, they are no way near the Soviet or the Chinese models of building their respective nations and social systems. The contexts, goals, strategies and patterns of their development are bound to be different and distinct.

Similarly, the Latin American or the Southeast Asian patterns of capitalism are more in the nature of manifestations of neocolonialism pursued by western powers. This is not autonomous capitalism nor is it a reflection of the unfolding of indigenous social potentials. It may not be very long before the dynamics of real internal forces in these countries start asserting themselves in shaping the patterns of development. The rumblings of this internal assertion in Latin America and Southeast Asia are clearly discernible to sensitive observers.

c) It is a bit surprising that whereas Worsley accepts the validity of the existence of two blocs – the capitalist and the communist – despite the changes in the power and unity of both blocs, he finds, for the same reason of disunity and lack of power, that the ground occupied by the Nonaligned Group 'has been most seriously eroded away'. The fact in this respect appears to be different from what he wants us to believe. More and more of the Third World countries which were allies of one or the other bloc are proclaiming their nonalignment and seeking the membership of the Group (Iran, Pakistan and Romania are recent examples). In all the forums of the North-South Dialogue (not only UNCTAD, as Worsley says, but even in UN Special Sessions, 1974 and 1975, and the Paris Conference), the Third World, despite its specificities and divergence in interests, succeeded in evolving consensus positions against the North. The divisions and confusions that characterise Third World positions on such global issues are largely the result of their weakness against the North's diplomatic and political pressures rather than an indication of the lack of willingness on the part of Third World countries to coordinate their mutual policies. If nonalignment is understood as an urge to pursue strategic and foreign policies different from and independent of the power blocs, it is essentially a reflection of the dynamics of internal development in Third World countries which is evolving a pattern distinct from the capitalist and communist models. As such, it is very much a vibrating symbol and an expression of Third World aspirations.

d) One last observation regarding Worsley's comments on the Chinese 'Theory of Three Worlds'. This theory is nothing but the extension of Maoist 'united front' tactics to foreign policy and international politics. As I show later, it is so narrowly China centred that in many significant ways it appears to be ideologically inconsistent with the Marxist-Leninist framework to which the theory claims its allegiance, and conceptually too naive to be accepted for universal application. The entire theoretical edifice of the Chinese approach to the Third World would fall flat on its face if it is pitted against its current domestic policies and external postures (particularly towards Vietnam on the one hand and Japan, Europe and America on the other).

In the study and conduct of international economic and political relations, the term 'Third World' has become an essential part of the idiom. It is used as

a concept and a category. First coined by the French scholars in the early fifties – the phrase used was *tiers monde* – it soon became fashionable with other scholars. Within a decade of its birth, by the beginning of the 1960s, it was an acceptable and widely used term.[1] Since then it has also been used frequently as a synonym for such phrases as 'underdeveloped world', 'developing countries', 'less developed countries', 'former colonies', 'Afro-Asian and Latin American countries', 'the South' (of the North-South division) and so on. Lately, in the past five or six years, however, the validity of the 'Third World' as a concept and its utility as a tool of analysis in the study of international relations have been seriously questioned. Not only that the question 'Third World: does it exist?' is raised and answered in the negative frequently, but even a 'Fourth World' (also a'Fifth World', in some writings) has been carved out of the group of countries that were hitherto described as the Third World. The debate about the relevance and validity of the Third World concept has not yet concluded. It has, rather, reached its critical stage where all those seriously involved in studying the Third World may find it unavoidable to join in.

The concept of the Third World, as initially used, carried specific political and power connotations in the context of the cold war and power bloc politics. It was used and understood roughly as an expression parallel to the term 'Third Force' that described the Nonaligned Group of Asian and African countries. The Third World as such was viewed to include the group of countries that represented the third component in the operation and dynamics of a bipolar global balance. Latin America was kept out of it partly because of its special strategic and security relations with the US under the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter, and partly owing to its largely European cultural orientation.[2]

The power connotation of the Third World concept in relation to the global balance slipped into the background for a while as against emphases on other aspects which will be discussed later. However, the power connotation has recently been revived and redefined within the framework of Marxism-Leninism by the Chinese. 'The Theory of Three Worlds', as the Maoist approach is described, views the world stratified into three layers or groups of countries. In Mao's words:

> . . . The United States and the Soviet Union form the first world; Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the second world. We are the Third World. The Third World has a huge population. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the Third World. The whole of Africa belongs to the Third World and Latin America too.[3]

This division is described as based on imperialism and hegemonism of the two superpowers which account for the 'development of the fundamental

[1] For a brief note on the sources relating to the origin and current usage of the term 'Third World', see L Wolf-Phillips, 'Why Third World?', *Third World Quarterly* I(1) 1979, pp 105-14. The Institute for the Study of Economic and Social Development of the University of Paris brings out a journal called *Revue Tiers-Monde* (since 1959) dealing with the problems of the Third World.

[2] See, for instance, J D B Miller, *The Politics of the Third World*. Oxford University Press. 1965.

[3] Chairman Mao's theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism. *Peking Review* 20(45). 4 November 1977, p 11; also p 17.

contradictions of the contemporary world'. It is thus assumed that the contradictions between the First and the Third Worlds, that is of the imperialists on the one hand and their victims on the other, are antagonistic. The Second World while trying to exploit and attempting to dominate the Third World, is exploited and bullied by the First World.

The Third World by 'correctly handling the contradictions' (to put it in Maoist terminology) can forge a 'united front' in the struggle against the two hegemonist and imperialist superpowers. Of the two superpowers, the theory describes the Soviet Union as 'the most dangerous source of world war'.[4] Although the theory accepts the fact of differences in the social, political and economic conditions of the Third World countries and their consequent stand on international issues, such differences are considered peripheral and less important.[5]

The Maoist idiom apart, this theory clearly adopts 'power' as the basis for global differentiation. The theory has been strongly criticised not only by the Soviet Union,[6] but also by Albania, a one time close ally of China in the Sino-Soviet split. The main attack has been on the theory's indifference to, and disregard for, the class characters of the different Third World regimes and societies as also for its attempt to equate the USSR with the US in order to denigrate the former. It would be an unnecessary digression to attempt an analysis of the Maoist theory here, but it may be mentioned that it was mainly a statement to outline and rationalise China's foreign policy strategy in the context of building bridges with the US, Japan and Western Europe against the Soviet Union. Recent developments in China's foreign relations amply substantiate this contention. During his recent state visit to the US, the Chinese Senior Vice-Premier openly asked for a united front of China, the US, Japan and Western Europe against the Soviet Union. As against this, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, clearly contradicts its avowed support for the Third World and the anti-imperialist forces. As for its cooperative relations with the Third World, the advocacy of the principle of the *Panchsheela*, formulated in the early 1950s, had adequately served China's foreign policy goals and was still valid. It, therefore, does not sound convincing that for the same purpose China had to evolve a new approach.[7] Being a statement of China's foreign policy strategy, it cannot be relied upon as a definition of the Third World concept. The objection is not with the countries included in the composition of the Third World category, but with the rationale extended to justify this categorisation. Besides being a statement of China's foreign policy strategy, the 'Theory of Three Worlds' may also be seen as an attempt on the Chinese part to have their country included in the category of the Third World, which is not generally done.

It was mentioned above that the power connotation of the concept of the Third World slipped into the background before the Chinese revived and

[4] *ibid*, pp 19-22.
[5] *ibid*, p 28.
[6] For the Soviet theoretical position on the Third World see Y Zhukov *et al, The Third World.* Moscow: Progress Publications. 1970.
[7] The author is in the process of completing an analysis of the theory and practice of the Maoist theory of Three Worlds along these lines.

redefined it. This was evident during the sixties, when there appeared a growing academic interest in political institutions and processes of the Third World, more than in its place in the global balance. It could be that the new emphasis was a result of the power connotation and policy orientation with which the study of the Third World had begun earlier. Political sociologists like Peter Worsley were attracted towards the Third World mainly because it constituted a 'distinctly different set of political cultures'.[8] Not that he rejected or ignored the policy perspective in dealing with the concept, but his focus was different. He was motivated by a sympathetic and serious concern about the challenges posed by the emergent countries of the Third World, the challenges that could not be answered by what he called 'the ineffable superiority either of late capitalism or late communism.'[9] The study of political institutions and processes as they were evolving and unfolding themselves in the Third World was also the main task of the Committee for the Study of Comparative Politics set up in the US by the Social Science Research Council towards the beginning of the 1960s.[10]

However, by the middle of the sixties, the cold war had become a routine and the tensions generated by it were slackening in intensity. The economic and development issues were becoming prominent, reducing the monopoly of security and strategic issues in world politics. That marked the beginning of the Third World concept being viewed in its economic context and thrust.

In its economic connotations the Third World concept referred to countries which were neither industrialised or free market economies (the First World), nor the socialist and centrally planned economies (the Second World), but those which were still groping in order to evolve a viable system of, and approach to, economic development. Such Third World countries were poor and underdeveloped and belonged to Asia, Africa and Latin America. One significant fallout of the shift from political to economic connotations in approach to the study of the Third World, was the weakening of reservations regarding the inclusion of Latin America in this category. The variations in the levels of poverty and underdevelopment as also the peculiarities of economic behaviour and potential, were taken into consideration and regarded as less important and secondary in the context of international economic comparisons. One economist thus described the characteristics of the Third World:

> . . . the dominance of subsistence production and self-employment; low per capita incomes and unequal distribution of incomes, imperfect markets, low productivity, dependence on export earnings and foreign capital flows, and small public sectors and minimal modern industrial sectors . . . There are wide variations on such variables but a median behaviour of these countries should be focused upon rather than on the particular characteristics of one or a few countries.[11]

[8] Worsley, *The Third World*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1964. Miller's study (*op cit*) may also be seen as another example of such an interest. Also see K Buchanan, 'The Third World – its emergence and contours'. *New Left Review* (18) 1963, pp 5-23.

[9] P Worsley, *ibid*, p 275. Also see chapter VI and the preface.

[10] The Committee launched its programme with the publication of the first volume by G Almond and J S Coleman (eds), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton University Press. 1960.

[11] L G Reynolds, *The Three Worlds of Economics*. Yale University Press. 1971, pp 97–8.

By the beginning of the seventies the debate between the advocates of a differentiated approach on the one hand and an overall (generalistic) approach on the other to the concept of the Third World had sharpened. Whereas the generalistic approach relied on the criteria of overall poverty and underdevelopment, the differentiated approach emphasised different groupings within the Asian, African and Latin American countries on the basis of the GNP, per capita income, levels of industrialisation and so on. Caplow was perhaps one of the early supporters of the differentiated approach.[12] Subsequently, this approach was strengthened by the consequences of the oil crisis which suddenly turned the OPEC into a group of extremely wealthy and powerful developing countries. In the wake of this development, the scholars and strategists who, for various reasons, wanted to emphasise income stratification within the Third World, proliferated.[13] The concept of the Third World, as prevalent hitherto, was seriously questioned and that of a 'Fourth World' created instead. The World Bank economists who conformed to this new approach became a source of legitimacy to it through the Bank's Annual Reports.[14]

Before we look at the differentiated approach somewhat more closely, it is useful to keep in mind the context of international economic and political developments in which this approach has gained strength and momentum. The context, as mentioned above, was provided by the oil crisis. The consequent sharpening of the North-South confrontation and the spectre of chaos and disunity in the First World of industrialised free market economies, threatened to put the prevailing international economic system into jeopardy. The OPEC succeeded in forging a united front with the rest of the developing countries in forcing a dialogue on the West to resolve overall economic issues to the advantage of the long suffering Third World and evolve a New International Economic Order.[15]

The comparative failure of the West to evolve a cartel of energy consumers in the form of International Energy Association (IEA), to confront the OPEC during 1973-5 (the categories of energy producers and energy consumers to divide the world were coined during this time), brought about a desperate need

[12] He made three categories of developed and underdeveloped countries: a) developed countries b) developing countries that are partially industrialised and that import capital and technology, and c) underdeveloped countries in which technology has not yet taken roots. The last two categories referred to the Third World. T Caplow, 'Are Rich Countries Getting Richer and the Poor Countries Poorer?' *Foreign Policy* (3) 1971, p 91.

[13] For some assertive articulation of the differentiated approach to the Third World, see I Adelman and C T Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equities in Developing Countries*. Stanford University Press. 1973; C F Bergstan, 'The Response to the Third World'. *Foreign Policy* (17) 1974–5.

[14] See *World Bank Atlas 1977* and *World Development Report*. Washington: World Bank, 1978. There is some confusion about the exact application of the terms 'Third World' and 'Fourth World'. Sometimes the latter is used to describe the OPEC and the novice-rich developing countries and at others the former. The *World Bank Report* and an increasing number of scholars are, however, using the term 'Fourth World' to describe the poor, non-oil-producing developing countries.

[15] The two UN Special Sessions (VI and VII) on Raw Materials and the New International Economic Order in 1974 and 1975; also the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation (1975–6) were the result of such Third World efforts.

for the West to weaken the Third World united front by dividing its ranks.[16] One can have an idea of the extent of the West's desperate and nervous feeling over North-South issues from the fact that some of the establishment academics in the US even suggested a military approach to silence the Third World's demand for a New International Economic Order.[17] On the diplomatic front, even some Third World countries found it expedient to support the new categorisation of 'Fourth World' – the basket cases of the most seriously affected countries as it was called in the UN diplomatic parlance – which made a case for immediate economic relief to them.

The impact of the North-South political and economic tensions on scholars has been direct and immediate. They were also divided across the North-South axis, more in terms of their academic stands than nationalities. Those who favoured the western point of view threw their weight in favour of the differentiated approach and those who sympathised with the South argued for treating all the developing countries under one category as the Third World. The fact that diplomatic and strategic considerations have influenced academic approaches to the Third World is even being acknowledged, at least implicitly. Rothestein, an advocate of the differentiated approach, uses the term 'Third World bloc' only to disprove it, and says that he was searching for a criterion to 'understand differences among the underdeveloped countries' and to 'distinguish more specific groups of underdeveloped countries.'[18] Surely, if this is the objective, one can certainly find the differences not only within the Third World, but also within the first two worlds. On the other hand, a highly placed Egyptian economist recently wrote:

In these times of stalemate in the so called North-South negotiations or dialogue . . . the Third World as a concept is challenged intellectually and its usefulness as a tool of analysis and action is increasingly being questioned. It goes without saying that nobody has ever ignored the features that could allow for every kind of classification of Third World countries; size, population, natural resources, per capita GNP, importance of the secondary sector, etc. What is new is the belief, in or the fear of an outcome of, the differentiation process that may break in a definite way, the solidarity of the Third World.[19]

The diplomatic and strategic considerations and influences apart, the new categorisation of the Third and the Fourth Worlds based on the differentiated approach appears to be untenable. The main basis of this categorisation is

[16] Such desperate mood was reflected in the writings of Bergstan, Tucker, Moynihan and others during the years 1974, 1975, 1976. See, for instance, Bergstan, *op cit*, R Tucker, 'Oil: the issue of American intervention'. *Commentary* 59 (1) January 1975; P Moynihan, 'The United States in Opposition'. *Commentary* 59 (3) March 1975, pp 31–44.

[17] G J Pauker, *Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. November 1977. The fact that American intentions to use military strength in protecting its economic and political interest in the Persian Gulf have been reiterated by the Secretaries in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs (26 February 1979) in the aftermath of the Shah's overthrow in Iran, should also be kept in mind here.

[18] R L Rothestein, *The Weak in the World of Strong*. Columbia University Press. 1977, p 53. See also W Laqueur, 'Third World Fantasies', *Commentary*, 63 (2) February 1977, pp 43–8.

[19] I S Abdalla, 'Heterogeneity and Differentiation – the end of the Third World'. *Development Dialogue* 1978 (2) p 3.

national income and wealth calculated on the basis of GNP. It is widely acknowledged that GNP is a misleading indicator even of economic growth, let alone of economic development. It does not give us any idea either of the potential or the actual development as it is a highly dependent variable. What shall one say about the richness of, until recently, the most influential OPEC country – Iran – where recent developments have turned it, at least temporarily, into an oil importing country. The new wealth of the OPEC is narrowly based on the export of only one raw material, and that too because of the present day strategic significance of oil. The future of this wealth is delicately dependent upon the discovery of alternative energy resources. Further, if the Third World has to be divided on the basis of GNP levels, one will also be justified in carving out a few more worlds from within the First and the Second Worlds as well.

The GNP differentiations do not basically alter or disprove the comparative levels of overall poverty and underdevelopment of the Third World *vis-a-vis* the first two worlds. This can be clearly seen by a comprehensive reading of the world economic and social indicators.[20] The population affected by the new wealth in the Third World is extremely small. The rich OPEC countries do not and cannot consume even a fraction of the oil they produce owing to the lack of industrialisation. They have only just started thinking along the lines of laying down industrial infrastructures. The availability of skills, organisation and technology in these countries is very low. The distribution of income within the countries is highly uneven – not to be confused with the per capita income or GNP. There are not enough roads, schools and hospitals. If these indicators are taken into account with due emphasis, the World Bank (1978) ranking of the Third World nations will be drastically reshuffled. The 'Fourth World' would then cease to exist as a category.

A more viable approach to the Third World concept should, therefore, be based upon the overall development viewed in a comprehensive sociological perspective. Such a perspective has to be kept within the bounds of a comparative framework, for the Third World can exist only when there are the First and the Second Worlds. Since the development perspective incorporates the mutually related nature of social, economic and political components of a given society, the concept of the Third World based on this view may be better able to explain both its political as well as economic connotations that have been prominent from time to time as discussed above. It is from this perspective that the Third World is distinct and separate from the other two worlds and includes nearly all the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,[21] for the context of development in these countries in the post-Second War period has been conditioned by their pre-colonial evolution and colonial trauma. It is now becoming clear to many sensitive social scientists and statesmen that in terms of goals, levels, patterns and strategies, the experience of either capitalist or socialist roads to

[20] *ibid.*

[21] For such a comprehensive sociologically development oriented perspective on the Third World, see I L Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: the theory and practice of international stratification.* Oxford University Press. 1966; Second Edition, 1972; D Seers and L Joy (eds), *Development in a Divided World.* Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. 1970.

development may not be fully applicable to Third World countries. Instead of industrialisation and affluence, a more relevant approach to development in the Third World may lie in building societies that provide for the 'basic needs' of their people on the basis of 'self-reliance', societies that can exist with equality, independence and dignity in the international system.[22] Therefore, it is on the basis of the contexts, goals, strategies and outcomes of development that the Third World is a distinct concept and a category by itself. Underlining this 'otherness of the Third World', Hensman wrote:

The Third World is outside Europe and North America, and it is not an extension of of the power values and interests of greater Europe (Europe, North America, Japan and Australia); given local colouring in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it is an authentically independent and original creation of the peoples of the southern continents, conscious of their pre-colonial past and identity, but open to a 'future without precedent'. It is a future in which the primitive, peripheral or subordinate role its peoples played as producers and consumers is ended.[23]

The category and concept of the Third World understood in the light of the foregoing discussion is, however, more easily defined broadly than applied precisely in any exercise of global stratification. The problem mainly arises because the Third World concept is based upon the concept of development, the meaning and measurement of which are still in the process of evolution and definition. Further, development is also a value laden concept highly susceptible to the factors of time, space and culture. This makes the task of comparative evaluation extremely complex, difficult, and even subjective (in a general sense).

