The October 2026 enforcement action against Bank of America provides a recent example of serious admitted regulatory violations being addressed through financial penalties and corrective measures while the banking institution continued operating.
On 13 October 2026, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced a US$1.2 billion civil penalty against Bank of America, N.A. The bank admitted wilful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, including failures to maintain an adequate anti-money-laundering programme, conduct appropriate checks on foreign correspondent accounts and report suspicious activity.
The Findings and Financial Penalties
The US Treasury reported that the bank failed to report promptly more than US$5 billion in suspicious transactions. More than US$1 billion involved national-security-related and other priority financial-crime risks.
These amounts describe suspicious activity requiring investigation and reporting. They should not be presented as sums wholly established to be criminal proceeds.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) separately assessed a US$750 million penalty. This was credited against FinCEN’s US$1.2 billion assessment, rather than added to it. An additional US$11.6 million sanctions settlement brought the combined amount to approximately US$1.21 billion.
Failures Despite Earlier Intervention
The OCC found longstanding weaknesses in transaction monitoring, staff expertise, training and internal audit. Significant shortcomings persisted after a December 2024 regulatory order requiring corrective action.
This history matters. The authorities were addressing continuing institutional failures after an earlier opportunity to improve, rather than an isolated error newly brought to management’s attention.
The Regulatory Response
The enforcement measures required the bank to:
Bank of America continued operating. The announced measures sought to enforce compliance and strengthen controls without requiring the banking business to close.
The action was a civil regulatory resolution involving admitted statutory violations. It should be distinguished from a criminal conviction or a guilty plea.
The Relevance to BCCI
Bank of America’s circumstances were not identical to BCCI’s. The 2026 action concerned anti-money-laundering and sanctions compliance. BCCI also faced concerns about financial losses, impaired assets, accounting reliability and the ability of regulators to supervise its international structure.
The comparison nevertheless concerns an important regulatory principle: serious institutional failures do not automatically make closure the necessary response.
In Bank of America’s case, regulators imposed substantial penalties and required further corrective work despite deficiencies that had persisted after an earlier intervention. They continued to pursue reform while banking operations remained in place.
For BCCI, the corresponding question is whether its problems could have been addressed while preserving viable operations through restructuring, management changes, additional capital and effective supervision.
A Question of Regulatory Alternatives
By 1990 - 91, BCCI’s Abu Dhabi majority shareholders were providing substantial financial support for a restructuring programme. Proposals included management changes, branch reductions, separation of impaired assets from viable businesses and reorganisation into separately regulated banks.
The comparison does not depend on assuming that the regulatory arrangements of 2026 were available in precisely the same form in 1991. BCCI already had a proposed route to restructuring.
On what basis did the European regulators, led by the Bank of England, conclude that those proposals were insufficient? What findings in the confidential draft Section 41 report made the rescue package unacceptable, and could those concerns have been addressed through changes to the programme?
Why was closure pursued without first requiring the report to be finalised and giving BCCI and Abu Dhabi a meaningful opportunity to answer its allegations?
These questions require examination of the contemporary evidence, including the regulators’ reasons for considering further restructuring inadequate.
Accountability and Consistent Treatment
Wrongdoing at BCCI required investigation and accountability. The issue is whether that could have been achieved while protecting viable banking operations and customers and employees uninvolved in the misconduct.
Bank of America’s treatment demonstrates that even persistent, admitted compliance failures can result in penalties and further reform rather than institutional closure.
That difference does not by itself establish bad faith or discriminatory treatment. It does warrant a clear explanation of why continued operation under corrective measures was considered appropriate in one case, while BCCI’s financially supported restructuring was abandoned.
Whether US pressure or other considerations influenced the decision concerning BCCI remains a question for examination against the documentary record.
Sources
FinCEN: US$1.2 Billion Penalty Against Bank of America, 13 October 2026.
US Treasury: Enforcement Actions Against Bank of America, 13 October 2026.
OCC: US$750 Million Assessment for Deficient Anti-Money-Laundering Compliance, 13 October 2026.
Research Note: This analysis reflects the documentary record available at the time of writing. Where official records remain subject to information and disclosure requests, the conclusions should be read as provisional and capable of revision in light of new evidence.