This difficulty of measuring development is not an adequate reason for denuding the concept of the Third World of its development based criteria, and adopting that of GNP and per capita income instead. For despite this difficulty, we would surely not categorise any of the First or the Second World countries as one belonging to the Third World. It may also be possible to evaluate some of the debatable cases on the basis of the development criteria. For instance, South Africa, irrespective of the political complexion and character of its present regime (which in any case is on its way out), belongs to the Third World. So do all the countries of Latin America. Yugoslavia, despite its 'socialist' appearance, is struggling hard to work out a viable synthesis of the East and the West in its system of 'self-management' so as to reflect its basic historical and social urges. This is a major preoccupation of the rest of the Third World also.

The difficulty regarding the categorisation of China exists not because of its great power status and the level of social mobilisation that gives a different flavour to its economic system and political institution. The problem mainly arises from the fact that although the context and outcome of development in China gives it an appearance of a Third World country, its successful attempts to operate the strategies of socialist development and institutionalise goals of

[22] D Seers, 'The New Meaning of Development', *International Development Review* 19 (3). 1977, pp 2–7; Pugwash Conference, *Proceedings of Twentyfifth Session*, Madras, 13–19 January 1976; M Haq, 'Towards a Just Society', *International Development Review* 18 (4) 1976, pp 2–7.

[23] C R Hensman, *From Gandhi to Guevara*. London: Allen Lane. 1969. p 71.

socialism make it essentially a part of the Second World. All the doubts about China's position in the Second World would be removed once it succeeds in its post-Mao efforts to undertake rapid industrialisation without disrupting its socialist framework. China's own claims to be categorised as a Third World country may not be of much help in this respect.

Notwithstanding the small difficulty of application involved in some specific cases, the Third World, viewed in an overall developmental perspective appears to be a sound concept and a flexible, resilient category. Accordingly, this also underlines the fragile, untenable and misleading, if not mischievous, nature of the attempts to question the validity of the Third World concept and evolve that of a 'Fourth World' in addition to the Third World. The expression 'Third World' neither denotes an inferior value structure, nor a descending numerical order. It represents a set of specific characteristics that are unique in more than one way to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It represents the broadly similar, although not exactly identical, nature of these countries' experiences in the processes of development, the processes that were arrested in the past are discouraging and uncertain at present, and are likely to be unprecedented in the future.

CONSEQUENCIES OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY EDUCATION

V Subramaniam

It is not surprising that the first pungent appraisal of Christian missionary education in Africa has come from a Muslim African intellectual like Professor Ali Mazrui in his article 'Churches and Multinationals in the Spread of Modern Education' in *Third World Quarterly* I(1) 1979. The 'profound incongruence' between the increasing secularisation of western society and the Christian religiosity of western missionary education in Africa and the 'paradoxical role' of the missionary school in thus creating a 'techno-cultural' gap are highlighted by him with brutal clarity. My purpose in this short note is to draw attention briefly to some other equally important complicating factors and consequenees apart from the 'techno- cultural gap'.

Christian missionary education did not have the same impact on all Afro-Asian societies; in fact one can discern three different types of impact in three areas, namely French Africa, British Africa and India. In the first case, missionary educators were quickly replaced by the colonial government as the educating agency formally by the decree of 1904. The immediate reason was probably the new wave of anticlericalism in France following the Dreyfus affair in which the Catholic church and the army brass were ranged with the vengeful persecutors of Colonel Dreyfus – who was finally declared innocent and rehabilitated. But even earlier, the French colonial administrators in Muslim areas had learnt not to encourage Christian missionaries. The dramatic contrast between the Ivory Coast and Ghana at the time of independence showed the consequences of these different educational policies of the French and the British. About 75 per cent of the schools were government run and nearly the same proportion of the schoolgoing population went to these schools in the Ivory Coast, whereas 75 per cent of the schools were run by Christian missionaries in Ghana and 75 per cent of the scholars went to them.

But the dominance of the anticlerical government school did not reduce the techno-cultural gap very much in French Africa for several reasons. The village primary school with some emphasis on agriculture did not go very far and higher education in school and college, by all accounts, followed the French literary educational pattern, except for the two or three highly prestigious professional institutions catering for a microscopic minority. Finally, the process of decolo-

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nisation involved the French African political elite not only in French politics as members of the French Parliament but in government as ministers of the cabinet. As a result, Francophone African leaders, well after independence, have drawn far too freely from the reservoir of professional talent in France itself, without much compulsive anxiety to develop local African technical potential. The advantages of an anticlerical educational system were thus not reaped in terms of technical or scientific education, but they appeared in the toning down of the schizophrenia between devoutness and modernism, which still characterises the Anglophone African elite.

In India, the story and the consequences of Christian missionary education are far too complex for a brief note, but the highlights include first, the general indifference and even discouragement of Christian missionary activity by the British and secondly, the inoculative and revitalising effects of that activity on the Hindu elite. The East India Company, controlled mainly by the Anglican English and Scottish Presbyterians when it set out on its career of conquest was aware of an already existing sizeable coastal population of Roman Catholics, the much earlier educational activity of Jesuits and the growth of a sceptical and secular industrial society at home in Britain. Their main policy was one of general discouragement of missionary activity, specific discouragement of British missions and partial encouragement of non-British missionary activity – Danish, Dutch or Swiss. The conflict between anachronistic Christian spirituality and western secularism did not form the primary conflict in education. The more important confrontation was between Christian propaganda with instrumental educational institutions and Hindu and Muslim counterpropaganda through education as well as all the other instruments used by western missionaries. Thus, Indian nationalism took shape at first partly through religious counter-propaganda, which finally carried Hindu spirituality right into the West. This story has been told several times from different angles starting with Zacharias' *Renascent India*, toa recent discussion in my book *Cultural Integration in India* (New Delhi: Ashish. 1978). From Raja Ram Mohan Roy onwards, through Annie Besant and B G Tilak to Mahatma Gandhi, every major leader usedHindu religious symbolism for political awakening, and others used political awakening in part to export Hindu spirituality to the West.

This basic difference between Hindu India and Christian Africa led to important differences in religious revivalism and politico-cultural revivalism. The African educated elite were led into politics through secular *gemeinschaft* including benefit societies, unions and political organisation itself. Religious protest in the shape of over seven hundred independent churches in Africa comes mostly from the masses and their own charismatic leaders, with only the minimum contact with political movements. This dichotomy between political and religious protest led in some cases to a destructive confrontation between a young African state and a protesting church, as in Zambia between the UNIP government on the one hand and sects like Lenshina's or Jehovah's Witnesses.

The cultural revivalism of African leaders arose later partly as a reaction against earlier imitative tendencies and partly as a nation integrating mechanism.

Any educated middle class derived from the colonial situation is first of all imitative of its rulers. Indeed even in the earlier historical periods the Roman historian Tacitus and the Arab historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun have noticed this tendency. This becomes stronger in an educated middle class. In due course, for several reasons, this tendency leads to its dialectical opposite, namely revivalism. The main reason is that this class is rebuffed by the colonial rulers politically and socially and then turns against its own imitativeness. In India this tendency took shape early against Christian missionary propaganda and went through several stages of sophistication, resulting in a rediscovery of the western work ethic in the Hindu scripture *Bhagavadgita*. I have elaborated on this aspect in my paper 'Karmayoga as a Westernised Middle Class Interpretation of the *Bhagavadgita*' presented to the Ninth World Sociological Congress at Uppsala in 1978. This type of revivalism was possible in the context of Hindus keeping their own religio-cultural heritage.

Christianised educated Africans would not psychologically turn to their pagan cultural heritage as Hindus and Muslims could. The more easily available mode of retaliation against a nominally Christian colonial ruler was to assert that he, the African, was a better Christian in terms of devoutness or Christian ritual. The American Negro in a state of greater helplessness adopted it fervently with his Negro spirituals while the Anglophone African with more elbow room took it up a little less fervently. Also, straightforward political revivalism looked meaningless when the British used a policy of indirect rule that kept and used African institutions to achieve their purpose. For all these reasons, cultural revivalism took shape among the educated Anglophone Africans on the eve of independence or after in two main ways: externally in dress, ceremonial and interior decor; and politically in the shape of 'African' philosophies of social and economic development such as *Ujaama*, Humanism and *Harrambee*. Compulsive devoutness as a way of shaming the non-practising Christian colonialist could now be safely discarded.

Reflecting on the way Christianity was changed doctrinally and denominationally in various countries of Europe, Lord Birkenhead once said that it is not religion that changes a people's character but a people that change the character of the religion they adopt. In Anglophone Africa he might have well reflected on the paradox that Christianity changed the educated African elite while the less educated Africans changed Christianity.

LEPROSY

Scourge of the Third World

Nearly 15 million people suffer from leprosy. Virtually all of them live in the Third World. The rich and developed countries are almost totally free of the disease, with the significant exception of the Northern Territory of Australia (a fact the Australian government denies but WHO insists on), where it is prevalent among the Aborigines. In Africa and India there are villages where over half the inhabitants have leprosy: and everybody seems to catch it sooner or later.

According to the Leprosy Mission, London, of the 15 million who suffer from it, only three million are at present receiving treatment. More than five million are children between the ages of three and fourteen. Because the disease is infectious and because such vast numbers are even today unable to get treatment, leprosy continues to spread. About a quarter of a million people catch it every year. It is only lack of money which prevents its successful treatment and total eradication.

Until 1946 there was really no effective treatment for it. The traditional method of dealing with those afflicted was to isolate them from society in special colonies and settlements. With the discovery of Sulphone, isolation became unnecessary, though few would believe that. Patients can now be treated in their own homes. No vaccine has yet been discovered, but intensive research continues.

According to LEPRA, the British Leprosy Relief Association, many people are shocked to hear that leprosy still exists. They read about it in the Bible and assume it was stamped out centuries ago. Leprosy is endemic to underdeveloped countries whose poor nutrition, overcrowding and poor medical facilities are a normal part of life. Tragically, leprosy is often very low on the list of national priorities. Most Third World governments pretend that leprosy does not exist.



Source: *World Leprosy Map reproduced with the kind permission of The Leprosy Mission Around The World, 50 Portland Place, London W1N 3DG*



The Lepra Logo

Leprosy

The Cause

Leprosy is caused by a small germ or bacillus called *mycobacterium leprae*. It is an infectious disease, but it is not clear how it is passed on. It is not easily caught, and in fact the majority of people have some immunity to it.

People who are exposed to leprosy react differently. In the small proportion of those who have no resistance, the germs multiply readily. This is *lepromatous* leprosy, and at certain stages may be infectious.

Some people have a high degree of resistance to the disease, and if they do catch it the germs multiply slowly in their bodies. This is *tuberculoid* leprosy. In between these two extremes, there are many degrees of resistance.

Spread

Nobody knows exactly how many people suffer from leprosy. One current estimate is 15 million. There may be many more. Of these only 3 million are at present receiving treatment. More than a quarter of a million new patients catch leprosy every year.

Infected Areas

Leprosy is present in almost every country, but most sufferers live in Africa and Asia. The people in these countries are poor, and undernourished. They are threatened by many other diseases besides leprosy. Standards of hygiene may be low, while ignorance and fear prevent sufferers seeking the help they need, even where it exists.

Book Reviews

The titles reviewed are listed below with names of authors, editors and reviewers.

Drought in Africa 2 edited by David Dalby *et al.* JOHN HOWELL.

Landuse and Development edited by Phil O'Keefe and Ben Wisner. JOHN HOWELL.

Drought and Irrigation in North-East Brazil by Anthony L Hall. JOHN HOWELL.

The Cyprus Revolt by Nancy Crawshaw. M AZIM HUSAIN.

Southeast Asian Transitions: approaches through social history edited by Ruth T McVey. MICHAEL LEIFER.

Elite Politics in an Ideological State: the case of Pakistan by Asaf Hussain. KHALID HASAN.

Politics and Government in Malaysia by R S Milne and Diane K Mauzy. RUTH T MCVEY.

Towards Total Revolution: the writings and speeches of Jayaprakash Narayan edited by Brahmanand. EVAN CHARLTON.

India: population, economy, society by R H Cassen. FARRUKH NIGAR AZIZ.

Experiments in Family Planning: lessons from the developing world by R Cuca and C S Pierce. FARRUKH NIGAR AZIZ.

Militarism in Modern China: the career of Wu P'ei-fu, 1916-1939 by Odoric Y K Wou. DAVID STEEDS.

China's Economy: a basic guide by Christopher Howe. DAVID STEEDS.

China and Japan 1949-1976 by R K Jain. DAVID STEEDS.

Finding a Voice: Asian women in Britain by Amrit Wilson. UMA RAMNATH.

Role of Rural Women in Development edited by Vira Mazumdar. UMA RAMNATH.

International Perspectives in Rural Sociology edited by Howard Newby. IAN ROXBOROUGH.

Sphinx and Commissar: the rise and fall of Soviet influence in the Arab world

Mohamed Heikal
London: Collins. 1978. 303 pp. £6.95.

Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: policy formulation 1966-1973

Ilana Kass
Folkestone, England: Dawson. 1978. 273 pp. £11.00.

The Limits to Power: Soviet policy in the Middle East

Edited by Yaacov Ro'i
London: Croom Helm. 1979. 376 pp. £10.95.

In the Direction of the Persian Gulf: the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf

A Yodfat and M Abir
London: Frank Cass. 1977. 167 pp. £8.95.

Soviet policy towards the Third World has been a subject much discussed in academic and policymaking circles ever since Moscow tried to break out of the *cordon sanitaire* imposed by western collective security pacts surrounding the Soviet Union. It was through the supply to Egypt of a major consignment of weapons in 1955 that the shift in Soviet policy was signalled; and since then analysts have continually tried to assess the nature of Soviet objectives, the extent of Soviet aid and the reasons for the various successes and failures of Soviet policy. It is to this continuing debate that the four books

under review seek to contribute.

At the centre of any effort to discern Soviet intentions in the Middle East must be a consideration of the Soviet attitude towards, and involvement in, the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the exception of Yodfat and Abir's book, which focuses mainly on activity in the Persian Gulf, all the books under discussion deal extensively with this core issue. Mohamed Heikal, as the former editor of the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram* and a close confidant of the late President Nasser, presents his third book analysing Egypt's policy, this time towards the Soviet Union. His account of those relations combines a wealth of anecdote and detail with a perceptive analysis of the factors behind Soviet successes and failures. Heikal's contacts with Soviet leaders and officials offer a unique, if necessarily personal, picture of Soviet calculations and behaviour.

The book by Ilana Kass on the formulation of Soviet policy towards the Middle East from 1966-71 (despite the claim of the title that the book goes up to 1973) covers a period also dealt with by Heikal, and the different vantage points occupied by the two authors – one an Egyptian journalist and the other an Israeli academic – offer an interesting comparison. Kass attempts to do two things. One is to show that Soviet newspapers express consistently different views on the Middle East. This she does very well, using a wide and representative selection of articles from the four major dailies (*Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Krasnaya zvezda* and *Trud*) in an analysis which complements the two excellent contributions by Eran and Friedgut in the Ro'i volume on domestic perspective. She then tries to make a qualitative jump from the analysis of newspaper editorials to an inference about the views of the leaders whose interests the newspapers were supposed to represent. It is Kass' argument not only that Soviet policy was the product of an interplay between group interests, but also that these interests expressed themselves in a coalition between military and defence industry leaders (a conclusion drawn by the closeness in the editorial opinions of the military paper, *Krasnaya zvezda* and the Council of Ministers' paper, *Izvestia*) on the one hand and party leaders on the other (as represented by *Pravda*), with the Trade Union Organisation (and its newspaper, *Trud*) occupying an intermediate yet independent position.

In certain ways the assessments by Heikal and Kass of Soviet policymaking converge. Heikal's view that in the period following the 1967 war the Politburo was split between the politicians (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny) and a military-ideologist coalition (p 188), is supported by Kass' conclusion that counsels were divided with the *Pravda* group's advocacy of moderation and support for a political settlement being opposed by the *Izvestia* and *Krasnaya zvezda* group's support for Arab militancy and maximalism (p 53). The only slight disparity is that Heikal names Suslov as being in opposition while Kass, by placing Suslov as part of the *Trud* group (p 220), puts him in an intermediate and moderating position over the issue of the level of support which should be extended to the Arabs in the post-1967 era (p 170). Yet on many other issues their assessments are different, and while the approach urged by Kass is interesting, it is not totally convincing, mainly because of her failure to consult other sources (including Heikal's first two books) about the details of Soviet behaviour and her admission that any conclusions about actual connections between editorial opinions and leadership positions are, at the most, tentative. This tends to undermine the credibility of the book's more ambitious objectives and detracts from its solid, if more

limited, contribution to analysis of Soviet press opinion. It is also unfortunate that she did not extend her analysis beyond 1971, since a discussion of differing views of the October 1973 war would have been most interesting.

The evidence on the level of Soviet involvement in the October war is contradictory, difficult to substantiate and open to wide ranging interpretation as evidenced by the other books under review. Heikal assesses Soviet involvement as being calculated to do everything to prevent an Arab defeat, provided that the overall stability of East-West relations was not disturbed. He also maintains that the Soviets, like their American counterparts, were not interested in doing anything which would promote a decisive victory on the part of either of their respective client states. The overriding importance attached by the Soviet Union to the prevention of a confrontation with the US is shared by Galia Golan, in her solid and well researched contribution to the Ro'i book.

In that article, she goes so far as to maintain that 'the Soviet Union not only sought to preserve and protect its relationship with the United States, it actually risked its future relationship with the Arabs by its efforts to obtain a ceasefire and its willingness throughout most of the war to cooperate with similar US efforts'.

These assessments of Soviet behaviour as being calculated to minimise the likelihood of East-West conflict are, however, not entirely shared by Amnon Sella. In his article in the Ro'i book, Sella presents reports which circulated at the time about the possibilities that the Egyptians had nuclear warheaded ground-to-ground SCUD missiles and that the Soviets were preparing to airlift their own troops into Suez to rescue the Egyptian Third Army. Yet, as the author himself readily admits, there is no 'hard evidence to substantiate the rumours that the USSR actually brought nuclear heads to Egypt' (p 60). Nor is there any confirmation that the SCUD missiles were ever under Egyptian control, or that the Soviet crews who manned them were part of Egypt's offensive strategy in the 1973 war, as noted by Sella (p 45).

What does emerge, at least implicitly, from the various accounts is that if it is still not possible in retrospect to discern the extent of Soviet commitment to the defence of the Arabs, it was even more difficult during the actual crisis for the participants to distinguish between empty threats and real intentions. Thus, while Soviet minatory behaviour indeed might have been a prelude to a massive intervention which in the end proved unnecessary, that same behaviour could also have been interpreted as part of a more subtle Soviet strategy designed simultaneously to convince the Arabs of Soviet support, warn the Israelis of the risks of not lifting the siege and reassure the Americans that the Soviet commitment to detente was firm.

The maximum level of support which either side would ultimately have been prepared to extend to its proteges is unknown. Nor can a single interpretation be attached to actual Soviet behaviour during the war. Soviet analysts were well aware of the threats to detente 'presented by the "uncontrolled element" within international crises, that is, a package of factors which allows various local aggressive forces to create situations sharpening the conflict and pushing the major imperialist powers to more vigorous action than they had been prepared to engage in'. (V Zhurkin, *International Affairs*, Moscow (7) 1974, cited in Golan, p 10). The recognition by all the parties to the conflict that a major East-West confrontation had been narrowly averted had the effect of producing, in the postwar period, an environment conducive to a settlement.

The Soviet leaders have steadfastly supported an overall settlement in which all the participants to the conflict would be present, including both the Soviet Union and the PLO, which the Soviet Union, in line with the October 1974 Rabat Conference resolution, considers to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Compared to the meanderings of American policy towards a settlement, the Soviet line has been fairly consistent, and includes, as discussed by Robert O Freedman in his chapter in the Ro'i book (p 316), Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 boundaries, Arab recognition and great power guarantees of those boundaries, and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.

The recent signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is, however, a setback both for attempts to achieve a comprehensive settlement and for Soviet policy in the Middle East. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union airlifted substantial quantities of weaponry to the Arabs during and following the October war (Sella, *op cit*, p 50), this effort failed to meet their demand for more sophisticated weaponry to close the gap with Israel. Moreover, in the postwar negotiations, the Soviets proved unable to prevent Sadat from relying exclusively on the Americans for a settlement. These factors, plus a shift in Egypt's economic strategy to an 'open door' policy reliant on western and Arab investment and trade, led in March 1976, as discussed by Yaacov Ro'i in his chapter on Egypt, to the abrogation of the May 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The Soviet Union's strategy not only in the Middle East but also in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere had placed a heavy emphasis upon Soviet naval and air bases in Egypt. Moreover, Soviet-Egyptian relations had been held up as a model to other Third World countries of the Soviet Union's support. Indeed the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty had been singled out for praise by Brezhnev in his February 1976 address to the Twenty Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is therefore difficult to concur with Ro'i's conclusion that the Kremlin was somehow itself responsible for the break in relations through its unwillingness 'to concede its status as traditional and closest ally, apparently assuming that it had sufficient hold on Egypt to prevent Sadat from cutting the Gordian Knot' (p. 206). What is certainly true is that in the post-1973 era the cost to the Soviet Union, in both financial and political terms, of maintaining any influence in Egypt was much higher than it was either able or willing to pay.

It is a central theme of the Ro'i book, and one supported by the Yodfat and Abir volume, that Soviet exclusion from the peacemaking process and its expulsion from Egypt has resulted in a dispersal of Soviet influence into other states in the area. Yet Soviet success in finding a state which would provide the same facilities that the Soviet Union had enjoyed in Egypt has been strictly limited. In South Yemen, perhaps the most left-wing of the Arab regimes, the Soviet Union, according to Yodfat and Abir, had great difficulty in obtaining any air and naval bases (chapter VIII), although recent developments in the Horn of Africa suggest that the Soviet Union probably does now have its own bases in the PDRY. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has not fared quite so well. In Iraq, Yodfat and Abir maintain that under the terms of the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship, Article 9 'gave contractual authorisation for stationing Soviet forces in Iraq, or for Soviet use of Iraqi sea andair bases' (*op cit*, p 80). Yet Article 9 refers only to the mutual commitment by both parties to 'develop

cooperation in the strengthening of their defence capacity (*op cit*, p 37). While the Soviet Union undoubtedly does have military advisers in Iraq, the contention that there is any large scale stationing of Soviet forces is not supported by the evidence.

A similar dilemma is presented in assessing the extent of Soviet influence in Syria. Sella's statement that the Soviet Union has had naval and air bases in Syria since before the October war is not substantiated by any source he provides (*op cit*, p 41). It is certainly not possible to equate Soviet access to Syrian bases with Soviet control over those bases. The use by the Soviet navy of Latakia and Tartous as ports of call does not in itself justify labelling them as Soviet bases any more than American naval access to Israeli ports or the establishment in Sinai of an Amercan manned listening post can be used to prove the existence of US bases in Israel. It is a small but important point, since to assume that the Soviet Union does have bases in Syria would be to attribute far greater success to Soviet policy than is warranted. The excellent article by Golan and Rabinovich on Soviet-Syrian relations draws particular attention to the delicate balance that has been maintained by the Damascus regime between supporting American efforts for a negotiated settlement (support which has been virtually withdrawn in the wake of Camp David and the November 1978 Baghdad Summit) while increasing political and military relations with Moscow. This delicate balance was made even more precarious by the Syrian decision to begin its invasion of Lebanon on the very day Kosygin was in Damascus. The fact that the Soviets only threatened to cut off arms supply to Syria, without actually doing so, also illustrates Moscow's recognition of the limits of its influence in the area.

These constraints, plus the growing awareness of the economic benefits to be derived from trade with the oil rich states have produced certain shifts in Soviet policy, not all of which were apparent at the time the books under review were written. Yodfat and Abir and the authors of the two articles in the Ro'i volume on the economic aspects of Soviet policy all underline the fact that while the Soviet Union for obvious reasons supported the Arab use of the oil weapon during the October war, the changes brought about by the increase in OAPEC power have not all worked in Moscow's favour. The emergence of the conservative Gulf states as paymasters for the Arab cause has allowed the confrontation states previously reliant on Soviet military aid to seek arms elsewhere. Equally, western and particularly American realisation of the extent of its dependence on Gulf oil supplies has resulted in an enhanced American presence and interest in the Gulf. As Gur Ofer rightly says, 'the intensified western interest has thus raised the unit price the Soviet Union has to pay for any asset it is interested in keeping or acquiring in the region' (Ro'i, *op cit*, p 68).

At the same time, the new wealth in the Middle East has opened up important prospects to the Soviet Union for increasing its imports of oil and gas while also reducing its hard currency deficit through the sale of arms. Recent approaches by the Soviet Union to Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia underline Moscow's awareness of the importance of establishing contacts with the moderate Arab states. Massive Soviet arms sales to Iraq and Libya also indicate an increased emphasis on the economic benefits of arms transfers.

Apart from the shift in Soviet policy occasioned by the exclusion of Soviet influence from the peacemaking process and by the growing importance of the Gulf states, there

is also a further aspect not sufficiently considered by any of the books. This is the increased rift between the US and Egypt on the one hand and the 'moderate' and 'rejectionist' Arab states on the other. The insistence by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan, in addition to the more radical Syria and Iraq, that the peace process should be comprehensive and should not lead to a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt, which has been a growing source of dissension within Arab ranks ever since Sadat's controversial trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, is an event which certainly could have been included at least in the Ro'i book. America's firm promotion of a separate settlement has led to a greater unity of interests between the remaining moderate and radical states, and has unwittingly provided Moscow with enhanced opportunities to improve its position in the area. Thus, as with Moscow's early successes in the post-Suez era, its recently improved position may be due more to American diplomatic shortsightedness than to Soviet initiatives, underlying the necessity for both the Russians and the Americans to remember that in Middle Eastern politics, the situation is so complex and volatile, that nothing can be assumed in advance.

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Moral Claims in World Affairs

Edited by Ralph Pettman
London: Croom Helm. 1979. 199 pp. £8.50.

Among the complexities and contradictions in international affairs, that between 'morality' and 'power', as expressed in the perennial debates between the 'idealists' and the 'realists', is among the most fundamental. At the same time, the 'morality' end is rather neglected which fully justifies a symposium which in ten brief essays looks at some major theoretical and a few practical issues of 'morality'. As the editor admits in his preface, moral claims in world affairs are made by various actors for multifarious purposes. Traditionally they stem from the views of European elites and in theory the major confrontation arises between the statist (western) and the class (socialist) paradigms of world affairs; in practice, however, the strongest moral claims are now advanced by the underdeveloped Third World. Hence the prevalent theories of morality offer little guidance to the modern pluralist world in which the widespread claims for a greater degree of equality find little opportunity to lead to practical policies which continue to be shaped in a nation state centred system. Even the most hard headed 'realists' have to accept as an important fact a growing feeling that the present structure of world politics is inadequate. Although Europe-centred and inadequate, the traditional theories of 'morality' are, nevertheless, an important starting point though in many respects they reflect limitations to our ways of thinking rather than offer a sound basis for its positive development.

There is a basic argument among the six authors of the purely theoretical essays who dwell largely on two issues: the state-centred character of the majority of the theories of 'morality' and the consequent limitations this puts on the analysis of the concept which can be dealt with also, perhaps much more adequately, on the different levels of individuals and of world society. The issue whether the ideas of 'human rights',

'justice', 'good' and 'evil' conceived within European societies are at all suitable at the global level, is analysed from various angles and, to put the conclusions in a nutshell, must be generally left open.

Squarely about the issue of the Third World is the opening essay of the empirical part of the symposium, devoted to the complex issue of liberation in Africa, especially Southern Africa. In his perceptive treatment Jan Pettman plausibly analyses the general shift from simple demands for political liberation through a 'black government' to one for a social revolution. The subsequent two essays highlight the fundamental differences between the Chinese and the Russian moral notions which are too frequently subsumed under the umbrella notion of 'Marxism'. As Michael Yahuda convincingly argues, the Chinese notion of 'independence' has extremely strong moral overtones and can be regarded as the foundation not only of China's foreign policy which is basically non-expansionist, but also of the general Chinese *weltanschauung* which finds the principal conflict of our generation in the struggle of the Third World and both the superpowers. This rather clear and, to the members of the Third World, readily intelligible and acceptable conceptualisation must be contrasted to the Russian concept of morality, discussed by V Kubalkova. This is plausibly presented as a rather confused rationalisation of the vagaries of the Soviet system which has stubbornly 'refused' to follow Marxist predictions at home and which stubbornly clings to the conception of a two bloc world in which the place of the Third World is subordinate to the basic ideological struggle. For the Third World this conceptualisation is likely to appear to be Europe-centred – a manifestation of a basic split within the European civilisation which fails to accommodate the new global realities.

In his brief conclusion the editor justifiably claims that the issues of 'morality' and 'power' require a periodic restatement. This volume does so adequately with reference to the passing European dominance. Significantly, the Soviet version of Marxism comes squarely within the European fold whereas the Chinese one is firmly oriented towards the Third World.

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The United Nations: how it works and what it does

Evan Luard
London: Macmillan. 1979. 187 pp. £8.95.

The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970

John J Stremlau
Princeton University Press. 1977. 425 pp. £16.70. £6.25 pb.

At the start of his book Mr Luard says that the UN is often criticised most unfairly. Many people are prone to expect things of it which are quite unrealistic, given its basic nature, and condemn it for characteristics which they accept in comparable circumstances elsewhere. In truth, he says, the Organisation 'can never be anything but a mirror of the world as it is' (p 3). Yet it is soon evident that the author himself rejects the idea of the UN as simply a mirror. He sees the Security Council as a permanently

available bargaining mechanism, the existence of which may encourage compromise and agreement. More generally, he argues that the world organisation may use its collective influence to modify international relations. And throughout the book he makes proposals for the improvement of the UN with a view to its becoming more able both to help keep the peace and remedy international economic inequality. He concludes with a call for the extension of the Organisation's authority, addressed first to 'true socialists' but immediately extended to 'mankind', as the task in hand is said perhaps to be 'the chief challenge [of] the next century or so' (p 171). All of which is a far cry from the UN as nothing but a passive representation of external reality.

This basic contradiction in the argument is accompanied by others. It is not always clear how Mr Luard's specific suggestions for reform relate to his preceding analysis of the UN's present condition. Then, too, while the author is without doubt an authority on the subject, his dates are sometimes inaccurate. There are other minor points on which it is possible to carp. It is, in short, not the most meticulous of works. But none of these matters should be allowed to obscure the fact that Mr Luard has written a most useful book. It is clear, wide ranging, and the core of the argument is sound: that the UN is bound to reflect the will of its member states, and that given its disparate membership not too much should be expected of it. Overall, therefore, this book gives a very good picture of the Organisation, getting straightaway to the essence of its varied activities. It is just a pity that some less well informed and aware readers may put it down, voicing the kind of comments which it was partly written to guard against. Perhaps the author as scholar – Supernumerary Fellow of St Antony's College, Oxford – has here distanced himself insufficiently from the author as politician – Member of Parliament for Oxford until recently.

A question to which Mr Luard gives only a couple of passing mentions is the Nigerian Civil War of the late 1960s. This is understandable as the UN kept almost entirely clear of the attempt by the then Eastern Region of Nigeria to set itself up as the sovereign state of Biafra. But this is not to say that the matter had no international repercussions. Far from it. For on the one hand, Biafra sought to gain some form of recognition or acceptance at the international level, so as to legitimise and entrench her cause, and on the other there was much private concern and some action in Europe and America about what was seen as the struggle of the Ibo people not just for independence but for survival. As against these pressures Nigeria stoutly maintained that the matter was wholly internal. However, not wishing to alienate international opinion she agreed to a limited role for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), where she could count on wide support for her basic position, not least on account of fears that success for Biafra might encourage secessionist movements elsewhere. The participation of the OAU also meant that Nigeria could argue with a good prospect of success against the involvement of individual states or other international bodies. In the event the Commonwealth Secretariat also played a mediatory part at one stage, but the African states were not much more enthusiastic about this than Nigeria itself.

This is the area which Dr Stremlau examines in his well written and always interesting book. It is based on thorough and wide ranging research, including interviews with one hundred and forty leading participants. Among them were the Nigerian head of state throughout the war, Yakubu Gowon and the head of the Biafran Republic,

Odumegwu Ojukwu, and a number of those interviewed made confidential documents available to the author without restrictions. Along with other sources, this material has enabled Dr Stremlau to tell the story of the international politics of the domestic war in an authoritative and impartial way, and his study is unlikely to be superseded. It commands the attention of anyone who is interested in the interaction between politics at the domestic and international levels or in the war itself. Nor will those who are more generally interested in international relations wish to pass it by. It is an excellent piece of work.

As Dr Stremlau points out, the Biafran rebellion was the first large scale armed conflict since 1945 which had no association with the cold war. It could make no political claim on any foreign government nor did it fit into any category which automatically attracted outside support. However, the work of the Biafran Directorate of Propaganda, together with the reports of visitors and of Roman Catholic expatriate missionaries, resulted, after about a year, in the secessionists receiving widespread attention and sympathy in the West. Governments, although made to feel uneasy, could not be significantly moved. But unofficial support produced 'what quickly became the largest privately run relief operation in history' (p 242). Biafra became 'a ward of the international community' (p 238) and in a variety of ways this humanitarian assistance greatly facilitated the continuation of armed resistance. Throughout the war General Gowon remained committed to allowing food and medicine to reach civilians in Biafra (for which he came under increasing criticism), but quite apart from the fact that much of the imported food went direct to the Biafran army and bureaucracy, the arrangements for transporting it provided a cover for the import of arms. Cautiously, therefore, Gowon began in 1969 to take a tougher line on this matter, and Ojukwu began to lose sympathy on account of his refusal to cooperate over the regulation of the supply of relief. However, it was only a sudden military victory for the federal forces early in 1970 which brought the secession to an end. To the surprise of many outsiders there was no guerrilla resistance nor did federal troops go on the rampage. One observer said that 'in the history of warfare there can rarely have been such a bloodless end and such a merciful aftermath' (p 366). Reconciliation followed swiftly, greatly assisted by Gowon's refusal to extract retribution or even to behave as if he had won a victory. It was not an end to Nigeria's internal problems, but a storm of the greatest severity had eventually been weathered with remarkable success.

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The Arms Trade and International Systems

Robert E Harkavy
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger (distributed in the UK by John Wiley).
1975. 288 pp. £11.60.

Published in 1975 the conclusions of this work are still instructive. China, Japan and West Europe consortia are now challenging the superpowers in the arms trade and Israel, India, Iran, South Africa and Brazil are likely to enter the market on a lesser scale. Suppliers are under pressure to finance their arms industries through arms sales.

Barter of arms for resources is a new trend. It is difficult to develop a policy of 'common good' among the arms salesmen to enable them to have effective controls. Arms trading will continue and its elimination seems impossible. When select western countries are trying to make the world safe against conventional arms and nuclear proliferation by creating suppliers clubs, the book injects a cautionary note about the weakness of current scholarly and policy thinking, particularly in the US.

The book is well researched and offers interwar and postwar data of market shares of different categories of conventional arms. The forty or so tables provide a useful data base for inquiry. In most instances the postwar data goes up to 1968 and this is a deficiency. Still, what there is provides a good start for a major area of inquiry.

Chapter One argues that the international arms trade is the most important instrument and there is a trend towards multiple cross-bloc client relationships. Polarity, alliances and ideology seem less relevant today in the international arms trade. It is asserted that the basic structure of the international system is returning partially to the pre-World War II period.

Harkavy's argument is overstated and his framework of inquiry is inadequate. Multiple client ties in arms trade are happening and the growing link between domestic prosperity and arms exports is obvious, as in the case of US arms exports to Iran in recent years. True, the world is no longer bipolar. A major difference between the world today and the interwar world lies in the interface between technology and cultural nationalism in Third World thinking and in the linkage between military and civilian technology transfer to Third World elites and Third World resource diplomacy. Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Brazil and others are regional influential powers (although Pakistan's and Iran's cases are now problematic) who have, and will, import modern technology from abroad but who are unwilling to import foreign political, strategic and cultural values as part of the arms transfer package. On the contrary, they reject the foreign values, and they use imported technology to expand their capability base and their negotiating capacity *vis-a-vis* the great powers. In the Third World today there is a cross-cultural, anti-superpower orientation which may leave the superpowers in a 'no win' situation in the future. The superpowers cannot but offer modern military technology because industrial democracies are resource hungry and resource poor and yet public demands are proliferating. This is a new pattern in international life today. In interwar international relations the crucial dichotomy was between the great powers and the smaller ones. The great commanded and the small obeyed, or were supposed to because the great were responsible for questions of war and peace. Today the regions have their own power centres. In the old times the less than great powers were objects rather than manipulators, participants and power managers. Today, the giants of the past are becoming helpless. Witness the ineffectiveness of the US in the Middle East and South Asia, and of China in Vietnam in recent events.

The book argues that the revisionist states (Soviet Union and France, for example) have increased their share of the arms sales market over *status quo* states (for example the US) and the revisionist states have used arms supplies to extend their influence. This view is intuitively appealing but it is open to question. Harkavy uses SIPRI's differentiation between arms exports which are meant to create hegemonic relations, or

to restrict the arms race or to generate commerce. The book points to the growth of the commercial motive over the other two. True, that Soviet arms exports are guided by politics and strategy more than commerce. True, that the Soviet share of the market has increased. Still, influence is an elusive concept and the link between arms export and influence is problematic. Soviet influence in Egypt waned despite heavy arms supply and a friendship treaty. Soviet influence in Delhi and Indian influence in Moscow is explained by the Asian international setting and by the ineptness of US diplomacy in South Asia. Arms trade is not a source of influence; it is a consequence of other factors.

If influence between great-middle powers (or more accurately between powers in the middle of policy situations) is reciprocal rather than one sided then it is arguable that arms supply relationships create an inter-elite system of mutual dependency between seller and buyer and the impact of such a constituency on a particular transaction merits attention. Harkavy correctly emphasises the importance of relating arms trade to system characteristics. Figure 1.1 (p 10) provides an overview of his framework. This is incomplete, and refinement and expansion is needed. For instance, if the foreign seller and the domestic buyer elites comprise a subsystem and the foreign-domestic subsystem elite grouping competes with other groups who claim access to limited budgetary and policy issues, the framework should search for international-domestic elite linkages and their effect on the international arms trade. Furthermore, it is essential to study the role of corruption in the arms trade. Personal interests of elite members are hard to prove but in hypothetical terms it is undeniable that corruption shapes the choice of particular weapon systems, the choice of particular buyers and sellers and even the necessity of imports in select cases.

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The Terrorism Reader

Edited by Walter Laqueur
London: Wildwood House. 1979. 291 pp. £7.50.

International Terrorism in the Contemporary World

Edited by Marius H. Livingston *et al*
London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 522 pp. £24.50.

Terrorism is a subject on which agreement is most improbable. 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter', it has been repeatedly said, and even among those many nations which voted against the American Draft Convention on International Terrorism in 1972 on the grounds that acts of terrorism were the actions of freedom fighters, some since have in some cases acted most decisively against similar incidents directed against themselves, and described them as 'criminal acts'.

That the conflict is deeply rooted is shown most sharply by the historical anthology collected by Walter Laqueur, which resembles closely his earlier collection on the guerilla. Beginning with the classical and mediaeval views on the righteousness of tyrannicide, it deals separately with the terrorisms of the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries before bringing together a selection of views on the nature and consequences of terrorism, which is both interesting in its content and thought provoking in the extent to which it leaves many fundamental questions unresolved. Indeed the appearance of unity which it does give is deceptive in that it includes no article analysing terrorist acts from the point of view of a proponent. Since efforts have clearly been made to preserve such a balance in the earlier sections the conclusion seems fair that no such document was available to the compiler. Revolutionaries in the past have not been so reticent.

International Terrorism in the Contemporary World extends the story down to the present, adding a wealth of detail which is of the very greatest interest. This substantial volume represents an edited version of the proceedings of the 1976 Glassboro State College Symposium on 'Terrorism in the Contemporary World', which attracted many distinguished participants and led to a discussion which even in the summary version, ably presented by Marie G Wanek, has many points of interest. A selected bibliography compiled by Leo Bruce Kress also adds greatly to the value of the work to students. The papers themselves are, as is inevitable on such occasions, rather uneven in quality, but the coverage of each area is unusually full and complete. Beginning with a general introduction prefaced by the editor, the late Professor Livingston, and regional studies of selected movements, sections deal in turn with the psychology, political, legal, military, and historical aspects of terrorism. In general these are considered from the angle of the developed rather than the Third World countries, but not exclusively, and not without presenting much information that will be of interest to readers generally, though the size of the volume and its focus make it one principally for the specialist.

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Cities of Peasants: the political economy of urbanisation in the Third World

Bryan Roberts
London: Edward Arnold. 1978. 207 pp. £4.50 pb.

Shelter Provision in the Developing Countries: the influence of standards and criteria

A L Mabogunje, J E Hardoy and R P Misra
Chichester, England: John Wiley. 1978. 94 pp. £4.75 pb.

Urbanism of the Third World is a popular topic these days. There is a veritable flood of books, monographs and articles about Third World cities. A substantial proportion of this literature has been prompted by international conferences and seminars, such as the UN Conference on Environment at Stockholm (1972), and on Human Habitat at Vancouver (1976). Whatever else such international conferences achieve (very little indeed) they certainly provide platforms for lobbying of favourite solutions and pet ideas. Although they are supposed to be international forums for exchange of experiences and ideas, they essentially turn out to be assemblies where the Third World is lectured down. Ideas and proposals offered at such forums are, often, well worn cliches or overly generalised statements, or contemporary western fads. The recommendations

of the Habitat Conference are a case in point.

The Third World is urged to capture increments of urban land values, establish appropriate standards and criteria for buildings, encourage self help among the poor, and so on. One could overlook such innocuous generalities if they were not preempting self examination of the Third World countries. These packaged solutions to the problems of the Third World have the backing of international agencies and professional establishments. They command prestige and weight of opinions of the experts. They create an illusion of concerted action. Thus, such pat ideas acquire a life of their own. They are recycled through regional seminars by jet set experts. They are endlessly repeated in one report or study after another. Mabogunje, Hardoy and Misra's monograph is a vivid example of this form of internationalism.

It is the product of a collaborative effort sponsored by the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) of the International Council of Scientific Unions. It has been funded by the UN Environment programme. Its primary message is that the countries of the Third World are experiencing a qualitatively different form of urbanisation than what the western societies went through at comparable economic stages. Poverty, lack of resources and other ills associated with the underdevelopment render Third World cities incapable of providing houses, jobs, clean water and waste disposal to their exploding populations. Thus, slums and squatter settlements become predominant urban forms. For example, 60-90 per cent of the population of cities like Ankara, Ibadan, Addis Ababa lives in uncontrolled settlements. Shelter provisions for such cities pose a challenge to the Third World.

Mabogunje *et al* advocate that building standards and public service criteria should not be elitist in conception, but must be realistic to reflect the cultural, economic and technological conditions of the Third World. The authors say that 'the definition and enforcement of environmental standards can only be meaningful when the standards are related to the contemporary conditions in a country. The conditions include not merely technology, but also the socio-economic situation, the distribution of power, and the effectiveness of political organisation' (p 59). Undoubtedly, this is a valid proposition. The authors have lent it the weight of evidence. They recount the demographic explosion, lament government indifference, demonstrate some impatience with the elitist approaches, and plead for adopting an appropriate policy framework. All these statements are acceptable, but the question is: do they need to be restated in 1978? For example, the UN alone had published 950 reports and documents by 1976 on housing, planning and environment. Since Habitat, a mountain of publications has accumulated on these topics, each regurgitating the same material. So do we need another monograph pleading for setting housing and environmental standards in accordance with local conditions? What will it do, other than earn some money for the publishers, publicity for SCOPE, and fatten the author's curriculum vitae? The medium has become the message. The message is simple, and one dare say, not unknown to policymakers in the Third World. The question is why it does not get absorbed, why governments which struggled for political independence from the West uncritically accept western standards when they are obviously irrelevant. This is the question that should be raised, and not mere reiteration of what has become common knowledge.

To get some answer to this question, one has to turn to another stream of urban

literature which purportedly examines political and economic processes of city development in the Third World. Bryan Roberts' *Cities of Peasants* is a recent addition to the literature on this theme.

Development theory has recently swerved towards neo-Marxism. Even thede velopment practice has begun to give greater weight to the needs and well being of the poor, instead of merely proposing the growth of the GNP. The World Bank has become imbued with McNamara's 'radicalism'. It talks about injustices to the poor and the greed of the upper classes. This is the intellectual climate of development. In this perspective, urban crisis ceases to be merely a matter of technocratic failures, governmental indifference, or inappropriate standards. Instead, it appears to be another manifestation of larger processes of dependency, dualism and despotism with which the Third World is afflicted. Roberts systematically investigates these processes. Although he focuses on Latin America, he synthesises much of the contemporary thinking about Third World development. Two noteworthy positions argued in this book are, first, that the multifold crises of the Third World are a direct outcome of the concerted and deliberate efforts of economic development. It is the capital intensive industrial and agricultural development that is creating the dependency, duality, and marginality of the Third World. This point may be noted by Mabogunje *et al.* The urban and environmental crises are not, primarily, the results of governmental indifference and inaction. Rather, they are the outcome of a particular mode of development that has been deliberately pursued by these countries. Secondly, while conceding the role of dependency, Roberts convincingly argues that each country takes a specific development path determined by its particular conditions. This position counteracts the mechanical analysis that the dependency theory tends to promote, wherein all that happens in a country is 'caused' by malevolent forces from abroad.

According to him, factors that seem to influence the development path of a country are its internal class structure, colonial history, regional set up, and the mode of economic development. The state is no more a backdrop to this drama; it has assumed the role of the director. A corollary of these positions is that 'cities are products of broader socio-economic changes, they cannot be considered in isolation from them' (p 9). This proposition contradicts urbanist assumptions that cities are entities by themselves, and that they can be treated in a similar way across cultures.

Roberts touches on most of the urban development issues that have come to the fore in this decade. He investigates the relationship between urbanisation and industrialisation, migration and urban development, social structure and modern versus bazaar sectors, *et cetera.*

The Third World's state apparatus has the benefit of modern technology; therefore, its repressive capabilities are far beyond the western countries at comparable stages of development. The city in Latin America promotes dependency on advanced capitalist countries, through its complex technology. This also means that the social classes which operate high technology in cities earn exceptional premiums. Thus professionals, managers and technicians appropriate high incomes. The duality of modern versus bazaar sectors (commonly known as formal versus informal) is also illuminated by the fact that one cannot exist without the other. The bazaar or traditional sector takes the slack of the modern sector, and it survives in the interstices of state regulations. In one sense the

bazaar sector exploits labour by invoking social obligations to maintain low wages. One interesting insight in this regard is that state control tends to encourage small enterprises. More pervasive is the state's presence in the market, less is the inclination of entrepreneurs to grow large. Often small entrepreneurs start new ventures rather than expand an existing one, to avoid being bound by wage and tax laws. Finally, it is argued that the poverty of the masses is not due to their traditionalism or lack of initiative or participation in the economic life. It is essentially the result of their too close an integration in the chain link of dependency. All in all, this book clears up many misconceptions about Third World cities. It demonstrates, at least for Latin America, that public policies and initiatives of development are the primary source of the so called urban crisis, and not the unawareness or indifference of policymakers, as the experts assume.

Obviously, development theorists illuminate the underlying processes that create intolerable urban (and rural) conditions, but they offer little advice to counteract these forces. Professionals and practitioners latch on to packaged solutions with a genuine concern to do something about these conditions. To someone seeking guidance for improving the lot of the urban poor, both approaches lead into unending circles. Perhaps intellectual probes can only raise questions; revolutionary practice alone creates answers.

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Independence Documents of the World

Edited by A P Blaustein *et al*
Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications/Leyden: A W Sijthoff. 1977. 2 Vols. 800 pp. $75.00.

Independence Documents of the World is a collection of those documents which mark the foundation or establishment of the sovereign national states of the world. In most cases, the choice is straightforward (particularly so in the case of the post-1945 Commonwealth countries from India to Tuvalu and Kiribati) but there are some 'political' problems for the editors. For example, Rhodesia is included, as are two Chinas, two Koreas (and two Vietnams) but not Palestine or the Western Sahara. The UK was bound to present a problem, which the editors met with the selection of the 1706 *Act for the Union with Scotland*, the 1719 *Dependency of Ireland Act* and the 1536 *Act for the Government of Wales;* however, there is no document for England, the major partner in the UK. This is a work which will be of use to the historian, the political scientist, and, perhaps, the lawyer, but *on its own*, it may seem an indulgent publishing venture. More of that later. It is a book for browsing as well as of specific reference. How else would the non-specialist discover that Canada has still to emerge from 'autonomous dominion' status (p 105); that the Republic of China sees the last will and testament of Dr Sun Yat Sen as a 'Declaration of Independence' (pp 125–6); that Denmark regards a thousand year old carving on the Runic Stone in Jelling, East Jutland, as its 'national birth certificate' (pp 185–9); and that the Cyrus Cylinder of the sixth century BC represents the birth of the Empire of Iran (pp 345–7)? Such are the

pleasures of serendipity.

Now for my comment about it being published on its own. Those political scientists and constitutional lawyers aware of previous publications of Oceana will, perhaps, have already understood my point. I am thinking particularly of *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (15 vols, 1971) and *Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties* (6 vols, 1975).

The *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* volumes (edited by A P Blaustein and Flanz) is a collection of the constitutional texts of the independent sovereign states of the world; every country section (prepared by a specialist in the area) has, in addition to an English text of the Constitution, a prefatory chronology giving an outline of the constitutional development of the country and a concluding bibliographical section which includes official documents, commentaries and specialist articles. The great virtue of this collection is that it is in loose leaf form and is constantly updated by the issue of supplements and, where appropriate, new texts. *Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties* (edited A P Blaustein and E B Blaustein) complements the foregoing Blaustein and Flanz collection in that it includes those territories which, for one reason or another, are not regarded as, are not yet, or will not be, independent sovereign states. There are nearly 80 such territories. Volume I covers the US and UK territories with which these two states have a special relationship; Volume 2, British Dependent Territories worldwide, mostly the remnants of the old Empire, which for reason of size or limited resources or preference have not come to independent status; Volume 3, the British 'Associated States' and the Protectorate of Brunei; Volume 4, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands and the Australian and New Zealand Overseas Territories; Volume 5, the French Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories, the Scandinavian Territories, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (USSR), the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara, Macao, the Netherlands Antilles, Palestine, the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus, and the Vatican City State; and Volume 6 concludes with the 'Homelands' of the Republic of South Africa.

Now the addition of the independence documents to this collection of independence constitutions and pre-independence/non-independent legal frameworks is an obvious bonus, but one would have preferred to have had the independence documents included in the Blaustein and Flanz collection of constitutions rather than as a separate two volume book. On its own it will have a limited appeal for the historical commentary is very brief; however, together with Blaustein/Flanz and Blaustein/Blaustein it forms a useful trilogy. Before their appearance it was a long and laborious task if one wished to obtain up-to-date copies of constitutions. The sets are too expensive for most of us but they should be part of any college or university library that undertakes the study of political science or constitutional law.

Two more Oceana publications might be mentioned here: *Investment Laws of the World* (8 vols, 1977). The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established as an autonomous international institution by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which came into force on 14 October 1966. *Investment Laws of the World* has been compiled and classified by ICSID and is part of a project for the collection, classification and dissemination of national legislation and international agreements

relating to foreign investment. It includes constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, regulatory provisions and bilateral treaties. Initially limited to the 53 Third World countries that are parties to the Convention, it will eventually cover the remaining Third World and developed countries. *The Digest of Commercial Laws of the World*, edited by George Kohlik, is published for the National Association of Credit Management, New York. A standard outline is adopted for each of the 67 countries included: Traders and Non-Traders; Contracts Generally; Elements fo Contract; Agency and Representation; Depositions; Courts Jurisdiction; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; Writs of Execution; Arbitration; Bankruptcy; Attachments; Garnishment; Liens; Assignments; Statute of Limitations; Pledges and Mortgages; Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques; and Partnerships and Associations. The final volume deals with Forms of Contract. As with all the other Oceana publications mentioned here (with the exception of *Independence Documents of the World*), these volumes are in loose leaf form allowing easy updating and supplementation.

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Asia's Nuclear Future

Edited by William H Overholt
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1978. 285 pp. £11.75.

The Overholt edited collection of studies on the prospects of horizontal nuclear proliferation in the volatile continent of Asia has the virtue of including some valuable case studies though it has the weakness of being overly speculative.

The book opens with an analytically sophisticated introduction by the editor charting the drawbacks of what is termed the first phase of nuclear proliferation research, which focused almost entirely on the chances of particular countries 'going nuclear', as if it were a single isolated event. The new wave of proliferation studies that Overholt proposes regards the Indian detonation as a watershed, with 'the acquisition of increasing levels of nuclear capability' as a far more relevant analytic focus. New interest has also been generated in the mid 1970s by the discovery of bureaucratic politics underlying pressures to acquire the nuclear option. Another distinction previously not developed is the categorisation of latent proliferators. There are 'coup vulnerable' countries with which the Third World abounds. Nor can the possibility of a 'terrorist nuclear bomb' employed by a non-state actor be discounted. The editor introduces a conceptual breakthrough by his analysis of global sets of nuclear proliferation chains, their delineated alternative routes and their driving force towards a crowded nuclear world. *Asia's Nuclear Future* develops the futuristic scenarios of a chain of nuclear-weapon option decisions in South Asia (including Iran), triggered by an Indian decision and in East Asia (including Southeast Asia) triggered by a Taiwanese nuclear weapons programme or possibly a South Korean 'bomb'. Mention is made of the so called 'bomb in the basement' that Israel has developed, but, on the whole, the more likely Israel-triggered chain in the Middle East remains unexplored.

A chapter on 'China as a Nuclear Power' by Pollack is a historical account of the

evolution of an independent deterrent and its surprisingly controlled and constrained character.

Passin's 'Nuclear Arms and Japan' explains the broad public consensus underly ing the postwar nuclear allergy and the many possible turning points which could make Japan change her mind. A chapter by an Indian scholar, Onkar Marwah, deals with India's nuclear intentions and policy in a sympathetic, almost apologetic light. Dunn's article follows with a projection of the fallout from the Pokharan nuclear test in neighbouring Pakistan and also Iran (though the recent revolutionary events there portend a quite different and low key response to any nuclear developments in the region as against the Shah's grandiose designs).

Overholt's concluding chapter attempts to sketch 'A US Nuclear Posture for Asia' and it is policy prescription at its most ambitious. The hypothetical situations that are envisaged, though admittedly of low probability, are – Soviet threats to Japan, a Korean war, an invasion of Korea and Taiwan, and a Sino-Soviet war. The contingency planning for the US is equally unconvincing.

Methodologically, the book is an addition to the literature on nuclear proliferation. And the conclusions are clear, that prevention of the horizontal spread is well nigh impossible, though management of the problems associated with retarded growth and dispersal is possible. Disarmament, no. Arms control, yes.

SHAHID QADIR
Third World Quarterly

Commodity Agreements and Price Stabilisation

David McNicol
Lexington, Massachusetts: D C Heath. 1978. 335 pp. £10.00.

Stabilising World Commodity Markets

F Gerald Adams and Sonia A Klein
Lexington, Massachusetts: D C Heath. 1978. 335 pp. £17.50.

While both these books add to the debate over the role of stabilising commodity markets, they are essentially different in character. McNicol's book contains a theoretically simple treatment of different types of commodity agreements developed with the intention of criticising those which involve supply management as being indefensible in the long run. Adams and Klein edited a series of papers presented at the Ford Foundation sponsored Airlie Conference in March 1977, and so include both a range of theoretical and practical approaches and a diversity of views on the feasibility of stabilisation schemes.

McNicol presents a typical US position on the IPC – that the programme of Common Fund and associated ICAs is not just a stabilisation of the commodity price scheme (mainly through buffer stock means) but also includes the idea and/or intention of raising commodity prices over time in order to transfer resources from developed to developing countries. It is agreed that this is not only an inefficient way of aiding developing countries but is unacceptable to developed countries in terms of the financial and policing burdens it would confer on them.

It seems that McNicol has set up a straw man. In the preparatory meetings held under the IPC to discuss the formation of ICAs, the emphasis has been on price stabilising issues, *not* price raising ones, and on how to set an appropriate price range and buffer stock size for this. If his book had been written after Nairobi, it would be a reasonable thesis. But in 1978, the limited buffer stock nature of the ICAs and Common Fund (extracting from its second window), should be obvious to all. Even the restricted objective of price stabilisation is proving difficult to negotiate.

In the Adams and Klein book it is not possible to find a common thread of opinion and so each section must be treated on its own. Part I, on development of commodity models, includes an excellent discussion of the many types of commodity models in existence and the areas which require further investigation and empirical work. There are two areas not mentioned in the survey which will perhaps attract more attention in the future, one being the extension of market-commodity markets to include processed forms of commodities and the other the further development of country-commodity models along the lines of the coffee and copper ones at WEFA.

The paper by Adams on COMLINK serves the purpose of outlining the rudimentary stage of the linkages modelled between commodity and macro models and their severe limitations. One would hope this work would continue with more emphasis on the national parameters which are sensitive to worldwide events and on the further integration of commodity and domestic price systems. Klein's contribution is basically a plea for the use of econometric models in evaluating stabilisation schemes and in analysing world interdependence. Even while recognising the data and the limitations of commodity models she is, as usual, optimistic about their usefulness (and neutrality) to policymakers.

Part II of the book is concerned with some of the theoretical aspects of stabilisation, with a concise survey of developments in the area of price stabilisation being given by Turnovsky, who leaves the reader both with a desire to investigate some of the proofs of the propositions stated, and with a realisation that, especially in the field of international commodity stabilisation, much theory has yet to be developed. Sarris and Taylor's paper adds to the survey by pointing out the inconclusiveness of gains or losses from stabilisation, given non-linear demand and supply function and the more realistic situation of no 'free' trade with reference to the example of cereals. The survey by Smith focuses on another aspect of the instability problem – that of information inefficiency in the short and long run. Perhaps the important contribution of this survey is the conclusion that more micro studies of expectations, investment, speculation (and so reasons for market failures) are necessary to assess the commodity market situation in a real world context. One is left with a sense of insecurity about attacking the problem at all – will price stabilisation help at all or are other solutions better?

Part III encompasses international policy oriented topics, McNicol's contribution being a shorter version of his book reviewed earlier with more (misplaced) emphasis on the price raising aspects of the IPC, and Zorn's discussion of producers' organisations, their objectives, formats and problems in effecting concerted action. His CIPEC example points out clearly the limited circumstances under which producer action to raise prices can be effective, though this does not negate the usefulness of organisations for other objectives such as information collection and dissemination.

Part IV is really a continuation of Part III, with even more emphasis on the US point of view.

To sum up, the book adds to the growing literature on international commodity market stabilisation problems, though I found the first two sections much stronger than the last two. One would have liked to have seen a developing country view of the IPC presented and defended – maybe with the same conclusions but at least with a different perspective.

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National Interests and Presidential Leadership: the setting of priorities

Donald E Nuechterlein
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (Distributed in the UK by Ernest Benn). 1978. 246 pp. £12.50.

'National interest' is undoubtedly one of the most important intellectual heritages of the Third World from the period of western dominance – it is the logical continuation after independence of the concept of 'national self-determination'. In the newly established states it gives rise to many problems additional to those encountered in the older western states – it has come to grips not only with broader (regional, continental and global) issues, but also with the lack of well articulated national traditions in political entities in many of which national building had not yet been completed and remains one of the major political objectives.

Little guidance is offered by western literature. Some thinkers discard the concept of 'national interest' as being too vague and therefore meaningless and as given to abuse in political arguments; others denigrate it as an obstacle to national solidarity and integration. Professor Nuechterlein is one of the very few western academics who has been constructively concerned with the subject (see J Frankel, *National Interest*. London: Papermac. 1970). Of the greatest interest in the book is the clear and commonsensical analysis of the concept in the first two chapters. To start with, the author suggests four broad categories of basic national interests: defence, economics, world order and ideology. Furthermore, he proposes that we assess the intensity of each interest according to a uniform scale, classifying them as survival, vital, major and peripheral. This admittedly imprecise classification provides a useful basis for international negotiations through assessing the intensity of individual interests for each party. Professor Nuechterlein merely introduces the classification and does not develop its full potential for the purposes of negotiations and bargaining – as frequently the assessment of the interests varies there is clearly much more scope in trading off one's interests ranking lower in intensity against those ranking lower in intensity for the other parties. He omits also a fundamental analytical classification of national interests according to the degree to which they are concerned with mere aspirations or with operational foreign policy, as well as the relationship between these two levels and political declarations and arguments. He does, however, discuss in some detail the important issue of how to assess value and cost-risk factors in determining one's interests and priorities.

The bulk of the book is concerned with the application of the scheme to US foreign policy. This empirical application enhances the value of the author's conceptual scheme by showing how well it serves the purpose of analysing actual foreign policy outcomes as distinct from the now fashionable study of its processes. It is also valuable as an aid to academics or diplomats concerned with international interaction and with the concrete issues of American foreign policy. The author orders into an identical scheme four historical case studies of US Presidents who decided to take the nation to war outside the western hemisphere – Wilson in 1917, Roosevelt in 1941, Truman in 1950 and Johnson in 1965 – as well as three scenarios of possible future crises in which the US could become involved: the Panama Canal, separation of Quebec and race war in South Africa. A useful chapter on the National Security Council and the War Powers Act and many references in the case studies throw considerable light on the decisionmaking process. In sum, this is a successful blend of theory and history.

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Economics: an introduction to traditional and radical views

E K Hunt and H J Sherman
New York: Harper & Row. 1978. 617 pp. £5.95 pb.

Hunt and Sherman's 'radical' introductory economics textbook sets out to present students studying economics for the first time with both 'traditional' and 'radical' (mainly Marxist) views, the latter including a critique of the former. It can therefore claim to be the first 'anti-Samuelson' textbook (its first edition was published in 1972). Its 600 pages are divided into four parts, covering 'the evolution of economic institutions and ideologies', an introduction to microeconomics, an introduction to macroeconomics and a much shorter part, 'socialist economic systems'.

The first part is relatively unchanged from the previous edition. It attempts to survey the development of 'traditional' and 'radical' economic ideas in their historical context, from ancient Greece to the present day. Such an attempt is clearly ambitious, probably overambitious; it certainly cannot be said to have succeeded in this case. Presumably because of the limitations of space, the inability to assume prior knowledge on the part of the student, and the desire to keep the discussion simple, the authors consistently oversimplify to an unacceptable extent. Thus, only three kinds of economists or or economic ideas ('ideologies') are allowed: liberals, conservatives and radicals, the first two being the two wings of 'traditional' views distinguished by their attitudes to state intervention, while radicals are distinguished by their belief in the possibility and desirability of fundamental change. Each economic thinker must then be fitted into one of these categories (and within each category little differentiation is allowed). Adam Smith, for example, is classified among 'the most conservative economists' along with Milton Friedman (p 437), which sounds too much like the interpretation the latter might make of the former to be true. If simplistic categories are required a better distinction might be that between serious, scholarly classical political economy and 'vulgar economics' favoured by some Marxists, since this, at least, allows for the possibility of some economists not being dominated by base political motives. Hunt

and Sherman's overemphasis of the latter, often to the virtual exclusion of serious intellectual scholarship, seems likely, despite their disclaimer (p xxiii), to encourage ignorant rejection of traditional views – or, more likely, of radical views.

The most important change in the third edition is a new chapter in part two on the labour theory of value. To a British economist brought up on the capital theory controversy it is surprising that previous editions had only a three page appendix on this subject; and the new chapter is also a disappointment in itself. It proceeds from a 'first approximation', simple commodity production – via a second, capitalist commodity production with equal rates of surplus value – to a third, where profit rates are equalised. Yet the logical or historical validity of this procedure is not explained, although, as the debate between Morishima and Catephores and Meek has shown, it needs to be justified. Marx is said to have 'formulated the definitive version of the theory' but the 'transformation problem' is never mentioned. Variable capital is said to be variable 'in that a worker may expend more or less energy in a single day', which is not what Marx meant by the term. Exploitation is characterised as 'a strictly scientific concept', but the rate of profit as 'a capitalist concept'. The asserted existence of surplus labour is given as an explanation for the existence of profit.

Part three, on macroeconomics, is the longest in the book. The general tenor of the argument can probably best be described as radical American (not Cambridge) Keynesian. It emphasises income distribution and the cycle as determinants of consumption, profits as the main determinant of investment, the importance of arms expenditure as a stabiliser, administered pricing and the increase of monopoly power as an explanation of inflation, and pollution. There are also chapters on 'International Capitalist Trade and Finance', which even in radical terms presents an inadequate account of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (there is, for example, no mention of the fact that it was a deliberate policy on the part of some European countries to convert excess dollars into gold) and underdevelopment, which appears to ignore much of the dependency theory literature and the real possibilities for growth in some LDCs that Warren has recently emphasised. The chapters in this part have been revised to take account of the inflation and depression of the last few years – the authors argue that 'most of the inflation and the "shortages" were caused by the global monopolies in collusion with the US government . . .' (p 528). Monetarist theory is particularly poorly treated, and the concept of the natural rate of unemployment is completely misunderstood at one point (p 340).

Part four starts with a brief discussion of the 'varieties of socialism', and then looks not uncritically at the USSR, China and Yugoslavia. The discussion has apparently not been properly updated – it nowhere goes beyond the mid-1960s although there is certainly enough interesting information available on economic reforms and problems of planning.

In their preface the authors envisage complaints from traditional economists that they do not present traditional views completely enough. Unfortunately, such complaints would be fully justified in many cases, and so would similar complaints from radical economists. The reader gets a strong impression that the authors are more interested in the colour of the opinions students end up with than in the intellectual process by which they get them, more interested in what people think, than how. It

is not therefore surprising that one can only conclude that this book will not help develop good economists, liberal, conservative or radical.

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The Alternative in Eastern Europe

Rudolf Bahro (translated by David Fernbach)
London: New Left Books. 1978. 463 pp. £9.50.

'In Poland in December 1970 the working class was provoked by the stupidity of the party state apparatus, but was then immediately and completely led to an acceptable alternative within the apparatus: the uprising gave the impulse for what one could call a 'small proletarian cultural revolution from above', i.e., the purging from the apparatus of some of the most reactionary, inconsiderate and unteachable bureaucrats . . . The essence of our internal situation is precisely expressed in the way the working class has no other cadres and no other organisation than that by which it is dominated' (p 190).

Those sentences best summarise Bahro's analysis of the Communist Party predicament in Eastern Europe: otherwise put, 'the workers are automatically atomised *vis-à-vis* the regime'. He himself was a diligent member of the East German Party 'apparatus' he now castigates so severely, but was gaoled in August 1977 after the publication of this book *Die Alternative* in West Germany. He has reportedly refused to be released and expelled to West Germany (as an international protest campaign sought), preferring to remain as a focus for reform within the GDR.

His disenchantment with official Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe does not extend to that propounded there about North-South relations, though he makes the proviso that Soviet (and allied) advisers to developing countries must first 'have given proof of their internationalist solidarity and fraternity' (p 59). 'The peoples of the backward countries today are involved in a race with catastrophe . . . What they need is not bread from Canada, but rather bread from Asia, from Africa, and for this they need a new form of life, similarly non-capitalist to that in the Soviet Union and China . . . What they initially require most of all for their material reconstruction is a strong state, often one that is in many respects despotic, in order really to overcome the inherited inertia' (p 58). He pursues the theme that for 'these people who are just in the process of organising themselves for industrialisation . . . their state can be nothing other than bureaucratic' (pp 128-9), or 'the state as taskmaster' from Babylon and Ancient Egypt to modern China, Burma, Algeria and Guinea; Iran under the Shah demonstrated 'the fundamental value of the state in this context' (p 129). The duty of the 'economically advanced countries of both power blocs will consist in doing away with the law of value in trade with the less developed countries . . . [otherwise] condemned to a pauperism which is perpetuated into the distant future by the drain of raw materials . . . The cultural revolution must create the broad social basis, beyond the laws of national and bloc interest, on which a massive and economically effective development aid can be established on a scale appropriate to the magnitude of the North-South antithesis' (pp 431-2). That 'aid' would not be a gift or loan but at prices

which exchange at units of labour-time – often at low or intermediate technologies in the South and normally at highly capital intensive productivities in the North. In the long run 'mediation to each higher unit by delegates elected from the base' could evolve an 'association of nations in a contentedly cooperating world' (p 453).

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Africa's International Relations: the diplomacy of dependency and change

Ali A Mazrui
London: Heinemann. 1977. 324 pp. £8.50.

The Foreign Polices of African States

Edited by Olajide Aluko
London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1977. 249 pp. £4.50.

Ali Mazrui, formerly professor of political science at the University of Makerere, Uganda, and now at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, is perhaps the best known African intellectual in the field of politics, with a number of creditable books on African affairs to his name. He writes with considerable grace and readability, his particular strength lying, not so much in his acquaintance with the inside story of African politics – he rarely tells us much about those politics which we did not know before – but in his ability to capture the mood of the intelligent, politically conscious African, his doubts and dilemmas, his feelings of humiliation and yet also his sense of Europe's continuing cultural dominance in his life. Mazrui has little to say about, and seems not much interested in the thinking of, the ordinary African of the village or the city street; on the other hand, perhaps it is not such who are likely to shape the destinies of the continent.

His present book – more a collection of well conceived essays than the development of a single theme – is in three parts: the 'global context', dealing with Africa's place in a relatively rigid, caste like international system and with African militancy, partially tinged by white revolutionary ideologies; 'inter-regional relations', covering Africa and Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Africa and the superpowers, and Africa and the United Nations; and, thirdly, a return to 'global issues', dealing with race as a source of worldwide social conflict, the question of armaments and arms control in Africa, the management of the population explosion, the now familiar ecological challenges facing the human race as they affect the African continent and, finally, the wider issues of Africa in the East-West conflict, oil, the rise of Islamic consciousness and its implications for Africa, and how Africans can, as the twentieth century draws to its close, come to terms with, and transcend, their cultural and economic dependency, as Mazrui calls them, on their old imperial masters.

In discussing these wide ranging questions confronting the independent African states, Mazrui is never at a loss for new ways of looking at familiar matters, and for inventiveness in finding new ways of describing them. His portrayal of King Mutesa and Dr Milton Obote of Uganda as examples of the 'fusion between indigenous culture and imported tradition' (p 37); his comparison of Charles de Gaulle and Kwame

Nkrumah as 'men of the day after tomorrow' (p 65); his examination of 'black scientific marginality', or why Africans have not contributed much so far to the progress of science (pp 95-102); his distinction between the economic and political isolation of South Africa, which he supports, and its intellectual isolation, which he rejects (p 205); his advocacy of birth duties, to be imposed and collected by some international authority, on countries which exceed a certain rate of population growth (p 260); his summing up of Africa's future in terms of the problem of resolving 'high reproductive symbolism' (that is, the dominance of kinship factors) and 'low class conflict' (p 298): are all instances of a highly original and penetrating mind. Mazrui, for all his didacticism, occasionally goes astray in matters of historical detail, but he always has something interesting to say. And his central theme – the striving of the educated African to be free from Europe, coupled with his ineradicable and ubiquitous dependency upon it – has a definitive strength about it.

Dr Olajide Aluko, a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria, has edited a rather more pedestrian but nevertheless useful book on the foreign policies of eleven African states: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire – *almost* in correct alphabetical order. His own introduction on the 'determinants of the foreign policies of African states' is not especially novel, but it reviews systematically the basic factors at work, leaving one to wish that his team had adopted his analytical model rather more faithfully. Inevitably, hardly any of them have. Equally inevitably, the essays vary in quality: though now badly out of date (as most of the contributions are), the studies of Ethiopian foreign policy by Professor Negussay Ayele and of Tanzanian foreign policy by Professor David H Johns, of California State University, are sensitive and convincing, whereas a superb opportunity is lost by the eminent Professor Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who should know) in writing a meaningless four and a half page official handout on Egyptian policy without mentioning President Sadat.

Professor Mazrui might consider it further evidence of African cultural dependence that three of the eleven essays in this book (on Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia) are written by Americans, and also perhaps that the basic design offered here for the analysis of foreign policy is the descriptive sort of historical account so familiar in the older European and American textbooks. If African 'scientific marginality', as Mazrui so rightly protests, really is no more than a product of history, the African political scientist should soon start to look around for his own way of explaining his own politics.

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Drought in Africa 2

Edited by David Dalby *et al*
London: International African Institute. 1977. 200 pp. £5.00.

Landuse and Development

Edited by Phil O'Keefe and Ben Wisner
London: International African Institute. 1977. 232 pp. £5.25.

Drought and Irrigation in North-East Brazil

Anthony L Hall
Cambridge University Press. 1978. 152 pp. £6.50

The dryland, or arid and semi-arid, regions in low income countries are a formidable challenge to development planners whether their commission is to increase productivity, to improve rural livelihoods, or to do both simultaneously. On the evidence of these three books, the challenge has not been met. Furthermore, it would appear that far from developing the resources of drylands the planners have contributed to the deterioration of the living standards of those cultivators and stock keepers who inhabit dryland regions, and have worsened the growing imbalance between the physical resources available and demands made upon them by man and beast.

This is not, in fact, a view which is sustained throughout the three books. There are, after all, forty authors with something to say about the development of the land and water resources of drylands: rainfed and irrigated agriculture, grazing, forestry, fishing are discussed from different professional perspectives. Nonetheless, there is a fairly clear thread of argument, and this concerns the diagnosis of the problems facing drylands and the choice of strategy adopted by governments and aid agencies. The argument is expressed in a number of ways but it is consistently critical of what is presented as prevailing wisdom.

Put simply, the 'prevailing' strategy – as seen by a number of authors – rests upon the assumption that drylands cannot be economically viable without massive investment and external intervention which modernises production methods. Such an intervention is feasible only in areas of high production potential. Elsewhere, the combination of low and unreliable rainfall, generally poor soils, low population density and lack of surface water prohibits any substantial development initiatives. Furthermore, increases over recent years in animal and human population densities have exacerbated an already precarious environmental balance due to overcultivation and overgrazing. More recent climatic changes – in Africa especially – have simply served to deliver one further blow to the prospects of survival. The incidence of famine is the immediate result, but this is only a symptom of a longer and remorseless process of degradation of the land resource. In the face of such natural forces, traditional landuse systems cannot be sustained. On these assumptions, the alternatives are clear: settled, commercial agriculture under irrigation for those farmers who have the aptitude and the land; and, where possible, modern ranching and mixed farming supported by government capital.

These assumptions are not, of course, accepted in these books. In particular, drought is seen not as the child of nature, but of man. The 'climatic' explanation of drought is a convenient myth ruthlessly employed to cover a continuing process of neglect and exploitation by colonial and independent governments. For some authors this can be traced to changes induced by the introduction of a money economy, individual tenure and taxation; others refer to more recent policy initiatives which have alienated the more productive land to settled agriculture without recognition of the critical effect on the system of landuse as a whole.

In contrast to this view, several authors adopt a more optimistic position. Traditional

dryland landuse systems are seen as both resilient and potentially highly productive, being capable of constant adaptation to a harsh environment and open to a process of gradual innovation particularly in the crop and animal husbandry practices of small producers. For this reason, a more sensitive and supportive strategy towards traditional systems – and an abandonment of grandiose schemes of transformation – is considered more likely, in the long term, to increase the productivity of land and labour. Furthermore, such a strategy can avoid many of the social costs of modern sector farming which can reduce incomes from the land for the many for the benefit of the privileged few.

Anthony Hall provides the most compelling argument for a redirection of dryland strategy in his study of the effects of the introduction of irrigated farming in Northeast Brazil based on the construction of large dams. He discusses not only the displacement of rural families but also the failure of Government agencies to provide the services to support new forms of production among settled farmers. In an oddly titled concluding chapter ('Alternatives to Irrigation') he advocates a form of collective cultivation on existing schemes; but the alternative *strategy* advocated is a shift in investment away from large scale irrigation to a number of smaller initiatives directed at subsistence farmers: research on food crops, credit to marginal producers, formation of co-operatives, and the construction of small dams and boreholes.

A 'liberal' package, in fact, but not one that would recommend itself to some of the more radical authors in the two International African Institute publications who suggest that a more fundamental change in the balance of social forces is required before any substantial changes are likely in the lives of small farmers and pastoralists.

Drought in Africa 2 is an expanded and revised version of a book first published in 1973. It would be inaccurate to claim a common approach or even a common concern with strategic questions. The book is a hotchpotch of different professional standpoints on drought: climatology, demography, animal husbandry and plant ecology. However the editors have singled out the contribution of Claude Raynaut as their introduction, presumably as a sort of political economy overview. In a paper called 'Lessons of a Crisis', he sets about the strategic response of aid agencies and governments to the Sahelian drought with some gusto, ridiculing the notion that only fertilisers, tractors and 'swarms of technologists' can develop the Sahel. In fact, Reynaut is something of a reactionary. He regards the dependence upon external monetary transactions as a root cause of underdevelopment and looks to the prospect of returning 'control over the total functioning of the system of production' to the peasant producers. Much of the rest of the book unfortunately shows how this control has irretrievably broken down.

O'Keefe and Wisner's *Landuse and Development*, by editorial contrast, has attempted a rather more coherent structure than *Drought* 2. Rather magisterially, the editors put their contributors into three groups according to the particular process focused upon: physical (vegetation, climate, soil), social (use of technology, role of government, tenure patterns, income distribution, migration), and human ecology (which is largely concerned with the process of local adaptation to resource constraints). In all three 'groups' there are challenges to 'established' thinking: 'desertification' is not an inevitable process (physical), peasant producers can be highly innovative (human ecology), *et cetera*. But it is the social process which appears to interest the editors the

most, and here the challenge is rather more fundamental in that the most formidable constraint to dryland development is seen in the exploitative nature of a system of landuse and production which reflects an emerging and subtle process of class formation. This is not a view which is likely to recommend itself to those responsible for decisions on dryland development projects and investment; and where authors airily dismiss conventional thinking, on the 'green revolution' for example, this is likely to confirm practitioners' distrust of the academic wing of much of the development profession. But all three of these books can be read with some profit by development planners, not only for the persistent questioning of much conventional thinking on dryland management, but also for the wealth of detailed material.

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The Cyprus Revolt

Nancy Crawshaw
London: Allen & Unwin. 1978. 396 pp. £12.50.

For forty years now the Cyprus problem has been before the international community, and continues to demand the attention of such international forums as the UN, the NATO alliance, the Commonwealth and the Nonaligned Movement. This book, essentially an account of the struggle for reunion with Greece, traces the dispute from the Greek war of independence, 1821, and deals in depth with the political and international repercussions and complications, focusing on the period from 1940 to independence in 1960. It is a work of accurate, balanced and fairly comprehensive reportage, presenting all aspects of the dispute without pleading for either the Greek Cypriot or the Turkish Cypriot case, and allowing the reader to draw his own conclusions. As such, it is a major contribution to an understanding of the Cyprus problem, throwing as it does an unbiased light on what went wrong after independence in 1960. It makes it possible to understand why, within three years, the Zurich and London Agreements became unworkable, and why the entire elaborate constitutional structure established in 1960 collapsed; it traces what followed in 1967 when the Turkish Cypriots were attacked at Kophinou, which became a turning point in the island's post-colonial history. It also elucidates with whom rested the main responsibility, and exposes the role played by the Greek Cypriot community under both Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas.

The inter-communal talks began in 1968. Because they were never intended by the Cyprus government to conclude, they continued interminably until other forces – led by the Greek military junta presided over by Costas Ioannides and EOKA B, established by Grivas in 1971 to revive the *Enosis* movement – overthrew Makarios in 1974. Twice before, in 1964 and 1967, Turkey had reached the brink of military intervention, only to be stopped by the US. But in 1974 on the eve of *Enosis*, Turkey reached the point of no return, and what followed took the form of a Greek tragedy. The Treaty of Lausanne excluded for all time any possibility of subjecting Cyprus to Greek rule – just as Greece had refused Turkey such a right when she invaded Asia Minor in 1921 – and Western Thrace, where the Turks were in the majority, had been ceded in 1923 to

Greece as part of the Lausanne settlement.

The account throws a fascinating light on the personality, the character and the role of Colonel Grivas, from the time in 1941 he formed the nucleus of the right wing terrorist organisation, *Khi*, until he died on 27 January 1974. It also gives, perhaps for the first time, a perceptive insight into the comradely relationship between Makarios and Grivas in the foundation of EOKA and in financing the purchase of arms smuggled into Cyprus for terrorist activities. From the common objective of *Enosis* beginning in the early 1940s, the author charts the course of differences which developed between the two personalities towards the end of the 1950s and, in particular, the bitter conflict which ensued after Makarios had entered into the Zurich and London Agreements. The diverging philosophies of later years reflect the degree to which the Greek Cypriot community was committed to achieve *Enosis* through terrorism, aided and abetted by the mainland Greek community and successive Greek governments.

The deep division which existed between the two Cypriot communities was intensified by the persistent and ingrained desire of the Greek Cypriots for *Enosis* to an extent which made them irreconcilable. The complex and elaborate Zurich and London Agreements of 1960 were concluded essentially by the Greek and Turkish governments with the general approval of the British government, but without any serious consultation or involvement of the two Cypriot communities whose future they were supposed to take care of and whose wholehearted commitment was essential to their success. The Greek Cypriot community, including Archbishop Makarios, accepted these Agreements grudgingly and regarded them only as a step towards the achievement of *Enosis*. Grivas rejected them outright. The collapse of the Agreements was therefore inevitable.

The author does not lay much stress on the fact that elements of common nationhood were lacking; even nineteen years after independence there is no national anthem, Archbishop Makarios throughout his stewardship of the island used the Greek national anthem. There is, of course, the Cypriot national flag, but it is flown only at embassies abroad and on a few government buildings in Cyprus. Otherwise within Cyprus, it is the Greek national flag or the Turkish national flag which is flown, depending in which area the flag is hoisted.

The author has noted but not dwelt on the fact that, during the period 1963-74, the government of the Republic of Cyprus was not the government envisaged in the Zurich and London Agreements which established the Republic. The Turkish Cypriot community continued to raise its voice in various international forums, denouncing the government of Archbishop Makarios as not representative of the people of Cyprus as a whole and as not being in accordance with the Agreements which established the Republic – but these protests were dismissed as the inconsequential effusions of a small and noisy minority refusing to accept the logic of the normal democratic process. In the years before independence the objective of *Enosis* was pursued under the camouflaged objectives of self-determination and anti-colonialism, just as after independence and till 1974 reunion with Greece and suppression of the Turkish minority was attempted under the facade of the freedom of action, both internally and externally, of a democratic sovereign independent member state of the UN.

However, the events which led to the Zurich and London Agreements – giving the

Turks representation and authority in all political, constitutional, and administrative matters quite disproportionate to the percentage of their population – do show that the Agreements were concluded to deal with the specific problem of avoiding partition and *Enosis*. This is evidenced, too, by the signatories to those Agreements which included not only Makarios representing the Greek Cypriots but also Dr Kutchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriots. The direction which the majority community took after 1960 to destroy the balance established between the 80 per cent Greek majority and the 18 per cent Turkish minority could only lead to intervention by an external power, namely, Greece, and thereafter inevitably by Turkey.

The author throws meaningful light on the complex interaction of international forces which governed and continue to govern the relationship of the two communities in the island: the changing relationship of the Turkish and the Greek governments depending on Turkish insecurities (mainly strategic for the mainland); concern for the Turkish minority in Cyprus; Hellenic irredentism; the mutually conflicting interests of Turkey and Greece in oil exploration and mineral rights in the Aegean; territorial limits, shipping access, air rights, fishing rights *et cetera;* the conflicting interests of the British government within the NATO framework; the involvement of the US and the USSR in pursuit of their global policies in the Mediterranean.

For the US, Turkey has strategic importance by virtue of its position on the Soviet frontier, twenty intelligence monitoring stations, and a ring of military bases which serve the US and NATO missions. The USSR, on the other hand, is interested in preventing the extension of US or NATO military bases to the island itself, whether under the aegis of Greece or Turkey being immaterial. Hence Soviet support for the integrity and unity of the island, and its policy of nonalignment. The Cyprus problem, therefore, is more than the adjustment of the rights of a minority. It is an international problem.

At the request of the publisher, the author concludes her book with a chapter summarising the main events which led in 1974 to the overthrow of Makarios and to Turkish military intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. Entitled 'The Aftermath 1960-1976', the chapter is understandably sketchy and lacks the depth, the comprehensiveness, the balance and the incisive perceptions of the main book. The author is conscious of this, for she states in the introduction that 'the troubles which have befallen Cyprus since independence lie outside the scope of this work and any attempt to deal with them in depth would be premature at this stage.'

With the death of Makarios in 1977 it is, perhaps, no longer premature, and what is now needed is a separate book, dealing with the period 1960-77, the period of the stewardship of Archbishop Makarios. It is to be hoped that before long Nancy Crawshaw or someone equally perceptive will undertake this task. Until then, this book, with its comprehensive bibliography, will serve as essential background reading for all those interested in the welfare of the people of Cyprus, and those diplomats and officials who continue to be involved in attempting to solve the riddle of a tragically partitioned Cyprus.

M AZIM HUSAIN
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Southeast Asian Transitions: approaches through social history

Edited by Ruth T McVey
Yale University Press. 1978. 242 pp. £12.60.

This interesting collection of five essays which examines differing examples of social change at the local or sub-state level has been published in honour of the memory of the late Harry Benda whose distinguished career was cut short in 1971. Professor Benda's contribution to a deeper understanding of the modern history of Southeast Asia arose from his interest in the impact of foreign ideas on indigenous social structures and in the nature of social change. Former students and collaborators of his have sought to sustain the impetus of the kind of intellectual enquiry which he pioneered by showing 'some of the relations between ruler and ruled, between the view from above and the view from below'. In her introduction, Ruth McVey assesses the scholarly virtues of this kind of study and provides a cogent survey of the kinds of issues which are addressed by the respective authors of these essays.

The five essays are mixed in terms of individual subject matter but are linked by their quality of scholarship. Heather Sutherland ably investigates the abortive attempt by the ruling elite of the Malay state of Trengganu to counter the intrusion of British colonialism in the early years of this century. The impact of this failure is further examined in a consideration of the domestication and ossification of that elite and the rebellion in 1928 by those disadvantaged by the transformation in social and political structure effected through the consolidation of colonial rule. Edilbert de Jesus looks at the workings of the tobacco monopoly in the Cagayan Valley in the Philippines and demonstrates how it served to underpin and sustain the position of a traditional ruling class. By contrast, Onghokham in his study of a personal quarrel between a Javanese regent and a Dutch resident in Madiun provides a fascinating picture of a clash between a member of a nobility transformed into a salaried bureaucrat and colonial officialdom. Such a clash did not represent an expression of nationalism; nor did the *Zarzuela*, discussed by John Larkin, which is a form of operetta performed in the Philippine province of Pampanga in the transition between Spanish and American rule. Dorothy Guyot in the final essay considers the unprecedented upsurge of communal violence between Burmans and Karens in the Irrawady Delta which occurred with the disintegration of colonial society and the intrusion of the Japanese led 'Burma Independence Army'.

These five essays provide a rich source in approach and material for an understanding of colonial societies in transition. That by Dorothy Guyot would seem to have the greatest relevance for an understanding of one particular aspect of contemporary Southeast Asia. The communal violence in Burma in 1942 may be seen as a major political watershed which served to alienate the Karens, whatever their religious affinity, from the idea of incorporation within a Burmese state. That sense of alienation has not yet been overcome.

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Elite Politics in an Ideological State: the case of Pakistan

Asaf Hussain
London: Dawson. 1979. 212 pp. £9.00.

The central thesis of this book that the military in Pakistan is 'a part of the political system and has all the power it needs to take over the government of the country' (p 145) is questionable. The suggestion that the military should, therefore, be given 'a constitutional role' is as invalid as it is suspect.

The author tries to analyse Pakistan's political history in terms of the country's governing elites: the bureaucracy, the religious leaders, the industrialists, the land-owning families and the professional classes. The people of Pakistan are conspicuous by their absence in this elaborate scheme. The result is that the author ends up by offering a subjective and partisan interpretation of highly intricate political and social problems, purely in terms of intra-elite rivalries.

The author states that he went to Pakistan in 1975 as a 'guest of the Pakistan military' to collect material for his book and was 'attached to the Research and Development Section (of the army headquarters)'. 'I often asked them (the officers) when the military would take over from Bhutto.' How did the question arise? He revisited Pakistan in 1977, five months after the answer had been provided by the military.

He asserts that the army has a natural role to play in the politics of Pakistan. 'Pakistan was all that remained of the Muslim empire in the Indian subcontinent. The military's identification with Islam linked it to the precolonial Muslim state. For the Muslim units of the British Indian army, the transfer of loyalties from the colonial to the ideological state did not present a problem. They could relate to a new role of protecting Pakistan as an extension of the role of the Mughal armies in being the defenders of the faith and state' (p 127). He adds that as the military's role in a Muslim ideological state is to defend Islam and Pakistan being 'an Islamic ideological state', it is perfectly in order that the army should rule. The author completely misses the point that there is no place in Islam for rulers who are not put in positions of trust through a free and voluntary choice of the people.

He argues that it is only ignorance which leads people to believe that the military's role in Pakistan's politics has been 'interventionist'. In his references to the events in East Pakistan in 1971 and Baluchistan in 1973, he makes no mention of the human and material devastation which resulted from army action.

Pakistan, of course, is not the only Third World country to have a military government. That does not make military rule either legitimate or desirable. Academics do not have to strain themselves to justify the suppression of the people by force: guns do the job much more effectively.

KHALID HASAN
Third World Quarterly

Politics and Government in Malaysia

R S Milne and Diane K Mauzy.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1978. 406 pp.

Professor Milne has extensively revised his *Government and Politics in Malaysia* in this

volume, with a special emphasis on Malaysian governance since the 1969 crisis. The result is an overview that will serve both as an introduction to the formal Malaysian political system and a work of reference for those seeking the background to events and policies in the 1970s.

The first five chapters are historical, outlining with admirable compression the background to the emergence of Malaysia, developments that led to the 1969 riots, and the government's response to that challenge. The second half of the book concerns itself with institutions and policies, and is to my mind much less successful. It continues the methodologically conservative approach of Milne's earlier work, in itself no bad thing, as it makes for the solidity and easy reference one wants in a work of this kind. But a description of formal institutions and official policies must be balanced by attention to the completeness of what they explain: are there significant spheres of activity or welders of power which are not formally recognised? As the Malaysian system of governance has come under increasing strain, and as a process of centralisation in both government and politics has reduced the opportunity for grassroots participation of a meaningful sort, less and less is explained by reference to the formal political system. There is, for example, no discussion at all of the Malaysian military (there is not even a reference to 'army' or 'military' in the index), even though its composition and character are of great relevance to the communal balance of power, among other things. If – aside from its participation in the National Operations Council in the early 1970s – it has not played a formal political role, surely in this day of military regimes that in itself deserves discussion.

There is a general loss of focus in the second half of the book, one reason for which is the recounting of post-1969 incidents in detail, which often appears to lose the forest in the trees and which will all too soon seem dated. More importantly, one has the feeling that Milne and Mauzy have drawn back from the implications of their analysis, since they are rather gloomy ones from the viewpoint of constitutional democracy. Malaysia has, after all, preserved some measure of political diversity in spite of the pressures on it, in contrast to the rest of Southeast Asia; why not indicate one's appreciation of this, particularly when the visible alternatives to the present system are so unpalatable? One can sympathise with this attitude, but the scholar's business is clarity not charity. Is it really possible to conclude that the present Malaysian system is a version of 'consociationalism' similar to the Netherlands (pp 354-5)? The material Milne and Mauzy provide on the development of the UMNO relative to other groups and especially the MCA indicates a trend, marked since 1969, away from the balance and sharing of political power which such systems as the Dutch *verzuiling* represented and towards a dominant party system under UMNO and Malay hegemony. Indeed, the authors remark at another point that Malaysia *has* a dominant party system (p 382), and this is quite incompatible, given the communal exclusivity of the hegemonic party, with their consociational argument.

A particular weakness of the book is its treatment of the socio-economic background to Malaysian politics. As the New Economic Policy has been the backbone of government attempts to deal with the communal problem in the 1970s, a chapter is devoted to it, but we are given little idea of the economic background or effects of this effort. Rural-urban migration and other politically relevant aspects of social change are vir-

tually ignored, entering only at the very end in a discussion of 'mobilisation' which centres on how to keep social change from having destabilising political consequences. The treatment of 'mobilisation' is empirically and theoretically skimpy, and we learn little from it except that the subject makes the authors very nervous. Nonetheless social change is taking place, is central to the transformation and prospects of the Malaysian political system, and therefore should have had a major place in the book.

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Towards Total Revolution: the writings and speeches of Jayaprakash Narayan

Edited by Brahmanand
Richmond, England: Richmond Publishing. 1978. Vols I-IV. 1145 pp. £35.95.

It may take many years before it is possible to assess with any accuracy the permanence of the influence which Jayaprakash Narayan exerted on the course of Indian political development. There can, however, be no doubt that he played a vital role in the creation of a climate of revolutionary unrest which provided Mrs Indira Gandhi with the public excuse she needed for the proclamation of an Emergency in June 1975. There is also no doubt that he provided the moral drive behind the formation of the Janata Party to fight the post-Emergency election, or that without him the Janata Government might have foundered in factional strife. That unusual phenomenon, a politician with a strong personal aversion for power or office, he could understand the tensions inherent in the sudden coalescence of disparate parties. After all, his own political ideas had passed through many phases in the process of evolution although it is now possible to see a consistent thread running through them which gives them their particular validity for the developing world. He believed in the people, a quality as rare among Third World politicians as it is in western democracies or eastern bureaucracies.

Printed in India but published in Richmond, Surrey in four volumes, the books contain a selection of Jayaprakash Narayan's writings and speeches over the last fifty years. A valuable but not flawless introduction by Brahmanand who was for many years secretary to JP – as every Indian calls Mr Narayan – takes the story of his life up to his imprisonment during the Emergency but the printing schedule permitted the inclusion of certain post-Emergency material in the final volume, the last being a touching reminder to members of the Janata Government of the pledges they took when they assumed office.

This collection of JP's writings flows remarkably smoothly, a tribute both to the judicious selection by the editor and to the quality of the original work. Publication at a time when politics in India are in the melting pot is particularly valuable because JP's comments are sharp and often surprisingly relevant to current conditions. It is fascinating to see how he matched the steady growth of authoritarianism with a growing determination to resist it. He was never in sympathy with the Nehru style – this is particularly apparent in his writing during the years of struggle for freedom from the British – but it was his observation of the ruthless quest for power by Nehru's daughter that galvanised JP out of the role of onlooker into that of the leader of a

revolutionary mass movement. His articles in various journals explain his progress from Marxism through socialism to his final ideological resting place as a Gandhian, but there was always a strongly pragmatic shape to his thinking. He was always adding his own experience to the doctrines and dogmas of others; he was the absolute antithesis of the mindless mouther of slogans. He sought out an individual path and was ready to follow it where it led him, even into intense public opposition if he was convinced that his course was right. On Goa, Kashmir and relations with Pakistan, he expressed views which were highly unpopular not only with the government of the day but with virtually all vocal opinion; he was not to be deflected by the most virulent criticism. He worried away at the problems of India, picking out the important from the trivial, the significant from the transitory; all his waking hours he devoted to consideration of how best the people of India could be helped to a better life. Finally he came to the conclusion that total revolution offered the only way forward. We are not given a precise definition of what this means. It would be peaceful, it would begin from the village, moving up to the largest urban concentration. Bureaucracy, the caste system, the manners and customs of the people, all have to be changed but, above all, the administrative system has to be radically revised.

Who was to bring all this about? One of the most frequently heard criticisms of JP in India used to be that he was too fond of standing on the sidelines and advising, and was not willing to risk the heavy responsibilities of office or leadership. Nobody could accuse him of this in the months before or during the Emergency. Afterwards, he was too sick a man to be able to stand the strain of office even if he had been willing to accept it. Yet there are sentences in this book which by a sad irony seem to show that – in a genuinely humble way – he came to believe that if time and ill health had not been against him, he might have become the vital instrument of change. He still could be if enough people would heed his words, set out clearly for all who choose to read them. The Janata Government might do worse than subsidise a somewhat cheaper version of these four very stimulating volumes.

EVAN CHARLTON
British Broadcasting Corporation, London

India: population, economy, society

R H Cassen
London: Macmillan. 1978. 419 pp. £10.00.

Experiments in Family Planning: lessons from the developing world

R Cuca and C S Pierce
London: John Hopkins University Press. 1977. 261 pp. £2.50 pb.

Population growth continues to be a crucial factor in the development policies of most countries of the Third World, and is of particular significance for India. In spite of considerable development effort, achievements and large scale family planning programmes, the rate of population increase has tended to neutralise any substantial progress in the material conditions of the majority of the Indian people.

The book is particularly timely in the present Indian context, when the country is

only just beginning to recover from the reaction to the compulsory sterilisation campaign of 1976 and reviewing not only its population policies but all development strategies.

Cassen's achievement is quite remarkable in that he has made available India's population history and put it into perspective with the comparative historical experience of population change in England, France, Japan and China, as well as the current experience of other developing countries.

In analysing the contemporary demographic picture, insights have been provided into the nature of the present trends of fertility, mortality and migration. An examination of the determinants of fertility, malnutrition, and the economics of family formation has enabled the author to present current and future characteristics of India's population. The national family planning programme's shortfalls and lack of significant success have been in large part due to inadequate management and the inability to match services to local circumstances.

In projecting future prospects, it was recognised that policies other than those pursued, particularly the industrial policies of modern India, could have made considerable inroads into poverty which has characterised Indian society for centuries. Even today the economy is failing to deliver the correlates of declining fertility: better health, education and employment to the majority of the people in an adequate time frame. Cassen, however, asserts that he is not arguing that the failure is due more than partially to population growth.

A major change in direction for accelerating progress is imperative. Employment creation is seen as the prime necessity with higher priorities for rural development. The likelihood of fundamental changes in the social structure under which real distributive growth could be possible is not on the cards, mainly because of the existing international economic order which obstructs genuine development.

The Cuca and Pierce book presents the other side of the coin to Cassen's scholarly work. It is a handy guide for the family planning worker who is involved in planning and implementing projects and programmes.

The book reviews ninety six experiments throughout the world in the delivery of family planning services to determine the usefulness of these efforts. It examines the methodology used and the problems encountered. It also analyses the approaches tested and the results obtained. The findings give indications of the criteria for future experimentation.

The review is comprehensive in its coverage inquiring into the relevance of the programmes. The authors are aware that the conclusions of many of the experiments cannot be viewed as definitive, and they recognise that experimentation has had a significant impact on the development of family planning delivery systems.

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Militarism in Modern China: the career of Wu P'ei-fu, 1916-1939

Odoric Y K Wou
Canberra: Australian National University Press (distributed in the UK by Dawson).
1978. 346 pp. £12.50.

China's Economy: a basic guide

Christopher Howe
London: Paul Elek. 1978. 248 pp. £7.50.

China and Japan 1949-1976

R K Jain
New Delhi: Radiant Publishers (distributed in the UK by Martin Robertson).
1977. 336 pp. £10.50.

These three books, about very different topics and written from different perspectives, make a useful contribution to our understanding of modern China. Odoric Wou's study of the warlord Wu P'ei-fu, 'perhaps the greatest of China's Super-Tuchuns' as he was described by an American observer in the mid-1920s, is concerned with China after the 1911 revolution, at the low point in its modern fortunes, when it was torn by internal dissensions and the prey of foreign imperialism. Christopher Howe and R K Jain both write about the new post-1949 China, the China which has 'stood up', Howe providing an introductory guide to the contemporary economic scene, and Jain concerned with a major aspect of China's foreign policy, relations with its increasingly powerful neighbour, Japan. Although the three books have little in common, other than careful scholarship, taken together they illustrate some of the more important and interesting features of modern Chinese history and politics.

Warlords were among the more colourful, awful, and occasionally bizarre characters on the Chinese political scene after the revolution of 1911-2, particularly after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916, and they epitomise many of the strengths and weaknesses of Republican China.

In his Introduction Dr Wou says that he has two objectives, first to write a biography of Wu P'ei-fu, and second to study the phenomenon of militarism, especially the specific military system over which Wu presided. I am not sure that the author succeeds in achieving his second and more ambitious objective, but he certainly achieves the first and provides a good study of the Marshal's public career.

In a brief review it is difficult to do justice to a text which is rich in information and ideas, and which touches on so many aspects of China's internal and foreign problems in the period 1911-49. To pick out one or two highlights more or less at random, Dr Wou has good chapters on the Marshal's relations with other leaders in the Chihli Clique and on the rivalries and rifts that developed within that Clique, and he gives an interesting account of his contacts with the Japanese in the 1930s. Wu emerges from the book as an able although limited man, a complex personality with many admirable qualities, 'a militarist who meant well', anxious to unify China, possessing a rudimentary sense of modern nationalism, and generally skilful in his handling of foreigners and foreign powers. The study of his career is essential to a proper understanding of the warlord after period 1916, and Odoric Wou has provided a careful

study of that career.

Christopher Howe in the preface to his book makes modest claims, suggesting that his purpose is to reduce our present knowledge of the Chinese economy to manageable proportions, and hoping that it will provide a starting point and 'a minimal factual framework from which enquirers can proceed to better things.' He is much too modest about his work, for he has produced a most impressive study of China's economy, its performance, problems and prospects, and of the controversies – both academic and political – that surround it. Moreover, he has managed to do a very difficult thing, that is to write a book on economics that will be of value to both specialist and layman. It will be of value to the specialist because of the quality of its analysis and argument and to the layman because it presents information and argument clearly and in a style that is remarkably free of jargon.

The book begins with an introduction that supplies both background and an overall view of China's economic performance. In the following six chapters, Dr Howe examines the great issues: population and the employment of human resources, organisation and planning, performance in agriculture and agricultural modernisation, the pace of industrial growth and the development of the various key sectors of industry, foreign trade and, most interesting of all, incomes, prices and living standards. The text is supported by a wealth of tables, appendices, and some useful reading notes for each chapter. The author is sometimes controversial, on such issues, for example, as size and rate of growth of population, and on income differences and living standards. However, although presenting his own arguments very positively – and convincingly, it should be added – he is balanced in his approach and fair to alternative views. I would have liked more on the historical background, but otherwise this is a first class study of a difficult subject, and it should be required reading for academic specialists, businessmen, journalists, politicians, and indeed anyone with an interest in modern China, including the most casual of three week package tourists!

The story of Sino-Japanese relations in the fifty years or so between the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the coming to power of the Chinese Communists in 1949 was generally a tragic one, characterised by the increasing power and aggressive designs of Japan on the one hand and the weakness and internal chaos of China on the other. *China and Japan 1949-1976* is concerned with the sequel to this story, a sequel in which, while the roles were not reversed, the attitudes of the two powers were very different, with Japan playing a more passive part from a position of growing economic strength, and China playing a more assertive one from a position of continuing economic weakness. As to the major supporting roles, again the sequel has important changes, for Great Britain has more or less dropped out, Russia continues to adopt much the same hostile attitude to both powers as before, while the US has switched from support for China to support for Japan. Jain, a prolific writer on international relations, gives a detailed account of Sino-Japanese relations after 1949, rightly emphasising the importance of trade.

It is difficult to accept either of the claims which he makes in his preface, that much has been written on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations since 1949 from a Japanese viewpoint, and that there is hardly any serious study of the subject from the Chinese perspective and that his work attempts to fill the gap, but this apart the book is a very

factual and generally accurate account which can be recommended. The author backs up the hundred and forty or so pages of narrative with a hundred and fifty pages of key documents on Sino-Japanese relations from February 1949 to March 1976, and these in themselves make the book extremely useful to students of the contemporary Far East. The conclusions of the study, while not particularly original or exciting, are sound: that it is very unlikely that Japan and China will enter into some kind of alliance with each other in the near future, but nevertheless the two countries are likely to continue and develop their present good-neighbourly relations.

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Finding a Voice: Asian women in Britain

Amrit Wilson
London: Virago. 1978. 179 pp. £2.50.

Role of Rural Women in Development

Report of an international seminar held at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 5 January-10 February 1977.
Edited by Vira Mazumdar
Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research. 1978. 125 pp. £3.00.

Before we examine how the Asian woman in Britain is finding her voice we have to ask a far more basic question. Has she come into her own in her own country be it Pakistan, India or Bangladesh? How independent and articulate is she in her own country, community, family? How does she cope with an alien situation and what resources does she possess to start a new life altogether? Amrit Wilson's book is an attempt to show to the western reader the shaping of the psyche of the Asian woman in Britain. She, quite wisely, does not rely on any prior knowledge or understanding of the Asian background. Her analysis of family structures operative in Britain, particularly the extended family, demonstrates its male-dominated stranglehold on the young girl from adolescence onwards. Her life is confined, by the concepts of *dharm* or modesty, *izzat* and *khandaan*. The last two are extremely hard to define but Ms Wilson copes with them admirably. *Izzat* is 'the sensitive and many-faceted male family identity which can change as the situation demands – from family pride to honour to self respect.'

In her own country, the Asian woman is fighting very hard to make herself heard. A peasant woman's life is unremitting and, in the main, seldom offers any escape from the tyranny of her husband's home. This reviewer finds it hard to agree that the rather lyrical memories of home evoked by Ms Wilson's interviewees are, in fact, typical of their situations in their own countries. Trapped in the bleak unlovely streets of the East End who would not remember the sunshine and space of the fields of Bengal? These are compensations for an otherwise hard life, and even these are denied to the immigrant woman.

Ms Wilson does say that 'it is true that village women in India have little power or status in society' but she goes on to state that a woman receives the 'care and emotional support of other women' in the joint family. This sisterhood offers some refuge 'to love

them, caress them, sing songs with them and soothe their sorrows'. But what of the arrogance of the mother/eldest daughter-in-law, the backbiting, the haggling over money? These are far more the common rituals of the extended family and outweigh the comforts of sisterhood.

What Ms Wilson does not make sufficiently clear is that the Asian woman in Britain is a victim twice over. First, because she belongs to a male-dominated, traditional, intensely conservative society; secondly, because this society, when transferred to an alien (and to the immigrant, immoral) environment, reinforces its most stifling aspects as a defence mechanism against encroachment from outside. Thirdly, and most vicious of all, she is held in contempt by the host community. The ultimate indignity of course is what can only be termed the bizarre virginity tests for immigrant brides. Even these vaginal examinations had been going on for several years before the recent scandal came to light.

Ms Wilson's best work is in her analysis of a discriminatory system instituted and supported by the state; beginning with the immigration laws, her criticism is penetrating and valid. The educational system, health services and job structures engender and perpetrate not only a sense of inferiority but of isolation. To take one example, the Area Health Authority policy is not to offer any special services for Asian women as that, in its view, would be discriminatory. The kind of concession made is to believe that a male Bengali porter and cook in a hospital constitute interpretation facilities.

In the face of this alienation, the brutal attacks and assaults on Asians can only be seen as endemic to a racist society. Self-help and consciousness raising among women would seem to be the only way out. Jayaben Desai and Grunwick led the way. At the same time young British born Asian girls are trying to come to terms with their inheritance and their contemporary situation. They now have the effrontery to wear dresses, expose their arms and legs, go to discos. They might still succumb to an arranged marriage, but should it not work out they are likely to leave their husbands and seek a job.

For this reviewer the most valuable section of the book is the transcripts of interviews with women from varied backgrounds. Each one is trapped in her own society and by the outside world. Some have broken free; others have come to terms with their initial bewilderment and despair. But all have an immense capacity for adapting and adjusting to hostile circumstances.

The second book, *Role of Rural Women in Development*, proceeds from the key statement that 'rural women constitute the largest group who have not only been bypassed in the distribution of the fruits of development, but whose traditional roles and status in their own society are also being altered adversely by the nature of the development process.' The burdens of progress fall most heavily on women and the IDS Seminar studied this problem in a refreshing manner. It aimed at 'seeking resolutions' not in the abstractions of social science theory but in the spheres of practical administration and social mobilisation.

Economic considerations apart, the pressures exerted on women, especially in the rural areas of developing countries, stem largely from the family and the stereotyping of women's roles. Furthermore, they restrict the access a woman may have to any services or the opportunity to better her situation in terms of vocational training, health educa-

tion or employment.

The recommendations of the task forces constituted by the Seminar are sensible in that they are realistic about the kind of changes they know can be made in existing social structures. The suggestions are not radical in temperament but advocate reorganisation and change at basic levels in order to help a wider range of rural women. 'Progress' is viewed cautiously as on the subject of legal 'literacy' for women. The task force report says that a 'codified legal system should not necessarily be superimposed on a customary, uncodified system, because the customary laws may in fact provide better protection to the rural women.'

In the discussion on 'Access to Rural Services' perhaps more emphasis could have been placed on the use of indigenous skills and technology in the areas, for example, of health and housing. This is an essential step towards the community supporting a service and making it viable.

Philanthropic attempts at mobilisation of women will come to nought if the impetus is not generated from within. Formal organisations bring along with them chronic lack of communication and the all too familiar bureaucratic barriers. It is amusing to see that in the suggestions for the training of formal mobilising and 'consciousness-raising' agents, rural women themselves are featured at the end of a list that begins with bureaucratic staff.

Several case studies on projects in Indonesia, Jamaica, the Cameroons, Ghana and Panama form part of this Report. One of the more interesting appendices is Ela R Bhatt's 'An Approach to the Rural Poor'. This analyses an action programme among agricultural workers in the cotton growing state of Gujarat in western India. Though only a few years old, the programme has proved that 'it is possible without elaborate techniques and high expenditure to reach and initiate self-help programmes among the rural poor.'

UMA RAMNATH
London

International Perspectives in Rural Sociology

Edited by Howard Newby
Chichester, England: John Wiley. 1978. 220 pp. £10.95.

This book is a collection of eight essays. Each is interesting in its own right, and together they cover a wide range of issues. The aim of the editor is to stimulate a rethinking of the basic ideas of rural sociology. In his chapter on the 'Rural Sociology of Advanced Capitalist Societies', Newby argues the case for moving away from the taken-for-granted reliance on the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy and the tradition of narrowly empirical community studies, and for a reinvigoration of rural sociology with the injection of a series of concepts from the corpus of Marxism. His attempt to do this is skilful and persuasive, and is given additional support by Foweraker's attempt to analyse the contemporary Third World peasantry in terms of recent Marxist theories of the articulation of modes of production.

Together with the two essays by other authors overviewing community studies in western societies and peasant studies in the Third World, the chapters by Foweraker

and Newby raise a number of important theoretical issues in the field of rural sociology. The remaining four chapters discuss a number of more specifically empirical and/or policy related matters, such as rural poverty, the 'Green Revolution' and power in rural communities. However, while the various chapters cover both western and Third World societies, and range from concern with theory to a concentration on policy and governmental performance, the common threads joining them are not brought together as they might be. To a considerable extent, there is a serious lack of integration between the various chapters of the book, despite a number of common concerns.

For example, it is apparent from a reading of the Newby and Foweraker chapters that the central concerns of new theories of rural sociology and peasantry – the role of the state and the nature of the development of capitalism in agriculture – link the study of western societies and the study of the Third World together, and that there is a great potential for cross fertilisation.

One common concern of all the chapters is the stress laid upon the importance of political power in any discussion of rural development. It is gratifying to see even apparently technical studies of rural poverty and agricultural innovation agreeing with the authors of the more explicitly political and theoretical chapters that the principal question for rural dwellers is the need to overcome their present situation of powerlessness and thereby begin to shape their own destinies.

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Book Notes

Dictionary of African Historical Biography

Mark R Lipschutz & R Kent Rasmussen
London: Heinemann. 1978. 292 pp. £4.90 pb.

It contains entries on over 750 people important in sub-Saharan history up to 1960. Included, is an extensive bibliography, collective entries on traditional and modern rulers, including colonial governors, explanations of titles (many of which have often been confused with proper names) an index of the variant forms of spelling of proper names and cross-referencing of all entries.

The editors do not claim that the book is a definitive biographical dictionary of African history, but maintain that their approach has been restricted largely to biographical material. Be that as it may, what information it provides is of great value to students of African history and the continent's political development.

K H

Directory of Institutes for Labour Studies

International Institute for Labour Studies
Geneva: IILS. 1978. 760 pp. SFr 125.

The *Directory* is an entirely revised version of an International Labour Organisation work published in 1973. It has an expanded coverage of over 260 institutions in seventy four countries summarising their aims, administrative structure, programmes publications and facilities. As a basis for the entries, a broad definition of the term labour studies is used to include industrial relations, industrial sociology and psychology, labour law and economics. For anyone engaged in education and research in labour relations this work should be of value and with over fifty developing countries covered, the relevance to Third World studies is clear.

S Q

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Paris: OECD. 1979. 285 pp. £10.00 pb.

This report deals with the jungle of data relating to the disbursement of financial resources to the Third World in a manageable manner. Covering both multilateral aid

flows and bilateral resource transfers from OECD and OPEC sources, this presentation of the comprehensive and remarkably up to date (7 December 1978) statistical facts is divided into three Sections. One shows total net receipts of each developing country; another treats each country individually categorising the resource receipts by type and donor. The third section concerns the thirty one Least Developed Countries, the forty five Most Seriously Affected Countries and eleven Oil Exporting Countries and highlights the inequity amongst Third World countries. The volume is an indispensable ready reckoner on the contentious subject of aid.

J V H

Development Guide

Overseas Development Institute
London: Allen & Unwin. 1978. 216 pp. £5.95.

First published in 1962 to meet the demand for a handbook to provide information on non-commercial British organisations involved in development planning and training, this third and thoroughly revised edition updates details on old and new bodies. As the basic criterion for inclusion is relevance to development in the Third World, educational establishments, commercial organisations, foundations and other social and cultural bodies in Britain have been excluded.

A useful addition is a list of overseas information clearing houses. Authoritatively compiled, it caters for the growing public interest in Britain on development issues.

S Q

Bibliography of German Research on Developing Countries

Bonn: German Foundation for International Development. 1978. 142 pp. DM10.

This is a continuously updated brief overview of development research findings of ongoing and concluded studies on a wide range of problems. Published since 1966, this reference annual lists over 6,000 reports, projects and theses published in Germany and in other German-speaking countries. Also included are evaluations of technical journals, lists of publications and other information material published by institutes relevant to the Third World.

N P

International Directory of Booksellers

Munich: Verlag Dokumentation Saur. 1978. 948 pp. DM 198.

With more than 63,000 bookstores, booksellers and wholesalers from 134 countries (over 100 Third World states) around the world included, this first edition will prove a valuable and important reference tool for the international publishing world. The index is comprehensive and divided into 23 different areas of specialisation facilitating the location of bookstores carrying specialised or technical literature. A section also contains names of national bookseller associations. A useful companion volume is the *Publishers International Directory* published in 1977.

J V H

Multinational Corporations: the ECSIM guide to information sources

Compiled by Joseph O Mekeirle
Brussels: European Centre for Study and Information on Multinational Corporations. 1977. 454 pp. BFr 1600.

The subject of multinationals is global, fragmented and controversial. Given the multidisciplinary character of the study, together with the information explosion on this important Third World concern, it is essential to know the facts. This handbook of sources does just that, and admirably. It is not a book to be read and shelved; it is more in the nature of a desk manual to be referred to, not just by scholars, but also by interested lay and expert groups. The framework is sytematic and encompasses both primary and secondary sources, books and periodicals, company and independent information and even bibliographies of bibliographies.

Numerous indexes according to authors, titles, periodicals, organisations and subjects facilitate easy reference.

S Q

South Asian Bibliography: a handbook and guide

Edited by J D Pearson
Hassocks, England: Harvester Press. 1979. 389 pp. £38.00.

Any research library with an interest in the study of South Asia will consider this book a major achievement in area bibliography. Produced under the auspices of the South Asia Library Group, by an assemblage of prominent scholars and librarians with knowledge and experience of the area, it covers unpublished materials (manuscripts in oriental and western languages, archives and theses) followed by maps, periodicals and official publications of the pre- and post-independence eras, as well as books related to the area as a whole and to individual subjects.

J V H

Middle East Contemporary Survey 1976-77

Edited by Colin Legum and Haim Shaked
New York: Holmes & Meier. 1978. 684 pp. $65.00.

The publication of this inaugural volume coincides with the rapidly changing Middle East situation. The sponsoring Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University intends the *Survey* to be an annual record and analysis. Most of the contributors are Israeli, the rest Anglo-Saxon academics. The Arab and Palestinian side is unrepresented. Subjects explored include the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations and economic issues. The country by country analysis excludes the Maghreb. A useful chronology of political developments is included.

N P

Arms Control and Disarmament

Compiled by Richard D Burns
Oxford: Clio Press. 1977. 430 pp. £25.30.

Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards

Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress
New York: Praeger. 1977. 270 pp. £14.75.

Disarm or Die

Nonpartisan Fund for World Disarmament and Development
London: Taylor & Francis. 1978. 108 pp. £1.75 pb.

The Burns compilation is a voluminous bibliographic work with the normative purpose of making 'swords with ploughshares'. Published under the auspices of the Los Angeles Center for the study of Armament and Disarmament, it is comprehensive though not definitive (no bibliography can be in a rapidly proliferating field). Where it is of great value is in its coverage of the period before the dawn of the nuclear age. All 'arms controllers' and 'disarmers' will welcome this publication.

Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards is a government report to assist the US Congress to 'independently evaluate policymaking activities' with regard to a central issue of concern to the Third World. Published under the direction of an advisory arm of Congress whose basic function is to help legislators anticipate technological changes, the report was followed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977 which put strains on the Brazilian relationship and terminated the aid to Pakistan. The entire gamut of issues is explored in the manner of an executive briefing, from incentives and disincentives of horizontal proliferation, to acquisition by non-state adversaries, and safeguards technology, to the international nuclear industry.

The *Disarm or Die* reader is a brief statement of disarmers Palme, Noel-Baker, Barnaby and MacBride setting the dimensions of the problem and proposing tentative solutions for consideration at the 1978 Special Session of the UN on Disarmament. A warning that we are at the 'crossroads of human history' is voiced and the link between disarmament and development emphasised.

S Q

Political Terrorism

Edited by Lester A Sobel
New York: Facts on File (distributed in the UK by Clio Press). Vol I. 1975. 309 pp. £8.80. Vol II (1974-78). 1978. 279 pp. £8.80.

In the words of the editor, 'the book is intended as a record of the wave of violence described as terrorism that achieved worldwide proportions towards the latter half of the 1960s and continued on into the 1970s. The material comes largely from the reports printed by Facts on File in its weekly coverage of world events. Although much that is here is highly controversial, a conscientious effort was made to set it all down without bias and to make this volume, as far as possible, a reliable and balanced reference work'.

The second volume brings the documented cases of 'terrorism' up to 1978. Carefully indexed, the two volumes contain much useful and factual information about the phenomenon that has come to be described under such controversial and politically charged towns.

K H

Political Prisoners: a world report

Edited by Lester A Sobel

New York: Facts on File (distributed in the UK by Clio Press). 1978. 285 pp. £9.15.

Any addition to the growing literature on human rights is welcome. The present work, listing fifty one countries (with some deservedly given larger sections) and containing sometimes skimpy, sometimes detailed information, is obviously of value. The editor admits that 'in attempting to compile a record of political imprisonment, it has often proved difficult to hold to a strict definition and to rigorously ignore whole groups of people who are widely described as political prisoners even though they have been jailed, technically on charges of violence or other violations of criminal laws.' Ironically, more than two thirds of the entries relate to Third World countries, a sad commentary on the absence of civil liberties in a part of the world which obtained freedom from colonial rule in the name of the very principles which are being violated with such impunity today.

K H

Castro's Cuba in the 1970s

Edited by Lester A Sobel

New York: Facts on File (distributed in the UK by Clio Press). 1978. 244 pp. £7.85.

Facts on File is a contemporary history publishing house in New York, established for the purpose of recording events with minimal comment, which is where bias can be introduced. This book is a reference work on a most important Third World country, its domestic developments and relations with the superpowers as well as the rest of Latin America. The period covered is 1970-77 and includes the Cuban-Angolan relationship. It is a useful chronological introduction to a distinctly Latin American mutation of Marxism-Leninism.

SQ

Pour un Nouvel Ordre Economique International

Mohammed Bedjaoui

Paris: UNESCO. 1979. 293 pp.

With this volume, UNESCO launches a series entitled 'New Challenges to International Law', as a contribution to the larger task of the promotion of a world order of peace through the study of the role of international organisations. The series plans to tackle controversial questions in order to stimulate creative thinking about the role international law can play in the modern world.

Mohammed Bedjaoui, the present Algerian Ambassador to France, begins with scathing criticism of western developed nations ('l'ordre international de la misère et de la misère de l'ordre international') and then proceeds ('le droit international du développement et le développment du droit international') to map out the future course of events. A whole range of problems is considered, such as NIEO, the circumstances of the concept's birth and the extent and significance of the present world crisis.

A full and detailed Bibliography rounds off a thoughtful and provocative work. The rest of the series will be awaited with interest.

N P

Latin America: a sociocultural interpretation

Julius Rivera
New York: Irvington Publishers. 1978. 246 pp. £11.25.

In this revised version of the 1971 edition a thirty five page postscript has been added to the original text. The bulk of the book consists of an intriguing set of intuitive generalisations about Latin American culture unsupported by any empirical evidence, and the author disarmingly makes no pretence of scientific objectivity. The postscript is a standard and unoriginal account of some of the principal economic and political problems facing Latin America today.

The striking thing about the book is its duality. The postscript entirely abandons the 'socio-cultural' approach which informs the main text and yet offers no critique of that earlier approach. The result is an unsatisfactory hybrid of speculation and pedestrian commentary.

I R

Twenty Five Years of Economic Development 1950-1975

David Morawetz.
London: John Hopkins University Press. 1978. 125 pp. £6.40. £2.95 pb.

This publication on behalf of the World Bank attempts a broad assessment of the postwar years by re-examining the objectives of the developing countries and surveying the inadequacy of the emphasis on increased GNP as a measure of success in development by means of heavy reliance on statistics. Ironically, it was the World Bank which in the early 1960s propagated the doctrine of growth through GNP. A more complex statement of social and economic objectives now underlies the Third World's growing perception of the nature of development. Where the Morawetz work is useful, is in pointing out that the benefits of growth are unsatisfactorily distributed.

K H

Recent Publications

The inclusion of a book in this list does not preclude a review in a subsequent issue.

BOOKS

Aarons, A *:et al (eds)*: **Child to Child.** London: Macmillan. 1979. 104 pp. £3.95.

Ainley, E M: **The IMF: past, present and future.** Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 1979. 98 pp. £3.50.

Asian Development Bank: **Rural Asia: challenge and opportunity.** London: Praeger. 1979. 489 pp. £13.75.

Ayandele, E A: **Nigerian Historical Studies.** London: Frank Cass. 1979. 305 pp. £12.00.

Ayandele, E A: **African Historical Studies.** London: Frank Cass. 1979. 314 pp. £12.00.

Ayisi, E O: **An Introduction to the Study of African Culture.** London: Heinemann Educational. 1979. 125 pp. £1.75 pb.

van den Berghe, P L: **Race and Racism.** Chichester, England: John Wiley. 171 pp. £4.50.

Best, A & Blij, H: **African Survey.** Chichester, England: John Wiley. 1977. 626 pp. £12.00.

Boon, G K: **Technology and Sector Choice in Economic Development.** The Hague: Sijthoff & Noordhoff. 1978. 313 pp.

Booth, J A & Seligson, M A (eds): **Political Participation in Latin America, Vol I: citizen and state.** New York: Holmes & Meier. 258 pp. $8.75 pb.

Bourdieu, P: **Algeria 1960: essays.** Cambridge University Press. 1979. 158 pp. £7.95.

Broehl Jr, W G: **The Village Entrepreneur: change agents in India's rural development.** London: Harvard University Press. 1978. 228 pp. £12.95.

Brown, N L (ed): **Renewable Energy Resources and Rural Applications in the Developing World.** Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1978. 168 pp. £9.95.

Caldwell, M: **The Wealth of Some Nations.** London: Zed Press. 1977. 191 pp. £5.00.

Carlson, S: **Indonesia's Oil.** Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1977. 257 pp. £13.75.

Cole, S: **Global Models and the International Economic Order.** Oxford: Pergamon. 1977. 92 pp. £5.25. £1.95 pb.

Chaudhri, D P: **Education, Innovations and Agricultural Development.** London: Croom Helm. 1979. 127 pp. £8.50.

Chesneaux, J: **China: the People's Republic 1949-1976.** Hassocks, England: Harvester Press. £12.50. £5.50 pb.

Cronje G & S: **The Workers of Namibia.** London: International Defence and Aid Fund. 1979. 135 pp. £1.50 pb.

Denyer, S: **African Traditional Architecture.** London: Heinemann Educational. 1978. 210 pp. £3.80 pb.

L'Equipe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Societes Pastorales (eds): **Pastoral Production and Society.** Cambridge University Press. 1979. 493 pp. £15.50.

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